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Summary
Simply put, this study is an attempt to provide an 
in-depth analysis of the techno-economic development of 
India's machine tool industry. Although this opening 
statement fairly and accurately reflects the objective and 
general theme underpinning the work, it is perhaps highly 
superficial in that it tends to gloss over the original 
piece of stage-setting for the study * by reference to the 
Soviet machine tool manufacturing experience of the 1930s, 
a comparative theoretical framework is built-up which, it 
is argued, might have had great relevance to the economic 
conditions facing the India of the 1950s at the start of 
its thrust for rapid industrialization.
The Soviet 'model* of machine tool production could well 
have been particularly appropriate to India's economic 
circumstances because of its emphasis on capital-saving; 
an approach which related not only to the character of the 
machinery produced but also the manner of its manufacture. 
Therefore, in an Indian economy which was already rigorously 
emulating the Soviet two-sector growth strategy, a case 
could be argued for India's tool industry to have similarly 
followed the Soviet development pattern.
However, as the development of the industry did not 
in the event follow the Soviet experience, then the initial 
concern of this study has to be with the establishment of 
what the alternative manufacturing philosophy was oriented to, 
if it was not to the achievement of maximum cost-price 
reductions à la the Soviet approach. In answer to this, the 
proposition is tentatively though nevertheless it is believed 
safely advanced, that machine tool production in India 
developed along well entrenched Western industrial lines. 
Here, it is the role of innovation that has been the dom­
inant feature. Under this scenario, little importance is
(xi)
attached to cost-price reductions of the machine tools 
produced, rather, emphasis is placed on improvements in 
design as a means of maintaining or increasing the sales 
of an enterprise through the creation of a fresh market.
The suitability of this type of manufacturing strategy : 
bringing pressure on the machine building customers of the 
machine tool branch to replace still productive machine 
tools is, to a capital-scarce country such as India, a 
highly dubious exercise even if it could be shown to 
operate satisfactorily.
Efficiency in production lies at the heart of the 
issue. It is important to realise that a capital-saving 
mode of development should have regard to more than simply 
producing labour-intensive technology; capital will also be 
economized if this technology is manufactured efficiently. 
It must be recognized though, that in the case of India, 
the possibilities which existed for raising productive 
efficiency in the tool branch have to some extent been 
inhibited by the need to pursue other development aims.
The goals of growth and technological self-sufficiency are 
two such factors which have figured prominently in the 
sector's development strategy.
Thus, although the primary aim of this study is to 
examine the various aspects which bear upon the efficient 
operation of India's machine tool industry and, as a result, 
provide indirectly some insight into the capital-saving 
performance of the branch, nevertheless, the success in 
attaining the other objectives of high growth and techno­
logical independence is also assessed. The conclusions 
derived from these specific analyses allied with the more 
general observations of the industry's techno-economic 
development assists in a culminating discussion that 
contrasts the appropriateness of the development strategy 
that was followed, on the basis of the efficiency obtained, 
against the adjudged advantages to be gained from pursuance 
of the Soviet approach.
(xii)
Chapter 1
A Comparative Analysis of Capital-Goods Led Growth 
Strategy in Developing Countries ; Theory and Practice
During the latter half of the 1920s, the Soviet Union 
launched a drive for industrialization which was 
revolutionary in character; its novelty lay in the central 
control and allocation of scarce resources. The unparallelled 
success since then, has prompted many of the newly emerging 
nations to emulate, to a lesser or greater degree, the 
pattern of Soviet development. A considerable number of 
these third world countries, recently freed from the chains 
of colonialism, naturally equated capitalism with exploit­
ation. For them, the arrival of planned development 
provided the means by which their rising aspirations could 
be sated : the socialist panacea to economic dependence.
One of the first disciples of this 'Eastern' model 
was India. Jawaharlal Nehru, the immediate post-independence 
Prime Minister, espoused the virtues of socialism and 
attempted to translate them into pragmatic form through a 
series of 5 year economic plans. Thus, industries of 
national and strategic importance were brought under the 
direct control of the central government; where they 
lacked the required capacity or simply did not exist, then 
invariably a public sector was established. The particular 
case of the machine tool industry is one such example.
What is so surprising about this branch however, is the 
manner in which its development has followed a 'Western' 
production philosophy: this, when the Soviet model would 
not only have been consistent with the vogue political 
ideology but, in point of fact, might also have been more 
appropriate.
It is from this perspective that the present study 
takes its cue. Two factors though, ought to be emphasised
-1-
from the outset.
The first has regard to the nature of what has been 
referred to in the text as the Soviet model of machine tool 
production. There must be no confusion as to the correct 
interpretation of this term : it is not crucial that Soviet 
production practices in machine tool manufacture may, or may 
not,have been, a deliberate and concerted act of Soviet 
policy-making. What is important is that a number of measures 
were enacted which, when combined into a whole, displayed a 
pattern that could have had * ex post* significance to the more 
contemporary developing countries such as India.
Secondly, whether the Indian machine tool industry would 
actually have developed on more efficient lines had it 
instead taken heed of the Soviet experience is a moot point.
The stance that this study takes is that it could have been 
the appropriate course of action and certain arguments are 
put forward in justification of this posture. Ultimately 
though, the question is conjectural : the wheels of time 
cannot be reversed. Thus, with India having chosen to tread the 
path of conventional manufacturing practices, this study will 
concern itself with an evaluation of the efficiency levels 
that the industry has, in consequence, achieved.
The objective of this introductory chapter is to 
provide a speculative tour d*horizon of the strategy of 
capital-goods led growth theory. The key to this form of 
industrialisation is, in essence, the emphasis given to the 
growth in the * heavy' goods and machinery industries; within 
this, the machine tool branch plays a critical supportive 
role by supplying the basic capital equipment necessary for 
such expansion to take place. For the Soviet Union and 
India in particular, the role of the capital-goods sector in 
economic development has been the subject of some debate.^ 
Although the approach of the two countries' planning authorit­
ies has been broadly similar, the controversy exists because 
the results have not.
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The starting point to the chapter is the argument that
capital formation is a necessary though not sufficient factor
in the achievement of rapid industrialization. Equally
important is the manner in which the capital is used. This
point echos Cairncross's doubts as to whether, ..."additional
capital .., would by itself suffice to start off a cycle of
industrialization. The problem is often one of organization
2
quite as much as of capital creation." In this context 
parallels for India can be drawn from the experience of Soviet 
planning. The success of Soviet development policy was due 
not only to the high priority it gave to capital-goods 
production but also, within this, to the promotion of the 
machine building industry. The viability of this policy in 
a 'closed economy' depended on the expansion of a machine 
tool branch to serve the growing needs of the machine tool 
using industries. As clearly, ... "the demand for such machines 
[machine tools] is closely linked to the evolution of the 
metal-transforming industry ... the Soviets realized 
that raising the efficiency in the production of machine tools 
would result in capital-savings percolating, ultimately, to 
the entire machine-using economy. It was from this per­
spective that the Soviets perceived the importance of machine 
tool manufacture. From the outset they seized the oppor­
tunity which central planning provided to improve efficiency 
in the organization of total production. This principle 
had the following elements: (i) Specialization by product;
(ii) Standardization and interchangeability o f •components ;
(iii) Long production runs; and (iv), A centralised policy on 
innovation. Almost certainly, the efficient organization of 
production was a significant contributory cause in the 
emergence of the Soviet Union, by the late fifties, as the 
largest manufacturer of machine tools in the world.
The Harrod/Domar identity is the fulcrum on which the 
theorizing of this chapter'rests. It will, therefore, be 
worthwhile to recall briefly the rationale behind the model.
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The most important feature of the theory is that 
capital is seen as the engine of growth. Harrod and 
independently Domar, realized ... "that full employment 
income in period t would not be sufficient in period t + 1 
because of the additional capacity created by investment 
in period t."^ The necessary level of increased expenditure 
may be found by examining the interaction between capital 
and output. Since investment in period t is determined at 
the equilibrium level of national income by the marginal 
propensity to save, economic growth becomes a function of 
the marginal propensity to save and the capital-output ratio, 
Symbolically, if Y is national income, K is capital, I is 
investment and S is savings, then the growth rate is :
G = 3Y
Yt
the savings ratio S = Sjk and (since It - St) this = I_t
Yt -Yt
9 K t  +'l = It 
3 Y
the ICOR = 9Kt + 1 = 1^ 
9 Y 3Y
Since 9Y = It/Yt • G =
Yt It/9Y ' V(K/0)
From this, construct, growth can be increased in either of 
two ways : (i) expanding the savings ratio, or.
(ii) lowering the capital-output ratio.
In summary, the intention of Section one is to examine 
the structural characteristics of the Soviet and Indian 
economies during their early periods of planning. In this 
manner, it becomes possible to isolate the constraints 
operating' against the expansion of the savings ratio (the 
numerator in the Harrod/Domar growth model) and, in con­
sequence, the rate of growth. In addition, while Section
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two provides a further main justification for capital-goods 
led development in the form of technology (a given variable 
in the Harrod/Domar model), the concluding section 
emphasises the efficiency in the production of 'machines 
which make machines' as a source of capital-saving for the 
economy as a whole. This is a process which, ultimately, 
raises the rate of growth by lowering the capital-output 
ratio of the economy (the denominator in the Harrod/Domar 
equation).
Section 1 - Structural Considerations
(i ) The Two-Sector Growth Model
Before discussing the mechanics of two-sector growth 
models it will be sensible to open with a consideration of 
the classification of capital-goods. The need is to provide 
a working definition of capital-goods so that they may be 
distinguished from consumption items. A statement by 
Joan Robinson acts as a good introduction to the problem,
... "capital is not what capital is called, it is what its 
name is called. The capital goods in existence at a moment 
of time are all the goods in existence at that moment. It 
is not all the goods in existence. It includes neither a 
rubbish heap nor Mont Blanc, The characteristic by which 
'goods' are specified is"that they have value, that is, 
purchasing power over each other. Thus, in [the capital- 
surplus] country Alpha an empty petrol tin is not a 'good' 
whereas in Gamma where old tins are a source of valuable
5
industrial raw material, it is." In practice, this gen­
eric interpretation of capital goods is not particularly 
helpful. Frances Stewart illustrates this fact when examin­
ing whether a distinction can be made between capital and 
consumer goods on the basis that the former renders future 
services whilst the latter are consumed instantly. With 
this criterion a temporal perspective is introduced as 
Mrs. Stewart states, ... "but this makes the classification 
dependent on the period of time taken to constitute 
'instantly'; if interpreted literally it makes all goods
Capital goods a la Robinson and only services, which by 
their nature are consumed instantly, Consumer goods.
Later however, she does put forward a different approach 
which is, ... "to define capital goods as goods which are 
not demanded for themselves but as inputs which, together
7
with other inputs render further production possible."
This classification though, suffers from similar definitional 
weaknesses as the time-oriented way of viewing things.
Only now, difficulties are concentrated on how to define 
•further production*. Any goods consumed by the labour 
force which maintain their health and strength must, under 
this definition, be classified as capital goods because if 
they contribute to the worker's productivity -further 
production becomes feasible.
It is evident that the classification of goods into 
capital and consumer items is fraught with pitfalls. But 
to avoid the question would without doubt seriously under­
mine the structure of the study at hand. Therefore, 
notwithstanding the absence of a rigid dichotomy between 
capital and consumption goods, it is surely logical to lead 
on from Mrs. Stewart's reasoning and address the problem in 
terms of the allocation of current resources to goods which 
in the future expand the productive base of the economy, and 
those that do not. This is a Marxian pattern of analysis 
whereby total material production is divided into two main 
departments :
I Means of Production : Commodities having a form in
which they must, or at least may, pass into productive 
consumption.
II Articles of Consumption : Commodities having a form
in which they pass into the individual consumption
8of the capitalist and the working classes.
It should be stressed that Marx included both industrial and 
agricultural goods in the, above departments. Thus, for the 
purposes of examining solely the division of industrial 
production, it is conventional to speak of 'group A' -
- 6 -
capital/investment/producer goods, and 'group B ' - consumer 
goods. Contemporary writers on the subject sometimes cloud 
the issue by supposing A and B to be synonomous with 'heavy' 
and 'light' industry. This is erroneous, as Professor Nove 
once wrote, ... "the entire machine building (engineering) 
industry is classed as 'heavy*, but passenger cars and 
domestic refrigerators made by this industry are classed 
as B, along with such products of 'light' industry as clothing 
and shoes, while that part of the textile industry's output 
which consists of cloth for the clothing industry is 
included with A. In principle, it is the use of any unit 
of the given product which determines its category, which
9
means that many products are to be found in both groups."
Classical theories of growth operate on the premise that 
the level of real investment in an economy is determined by 
the surplus of the category B producers above what they 
consume for themselves. Although, it should be noted that 
this surplus is a "gross" concept : intermittently capital 
goods do require replacement. In this respect, it is only 
the goods of group A, in excess of this replacement level 
that constitutes net investment and as such generates the 
growth potential of an economy. The limitation of this 
'classical' approach involves the realization that in 
underdeveloped countries, the rate of investment may be 
more a consequence of the existing stock of capital than the 
flow of wage-goods. Consequently for economic growth to 
take place some enlargement of capacity in the group A 
industries is required. Maurice Dobb, according to Raj in 
his 1967 article - 'Role of the Machine Tool Sector in 
Economic Growth', was the first economist in the West to 
recognise this fact. Dobb was aware of the initial retard­
ing effect this might have on growth of output on account of 
the diversion of some of the existing capital equipment to 
the manufacture of more such equipment, but pointed to the 
higher rate of growth of output which expansion of prod­
uctive capacity in the capital goods sector would malce 
possible at future dates.
- 7 -
In a later, more detailed study, Dobb concerned himself 
primarily with problems regarding the choice of technique in 
underdeveloped countries. He began this analysis by con­
structing a two-sector growth model with the limiting 
assumption that machines in the investment sector are made 
with 'unassisted* labour. This assumption is dropped when 
Dobb concedes to reality : rnachine-makers like machine-users 
also require machines with which to produce. To fully 
appreciate the theoretical implications of this point, it 
is valuable to quote Dobb at length: ... "To handle this
more complex situation we shall need to break down our 
investment sector into at least two sub-branches within it. 
Let us label these two branches i and m, the first as before 
being occupied with producing capital equipment for the 
G-sector, and the second with producing machine tools that 
can be used alternatively in making the capital equipment 
for the C-sector or, in branch m, in making machine tools 
themselves. This latter branch will accordingly be capable 
of a circular process of self-expansion, as well as of 
producing to meet the needs of expansion of branch i. It 
can, however, only pursue this self-expansion process at the 
expense of diverting to itself some proportion of the invest­
ment sector labour force that could otherwise have been 
making equipment for the C-sector and hence contributing 
directly to the growth rate as measured by L„/ t .. [the
11change, over time, in the labour force of the C-sector]." 
Dobb refers to the two distinct destinations of the output
of the machine tool sector by the use of suffixes m^ for 
itself, and m^ for i - the machine building industry. In 
fact, he spends considerable time enlarging upon the import­
ance of branch-m, both for the manufacture of machine tools 
necessary for the expansion of i, and for the increased 
tooling itself requires as necessitated by this expansion. 
Figure 1 should help to clarify this complex set of 
relationships.
A salient feature of the 'machine tool sector' in 
Dobb's model is its productivity, and the consequential
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effect that it has on the growth rate of the economy. The
effect of increased productivity in m is to reduce the size
of its labour force relative to branch i . This process has
an 'enervating' effect on growth (which, it may be remembered
is defined as a positive change in the labour force of
group B industries) via the increased supply of capital
goods to the consumer sector which the released m workers
make possible. This is so, because workers in the model are
denied the possibility of seeking employment outside their
sector. Moreover, sub-branch m^ possesses the peculiar
ability to initiate and sustain a circular production process
of its own, ... "turning out machines capable of reproducing,
if need be, improved types of themselves ... as such branch
m« is capable of breaking out of the determinism laid upon
12it by our structural equation."
Dobb's model represents a planned economy and because
of this he conceives the mechanics of its operation as an
13"accelerator - relation in reverse" with group B industries 
dependent on the productive capacity of the capital goods 
sector instead of the converse situation. With emphasis 
respecified away from promoting the maximum rate of expansion 
of the surplus product of the consumer goods sector, the 
alternative growth strategy is broached : that of concen­
trating investment resources into the self-reproducing process 
of m^.
(ii) The Approach to Planning in the Soviet Union 
and India
All two-sector growth models are based on the
assumption of a planned economy. This accords perfectly
well with the political ideology of the Soviet Union. It
also has relevance to the socialistic character of the
Indian industrial environment which evolved from Nehru's
archetype, ... "of combining economic mobilization with
political conciliation, a Soviet economy with a Western 
14policy." Bearing this in mind, attention is first
—10—
directed to the Soviet planning model.
The Soviet two-sector growth model is customarily 
associated with an equation constructed in 1928 by the 
Russian economist Fel'dman; it was to act as the basis 
for the Soviet State planning Commissions' 'General Plan.' 
which was expected to cover a period of between ten to 
twenty years. Fel'dman's division of the total output of 
the economy was a modification of the Marxian scheme. As 
Domar states, his initial aim was to ... "place all activit­
ies merely sustaining output at the present level in
category 2, while all capacity increasing ones were located
15in category 1." This approach suffers from the same 
definitional deficiencies discussed earlier in the chapter. 
Though in Fel'dman's final version, category 1 produces 
all capital goods for both categories, while all consumer 
goods including the corresponding raw materials are produced 
in category 2, the output of each category consisting of its 
respective final products only.^^ Problems of definition 
still remain, with some industries providing goods and 
services to both categories, e.g. chemicalsfand transportation. 
Nevertheless, Fel'dman's model does have general application 
to Soviet developmental experience. For the purposes of the 
current study though, it will not be necessary to delve into 
the econometric intricacies of his work; it will suffice to 
mention briefly his main considerations.
In unison with other growth models, Fel'dman's is 
based on a number of simplifying assumptions such as con- 
stantprices and the non-transferance of factor resources in 
the short-run from one category to another. In the context 
of capital, this latter assumption implies that the rate of 
investment is determined by the capital coefficient arid the 
stock of capital in his category 1 industries. Equally, the 
output of category 2 is determined by the capital coefficient 
and the stock of capital in the investment sector. This, 
in turn, poses the question which has direct relevance to 
many underdeveloped countries : if an investment sector
-11-
is so small as to be only able to cater to the replacement 
needs of both categories then growth can only be attained 
by the non-replacement of capital goods in the consumer 
sector. Thus, ... "the division of total output between 
consumption and investment at any moment depends on the 
relative productive capacities of the two categories, and 
not on the propensity to save, though the latter can re­
assert itself by causing an under-utilization of the capital
stock in one category or another, a waste ruled out in the 
17model." The division of investment between the two 
categories holds no such limitation, in fact (X) - the 
allocation of investible funds directed to category 1 emerges 
as the major attribute of the model. Domar, in his appraisal 
of Fel'dman's study pursues this aspect and observes the 
close relation between (X) - the fraction of total invest­
ment allocated to category 1 and (i) - Keynes' marginal 
propensity to save. Domar explains this phenomenon as,
... "merely a reflection of the fact that if a certain fract­
ion of the increment in national income (&) is to be devoted 
to investment, a corresponding fraction of investment (X) 
must be allocated to capital goods industries to make the 
production of this increment possible. In other words, in a 
growing economy some capital is used to make more capital.
It is in fact, ironical, as Domar notes, - that Fel'dman 
insisted throughout his work that the final goal of all 
production is consumption.
The growth model that India followed for its develop­
ment push was very similar to that of Fel'dman's. It was 
developed by a senior economist in the Indian government,
P.O. Mahalanobis and outlined, originally, in an article
19published in 1953. In actual fact, however, there were 
two growth models. The first, approximated very closely 
to the Harrod/Domar equation and was formulated in 1952.
This model was constructed for the purposes of the First 
Five-Year Plan although it aimed at providing for targets 
of income, consumption and investment over the next twenty-
-12-
five to thirty years. After experimentation with the
Harrod/Domar growth model, Mahalanobis finally devised his
20famous two-sector growth equation which was later to be 
implemented in the Second Five Year Plan. It was India's 
first attempt to influence the growth rate by recourse to 
sectoral allocation of investments and this new approach 
came about via Mahalanobis' identification of the rate of 
growth of investment in the economy with the rate of growth
21of output in the capital goods industries within the economy.
Like Fel'dman before him, Mahalanobis followed the 
Marxian classification of production; and, though both 
writers diverge from the lumping together by Marx of all 
raw material producing industries into Department 1, 
Mahalanobis does go further than Fel'dman. Specifically, he 
conceptualises that industries producing raw materials for 
consumer goods industries are included in the consumption 
sector and industries producing raw materials for investment 
goods industries are included in the capital goods sector - 
no mention being made of services.
The two key variables in the Mahalanobis model relate 
to c{ and p , both defined as constants. The former is the 
ratio of net investment to net national income, at factor 
cost in a given time period, and the latter is the increment 
of income divided by investment also in respect to some 
stated time period. Thus, in the Mahalanobis equation, the 
rate of growth of an economy is found by (though, the 
author depicted growth in per capita terms so that the 
formula became p - P , where P represented the constant 
increase in population). This is of course, equivalent to 
the familiar Harrod/Domar identity G = S/V, which was given 
in the introduction to this chapter. Only here, Mahalanobis' 
P is the inverse of V (capital-output ratio). In addition 
he elaborates on this basic framework by separating out the 
investment in the investment industries from the investment 
in the consumer goods industries. The particular assumption
-1 3 -
being that, ... "a constant percentage of Investment
goes to consumer goods industries and the complementary 
percentage %*t, going to the investment good industries 
(
Common to both the Soviet and Indian patterns of
development is the emphasis on a high relative level of
investment in the capital goods industries. The optimum
size of both Fel'dman's C() or Mahalanobis' (^ (,) depends on
the development strategy pursued by the respective planning
authorities. If raising consumption in the immediate future
is deemed to have maximum priority, then it is necessary to
aim for a higher level of investment expenditure in the
consumer goods industries. On the other hand, a higher
ultimate growth of the economy will be achieved, the greater
the proportion of investible resources devoted to the capital
goods sector. However, this higher future rate of growth
in consumption and employment is only achieved at the
expense of current consumption. As Mrs. Stewart states,
... "While growth In consumption will initially be lower,
the higher X ••• [ (X ) or ..., eventually growth in
C-good capacity will speed up, as the larger size of the
I-sector compensates for the smaller proportion of its out-
23put going to investment in the C-sector." Figure 2 
illustrates this point.
Ficfure 2 : Allocation of Investment between Capital-Goods 
Industries and Consumption-Goods Sector
Rate of 
Output of 
Consumer 
Goods 
(Growth)
Years
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The lower horizontal line (Xl = 1.0) in Figure 2 
depicts the situation whereby all investment is apportioned 
to the capital goods industries with the consumption 
sector receiving none. This is a highly unrealistic case 
involving zero growth in the consumer good industries - 
politically unpalatable for a government under any ideo­
logical banner. The second example, a constantly rising 
straight line (XI = 0.0) corresponds closely to the 
traditional economy where the major portion of investment 
is directed to the consumption sector. This type of 
growth implies both a constant level of capacity in the 
capital goods sector as also its output - the annual flow 
of investment suggesting a relative decline in the rate 
of growth over time. The Soviet Union and India have both 
attempted to follow the third course of action, symbolised 
by (XL =0.9). It is the curve which exhibits a rapid 
rate of growth in consumption after a very short elapse 
of years.
The relationship between the choice of investment 
rate and the choice of investment project is perhaps the 
most significant feature to emerge from the foregoing 
appraisal of the Pel *dman/Mahalanobis growth models. As 
Sen asserts, ... "once the specificity of productive 
capacity is recognised to have an important bearing on the 
question, the problems of allocation of investment between 
different sectors becomes the present-day equivalent of choosing 
future rates of saving. If, for example, we assume that 
investment goods are of two types, viz., those that make 
consumer goods and those that produce investment goods, 
the present-day allocation of productive capital between 
these two sectors comes to very much the same thing as the 
determination of the future division of national output 
between consumption and investment. The allocation of 
investment between the two becomes the means of influencing
-15-
the rates of investment in the future.
If one assumes further specificity, so that investment
goods to make investment goods to make consumer goods are
different from investment goods to make investment goods to
make investment goods, the decision has to be taken one
24further step backwards, and so on."
(iii) An Evaluation of the Relative Effectiveness 
of Sectoral Planning
The discussion thus far, has delineated the major 
theoretical aspects of capital-biased growth as it related 
to the early industrialization of the Soviet Union and 
India. But how 'successful’ have each of these countries 
been in pursuing this policy?
The strategy of Soviet industrialization encompassing 
as it did, high rates of capital formation with priority 
on basic capital goods industries has been vindicated by 
the consistently high rates of economic growth achieved. 
This is evidenced by citing the official and estimated 
growth rates contained in various studies by eminent 
scholars in this field. Table 1 provides data on the 
growth rates of G.N.P. and N.N.P. which clearly brings 
out the tempo of Soviet economic development. In com­
parison with the other countries' rates of growth during 
their respective initial stages of development, it is 
hardly surprising that the Soviet Union's performance has 
had such a profound effect on the policy-makers of India, 
This is the more so, if Bergson's argument is accepted 
that the composite statistics on Soviet economic growth 
represent a greater reflection of reality than do the base- 
year factor cost calculations.^^ (See Table 1)
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Table 1 : Annual Average Growth Rates of GNP and NNP
in Selected Countries
% GNP /O % Per
Capita
(GNP)
USSR :
1928-1963 
Ruble Factor Cost 
of I9 3 7 C 
Composite,1937 base 
1928-1940 & 1948-196;
(effective years)' 
Ruble Factor Cost 
of 1937 
Composite,1937 base
USA :
1840-1880
1880-1920
4.9
6.5
6.4
8.5
4,0
3.5
4.1
6.0
4.8
7.0
3.7
5.2
4.9
5.9
1.3
1.6
Great Britain :
1765/86-1785/1805
1801/11-1831/41
1.5
2.9
0.6
1.5
Source C. Wilber
A. Bergson
'The Soviet Model and Underdeveloped 
Countries',loc.cit. p.5
'National Income' in Bergson and 
Kuznets (eds.) Economic Trends in 
the Soviet Union, Cambridge (Mass.), 
(1963), p.6.
Notes : (a) Omitting the War and reconstruction years
of 1940-48.
(b) Covers the period 1928-58
(c) Output in all years is computed in terms of 
values prevailing in the base year.
(d) A composite is intended to approximate serial 
data where, in the comparison of each given 
year with the base year, output is computed 
in terms of given-year values.
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Similarly impressive have been the growth rates of 
industrial production. In an article by Hodgman^^, the 
expansion of Soviet industrial production in the years 
1927/28-1950 is measured by both the official Soviet indices 
and by his own 1934 value-added figures. The resulting 
growth patterns of-the varying time periods which he chose, 
correspond to events of importance in recent Soviet history, 
e.g. the Five-Year Plans; the war; post-war recovery; etc. 
Hodgman's data, in terms of annual average percentage 
rates of growth are contained in Table 2 below. On 
examination, it becomes immediately apparent that extremely 
high rates of growth in industrial production were attained 
throughout the periods of the twenty-three year span.
Table 2 : Annual Average Rates of Growth in Soviet
Industrial Production
Revised Official
Years Index (%) Index
1927/28-1932 14.5 23,6
1932-1937 16.6 18.7
1927/28-1937 15.7 20.9
1937-1940. 4.7 11.6
1946-1950 20.5 23.0
1927/28-1950 8.9 ' 12.5
Source : Hodgman : Ref,26
Taken together, the evidence does seem to suggest that 
the sectoral investment policy pursued by the Soviet Union 
did prove effective in the growth of the economy.
India's involvement with planning, and essentially its 
emphasis on a capital-goods led strategy of growth has, it 
is safe to say, made only limited progress towards the 
country's ambition of high self-sustained economic growth. 
In contrast to the Soviet Union over the first two decades 
of planning. India's performance pales under almost any 
criterion. Table 3 illustrates the 'track-record' of
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India in respect of economic growth, both from an absolute 
and a per capita perspective.
Table 3 ; Annual Average Growth Rates of National Income, 
Absolute and Per Capita by Each Plan
NNP Per Capita
First Plan 3,5 1.6
Second Plan 4,0 1.8
Third Plan 2,9 0,4
Source ; J. Bhagwati and P. Desai : 'India : Planning 
For Industrialization* O.U.P. (1972) p.62.
Although the figures in Table 3 represent an improvement
on the previous growth of the economy, which over nine
5 year periods between 1900/1 and 1946/47 had grown at an
average rate of less than 1 per cent, clearly up to and
including the Third Five-Year Plan, a rapid growth of the
27economy had not been achieved. Subsequent results have
been equally disheartening: by ignoring the three "Annual"
Plans of 1956/67 - 1968/69 and focussing attention on the
Fourth Five-Year Plan, it is found that the annual average
rate of growth of N.N.P. approximates to 3.5 per cent whilst
in terms of per capita N.N.P. only a barely positive figure
2 8of 0.2 per cent was recorded.
Judging by trends in the growth of the economy, the
results of India's napital-goods led planning policy have
been far less auspicious than the comparative figures for
the Soviet Union. Growth in industrial production, however,
did perform somewhat better. For the period from 1956/57
to 1975/75, the mean annual average rate of growth came to 
2 95.7 per cent. However, this needs to be compared to the 
rate of growth of industrial production which the Soviets 
averaged between 1927/28 and 1950, amounting to 8,9 per cent ■ 
Hodgman's revised index, and 12,5 per cent - official index 
(see Table 2).
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More disconcerting is the trend in consumption. In 
gauging the economic welfare of the people of India, the 
most appropriate index would be per capita private consump­
tion expenditure. In this context it has been quoted that,
... "The overall increase in per capita consumption during 
1960/61 and 1967/68 was 3.9 per cent but the top 40 per cent 
in rural and urban population increased their per capita 
consumption expenditure by 4.4 and 4,8 per cent respectively. 
On the other hand, the middle and lower income groups in 
rural areas experienced very little increase in per capita 
consumption and, in fact, the bottom 5 per cent actually had 
a decline of per capita consumption expenditure. The position 
of the urban poor is much more serious, for the lower 40 per 
cent of the population suffered a decline in consumption
and this was particularly severe for the bottom 10 per cent
30which amounted to 15 to 20 per cent." This must be con­
trasted with a 4.7 per cent annual average increase in 
Soviet per capita pr 
1928-40 and 1948-58.
ivate consumption expenditure between
31
Implicit in the priority given to growth in the 
Indian Five-Year Plans was the belief that all other object­
ives would be subordinated to the achievement of this goal. 
This assumption was made explicit in the introduction to 
the Fifth Plan, thus ... "In elaborating our strategy of 
development in earlier plan documents, we seem to have 
assumed that fast rate of growth of national income will by
itself create more and fuller employment and produce higher
32living standards of the poor." Unfortunately, this 
optimistic approach has not been rewarded in practice. The 
facts speak for themselves. During the Second and Third 
Plan periods when unemployment would have been expected to 
have sho\>/n some decline with the implementation of the 
government's "big-push" philosophy in the capital-goods 
industries, the reverse occurred. From Table 4, it may be 
observed that by the close of the Third Plan, not only had 
the growth of the economy failed to provide for the increase 
in the labour force over the preceding ten or so years, but
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more ominously, extant unemployment had not even been 
touched.
Table 4 : Estimates of the Volume of Unemployment and
Employment Generated 1956-66 (millions)
2nd Plan 3rd Plan at 1966
(1956-61) (1961-66)
Unemployment at 
beginning of Plan 5.3 7.0 9.5
Addition to
labour Force 11.7 17.0 23.0
Total Unemployment 17.0 24.0 32,5
Employment Generated 
during Plan 10.0 14.5 -
Source : P. Chaudhuri : 'The Indian Economy : Poverty
and Development', Vikas Publishing Ho.,
New Delhi (1978) p.48.
A major factor in the growth of unemployment has of 
course been the explosive increase in the population of 
India. At the time of the 1951 census, the population stood 
at 361 million; in 1961 it v/as 439 million; and by 1971 with 
an average 2.2 per cent growth per annum over the two decades, 
it stood at 547 million. The seriousness of this level of 
population increase on the achievement of planning goals can 
be highlighted by comparison with the Soviet population 
expansion during the thirties. Over the period 1929-39, 
the Soviet Union's population grew from 154.3 million to 
170.6 million in 1939, registering a more moderate 1.5 per 
cent rate of growth. Clearly, the sustained increase in 
India's population must have been a significant influence 
in the tardiness of the country's economic growth. A
33manifestation of this fact comes from a study by Morawetz 
who ranks 77 developing countries by GNP per capita for the 
years 1950-75. In 1950, India's G.N.P. per capita was 
095 (0U.S. in 1974 prices) which by 1975 had only risen 043 
to a discouragingly low 0138 G.N.P. per capita. The
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culminating testimony of India's "failure" to remove 
poverty through growth has regard to its ranking amongst 
the other developing countries : in 1950, India was ranked 
at 66 and twenty-five years and zero movement later - the 
ranking remained the same.
Therefore, in terms of growth, consumption and
employment, it appears that India's policy of encouraging
the development of the capital-goods sector has not proved
successful when compared with the Soviet performance. It
may well be that the applicability of the Soviet experience
is, as one commentator put it, ... "Contingent on the
presence of Soviet-type economic, social and political 
34conditions." Although the autocratic nature of Soviet 
development can take some credit for the rapid transformation 
of the economy, the suspicion of the present author is that 
this was certainly not the only reason and possibly not the
main one. It is more likely that the divergence in the
performance of the Soviet and Indian economies is a con­
sequence of the assumptions on which both the Fel'dman and 
Mahalanobis two-sector growth models are based. Hence, the 
need now is to show that although the conditions prevailing
in early Soviet industrialization were conducive to the
policy of sectoral planning, they were not in the case of 
India.
(iv) The Impact of Operational Constraints
Essentially, the sectoral allocation of investment 
resources conforms to Hirschman's 'unbalanced growth' theory 
which articulates economic development in terms of "bottle­
necks". It is from this platform that the raison d'etre 
of two-sector growth models - as reflected in the stress 
they place on the strategic role of capital formation - 
should be understood. Investment capacity is perceived to 
be the major bottleneck in the growth of the economy. The 
reasoning being, of course, that although it is possible in 
a relatively short period of time to increase output 
with the existing capital stock, additional capital is always
.22-
3 5needed to increase output over the long-run. Hence, the 
logic behind two-sector growth models cannot be faulted if 
domestic capital-goods capacity (remembering the 'closed 
economy' assumption) 2^  the primary bottleneck. In so far 
as it is, the emphasis on the growth of the capital-goods
industries is then justified. However, this 'blinkered'
approach to the problem tends to ignore the possibility of 
other factors operating to retard the growth of the economy. 
Mrs. Stewart, has drav/n attention to the existence of three 
further constraints , namely :
(i) Savings Capacity : the extent to which consumption
in the economy can be compressed to release
resources for investment;
(ii) Absorptive Capacity : relating to the scarcity of 
those factors which are likely to confine the 
capacity of an economy to utilise capital 
productively; and,
(iii)' Willingness to Invest : a 'hotch-potch' of
considerations ranging from technical conditions 
to psychological factors.
under these circumstances, the determination of the savings 
ratio and, in turn, the maximum level of investment is set 
by the lowest of the four capacities. In other words, the 
application of a two-sector growth model in an economy where 
constraints other than capital-goods capacity operate, leaves 
open the possibility that the wrong bottleneck may be chosen.
To what extent did these other constraints operate in 
retarding Soviet economic growth during the early phases of 
its industrialization? 'Willingness to invest* can quickly 
be discounted: obviously it becomes the responsibility of 
the state in a country which is governed by an autarchic 
regime. The 'supply of savings' was probably not a con­
straint either. This may be explained by reference to the 
economic conditions at the commencement of Soviet planning 
in which a relatively large industrial base - primitive 
though it was - already existed. Hence, a supply of savings
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was forthcoming because living standards for a large measure 
of the population were sufficiently high to permit con­
sumption to be depressed without affecting efficiency. Due 
to the fact that the state of the economy was relatively 
advanced, the availability of viable investment projects 
would also have been less of a limiting factor. 'Absorptive 
capacity', therefore, would not have acted as the primary 
constraint to growth. Coupling these points with the high 
rates of growth the Soviets did in fact achieve, it would 
appear that the correct policy of encouraging the growth 
of capital-goods industries was followed.
The situation for India over the first two decades of 
its planning programme was totally different. It is 
difficult to conceive of 'savings capacity' not acting as a 
limitation when the figures for per capita private con­
sumption expenditure are recalled* For the great mass of 
the population it would have been impossible to depress 
consumption still further. Given this fact, almost certainly 
the 'willingness to invest' constraint would also likely 
have becoifie operative, in as much as 'expectations' 
concerning the rate of growth of consumption would have 
acted as a strong psychological barrier against investment 
taking place. In addition, limited 'absorptive capacity' 
posed (and continues to pose) a major constriction on the 
growth of the Indian economy. Even in those industries that 
experience comparatively high rates of output growth, such 
expansion invariably co-existed with low levels of capacity 
utilization. It is probable, therefore, that although the 
low level of capital-goods capacity in India did act as a 
constraint to rapid economic growth, the likelihood is that 
it was not the principal factor involved. This contention 
is further supported by reference to the data on capital 
formation for the period 1955-65 where Net Domestic Capital 
Formation as a percentage of Net Domestic Product was 
relatively high at 12.3 per cent and yet the annual average 
rate of growth of G.D.P. over the same period only reached 
3.4 per cent.
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Neo-classical economists might well be in agreement
with the above discussion, albeit for different reasons.
Complications would arise because of ... "the assumption
behind such [two-sector growth] models" ...being ... "in
complete contradiction to the assumption of substitutability^
diminishing returns and continuity, that are at the heart
37of neo-classical economics." Furthermore, neo-classicals 
would reject the notion, implicit in the growth models of 
the Fel*dman/Mahalanobis variety, that resources are in 
abundant supply (at constant cost) until such a point is 
reached when no more become available whatever the price.
Such an assumption is incompatible with the facts of neo­
classical life in which a 'project appraisal' approach to 
economic development is utilised. From their viewpoint, an 
assessment of competing projects to identify that which 
gives the highest net present value is a more sensible" 
strategy than sectoral planning. The rationale behind this 
preference centres around the idea that shadow pricing more 
accurately reflects the opportunity cost of resource 
allocation. This would be the case whether it applied to 
a capital - or a consumer - goods industrial project. The 
going gets decidedly stickier for India in its pursuance 
of the two-sector growth doctrine if the neo-classical 
approach is extended to cover the definition of "investment 
capacity". If this were to happen, little would textually 
remain of the growth model concept; instead of an upper 
barrier to capital-goods capacity, capital-goods would 
always be available, though at steadily increasing prices.
Section 2 - Capital-biased Growth Strategy :
Additional Justifications
While there is now almost universal agreement on the
importance of industrialization, there is still much debate
38regarding the proper pattern of industrial development.
In the case of India,it has, since the early fifties, 
embarked upon an ambitious programme of industrialization.
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The orientation of this policy centred around the 
Mahalanobis philosophy of a rapid build-up in capital- 
goods capacity. However, in consonance with Dobb's 
theorizing, Mahalanobis drew a distinction between capital- 
goods industries in general, and machine-making industries 
as a sub-sector within this group. This point can be 
illustrated by reference to the draft he wrote for the 
Second Five-Year Plan in which vas ••• "stressed the need 
of establishing and expanding the basic industries to 
manufacture heavy machinery with all possible speed. This 
would enable India to install new plants for the production 
of steel, cement and other investment goods with the help 
of machinery manufactured out of domestic resources" ,.. 
and later in the same paragraph is found the crucial 
statement, ... "in my opinion, the development of the 
heavy machine-building industry is so important that, if 
necessary, targets of even steel, coal, or transport should 
be reduced to give higher priority to heavy machines
because this would facilitate a much quicker rate of
39industrialization ..."
However, the impact of the machine-making sector on 
economic growth ought not to be the sole criterion of- its 
importance. India's decision to follow a capital-goods 
led growth strategy may not seem as irrational as the 
reasoning of the previous section would suggest if an 
additional technological justification is cited.
(i) Appropriate Technology Issue
It used to be common belief in India (and indeed 
elsewhere) that the problem of unemployment could be 
solved merely by augmenting the size of production poten­
tial. However, the continuing phenomenon of increasing 
unemployment occurring coincidentally with an expansion in 
industrial capacity has quite recently brought about a 
review to such thinking. Slowly, the realization has
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dawned that, ... "decisions regarding the setting up of
any industrial establishment are not only a question of
scale of operation but also of the special technology
adopted for the purpose with its consequential impact on
40the volume of employment."
The possession of an indigenous machine-building
industry offers the host country greater latitude in the
'choice of technology'. In this respect, it is baffling
why the question of establishing local machine-making
capacity has only rarely been given serious consideration
in the development literature. Even when it has been
discussed, the emphasis has been largely in terms of
either saving foreign exchange, or cost comparisons of
domestic production with that of equipment currently
41produced in the developed world. Inadequate attention
has been directed towards the strategic role of an
indigenous machine building industry capable of producing
efficient labour-using techniques for other industries.
Although Hans Singer in 1954, did allude to the necessity
of underdeveloped countries fostering domestic technological
capacity when he put their case thus, ... "modern technology
is not compatible with their endowments and their natural
requirements. They cannot develop a technology harmoniously
42unless it is their own technology," More recently,
Celso Furtado in his celebrated work, 'Development and 
Underdevelopment* wrote in more specific terms, ... "Depres­
sed productivity [j.n underdeveloped countries] exists 
because of the relative rigidity of technical co-efficients ■ 
no possibility of combining factors except in given pro­
portions - and because technology develops along lines 
determined by the availability of factors and resources of 
the countries leading the industrialization process. Thus, 
if it be taken for granted that underdeveloped countries 
grow by simple assimilation of known techniques (and by 
the corresponding accumulation of capital), it follows that 
the transplanting of those techniques almost always implies 
structural underemployment of factors. This problem can be 
met only through the adaption of technology which is all
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the more difficult since underdeveloped countries, as a
rule, lack a native capital goods industry. In this
fundamental maladjustment between factor supply and
technological orientation may lie the major problem facing
43the underdeveloped countries at this present time."
Contrary to what might initially be suspected, the 
experience of several developed countries such as the 
United States and Japan suggests that the manufacture of
machinery is one of the more labour-intensive branches of
44 ' 45industrial production. W. Leontief in his study, found
that the capital-labour ratio in the machine producing
branches of the United States was relatively low. Though
perhaps more interesting from the point of view of under-
developed countries is the very low capital-labour ratio
found for the Japanese machinery industry in 1951, as shown
in Table 5.
Table 5 : Direct Capital-Labour Ratios in Japanese
Manufacturing - 1951
Petroleum Products 1.200 Metal mining 0.172
Coal Products 0.682 Fishing 0.170
Non-Ferrous Metal 0.363 Machinery and
Chemicals 0.338 Electrical
Iron and Steel 0. 337 Equipment 0.161
Non-Metallie Mineral Apparel 0.132
Products 0.298 Textiles 0.131
Non-Metallie Minerals 0.199 Paper 0.120
Processed Foods 0.193 Rubber 0.119
Grain Mill Products^ 0.193 Lumber and Wood 0.111
Shipbuilding 0.174 Printing 0.093
Transport Equipment 0.174 Leather 0.068
Source: Institute for Social and Economic Research, 
Osaka Uni. Japan, (mimeo), quoted from Pack 
and Todaro : Loc.cit. p.399
Pack and Todaro believe the explanation for this phenomenon 
lies in the nature of machinery production. To quote,
... "the foundation of the misconception of the branches 
capital intensity lies in the confusion between the direct
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and total input structures. While some branches which
produce important inputs to the machine branch, particularly
metals, are themselves very capital-intensive, there is no
necessity to produce these domestically even if domestic
46machines are produced."
A corollary to the process of machine construction is 
the development of an industrially skilled labour force.
It is widely believed that important 'learning effects' 
are involved in the production of m a c h i n e r y . I n  fact, 
one of the characteristics of India's 'informal' sector 
as also of the lower reaches of its organised industrial 
sector is the multitudinous number of skilled artisanal 
machine-makers.
Thus, it now appears that machine building is both a
labour - and skill - intensive activity. Further support
for this belief comes from Kenen who states, ... "many
low K/L industries turn out to be skill-intensive and vice
versa. A popular.explanation of the 'Leontief Paradox' is
indeed based on the assumption that K/L and 5/L (skill ratio)
48are negatively correlated."
An indigenous capacity for machine fabrication is an 
essential objective if labour-intensive technical change is 
to be generated in a developing country. No attempt to 
increase labour-intensity is likely to be successful unless 
it is accompanied by technical change in a labour-intensive 
direction. This is important, since most of the technical 
progress which takes place in the developed countries is 
inevitably capital-using and, if imported, will tend to impose 
a similar pattern of technical change in the emerging 
countries. The development of a local machine-building 
industry is required to supply 'appropriate technology' to 
the organised sector. It achieves this aim by facilitating 
the introduction of new machine designs and labour-using 
technologies and processes that are more suited to the local 
factor endowments of the developing countries. In the
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absence of such an industry, the range of technical choice 
will tend to remain narrow.
Assuming that a country decides to establish a 
machinery sector - is its output likely to be competitive 
with that of foreign producers? Pack and Todaro view the 
question as irrelevant, ... "there would be no comparative 
equipment of old design currently being produced in the
49developed countries for export to less developing countries." 
Moreover, even if there was a world market for technologic­
ally out-dated equipment, the manufacture of appropriate 
technology in developing countries need not result in higher 
unit total costs than labour-saving equipment of the advanced 
countries. There is some evidence to suggest that even 
where competitive equipment is being produced, adverse 
cost conditions are not necessarily the case. An analysis 
of the structure of the Israeli economy for 1958 indicated 
that the real costs of saving a (U.S.) dollar of imports
in the machinery branch were among the lowest to be found
50in any industry, despite the small size of the sector.
Support is also provided in a study of the effective tariff
rate (the rate of protection of value-added) in Pakistan.
The data showed that the effective rate of protection of
machinery was the lowest for any group of products in
Pakistan. Nevertheless, the rate of growth of output has
been very rapid - implying that the branch may have a
51comparative advantage.
The fundamental fact remains, however, that for those 
countries not possessing an indigenous machine-building 
industry, the importation of machinery will be required 
with the result that the range of actual technological 
choice is to a large extent limited by the technical 
specification of the foreign machinery. As long as the 
developing countries have no control over the direction and 
speed of technical change, the goals of industrial growth 
with significant labour absorption will remain exceedingly 
difficult to realize. Given the structure of World trading
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patterns, with technological capacity concentrated almost 
exclusively in the advanced nations, the relatively insig­
nificant demands of the developing countries for these goods 
will have only a negligible impact on both current prod­
uction decisions about the type of machine to be produced 
and more importantly, on the direction that factor-saving 
bias will take in the future. It is for this reason that a 
good argument can be made for the creation and encouragement 
of domestic machine building industries in developing 
countries, the production of which can be geared to their 
own technological requirements. Besides this technological 
aspect there are, moreover,two further considerations which 
figure prominently on the credit side for establishing 
machine building capacity.
(ii) 'Key Status' Argument :
An important issue in advocating preferential treatment
for the machinery industry regards the key role it assumes
during the process of industrialization. In fact, the
machine-building industry is recognised as a 'leading sector*
by most economic commentators as it tends to grow faster
than industry as a whole. Over the period 1961 to 1972,
the growth rate of the Indian machine building industry was
approximately 50 per cent higher (at 9 per cent) than that
of all other industry (excluding the machine building
industry). This experience, similar to that of the Soviet
Union during 1928-40 and in Japan during 1932-38, lends
some credence to the observation of Hirschman and
Gerschenkron who regard the development of producer goods
branches as a great advantage to latecomers in economic 
52development.
Despite the low level of capital formation in India 
at the commencement of its planning programme, the country 
has effectively established a machine building industry 
which traditionally only emerges at the latter stages of 
industrialization. Rostow, who was perhaps the original 
exponent of the 'leading sector' hypothesis traces the
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take-off period of Japan back to 1878-1900; in 1958, more
than half a century after the take-off began, the
machinery industry occupied only 18 per cent of Japan's
total industrial output. In India, the share of machine
building output rose from 4.5 per cent in 1946 to 23 per
53cent in 1960 and about 31 per cent in 1974. It would 
appear then, that the growth of the machine building 
industry in India, relative to all industrial output, was 
greater than in Japan during the early phases of its 
industrialization.
Mention should also be made of an influential study
by Hoffman, entitled - 'The Growth of Industrial 
54Economies.' It is an attempt to trace how the pattern 
of manufacturing output in industrializing countries is 
affected by the emergence and growth of a capital goods 
sector, defined by Hoffman in terms only slightly wider 
than the present study's coverage of the 'machine building 
industry'. According to Hoffman's thesis the first stage 
of industrialization is characterized by the net output 
of consumer-goods industries being on the average 5(±1) : 1 
that of capital goods. In the second stage, the ratio is 
reduced to about 2.5(±1) : 1, while in the third stage the 
net output of these two groups is approximately equal,
1(± 0.5) : 1. Although Hoffman's analysis is primarily 
concerned with capitalist countries, he does have this to 
say on the Soviet Union, ... "The Soviet Union is, of course, 
the most striking example of a country which has deliberately 
fostered the production of capital-goods industries by 
state action. During the first three Five-Year Plans 
(1928-42) investments in capital-goods industries were 
between 84 per cent and 86 per cent of all capital invest­
ments in industry (excluding repairs to existing capital 
equipment). In 1937 and 1940 the gross output of capital- 
goods was already about equal to the gross output of
consumer goods. The relationship between the net out-
55puts may have been similar." Ignoring the allocation of
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investment resources in India's First Five-Year Plan, 
where priority was given to the development of agriculture 
and the social and economic infrastructure, it has been 
quoted that as a proportion of planned expenditures in 
industry, 70 per cent were devoted to the metal, machinery
and chemical industries during the Second Plan and 80 per
56
cent during the Third Plan. Thus, by 1968 India's ratio
of consumer goods to investment goods in terms of gross
57value-added was in the order of 1,8 : 1. To progress 
from the first to the third of Hoffman's stages normally 
took several decades in most industrial countries. The 
Soviet Union, however, in just one decade had reached the 
third stage and India over an equivalent length of time 
had only just failed to achieve the same. This again gives 
substance to the Hirschman/Gershenkron hypothesis that 
contemporary underdeveloped countries can work their way 
from "last back to basic and intermediate industries", 
a process that completely reverses the traditional path 
of most developed countries which started industrialization 
with consumer-goods industries.
The 'leading sector' argument is integral to Hirschman's 
unbalanced growth strategy briefly mentioned earlier in the 
text. The philosophy behind this approach is to concen­
trate investment on those industries most conducive to 
transforming the economy to a higher stage, Hirschman 
maintains that this is preferable to dissipating scarce 
investment funds by attempting to advance on all fronts at 
the same time. A metaphor by Wilber highlights this 
distinction, ... "to be breathlessly climbing a peak in
a mountain range is considered more important than standing
59poised on the crest of a ridge in the foothills."
Planning in the Soviet Union provides a historical example 
of this policy. The country pursued a 'shock' strategy of 
bottlenecks successively created and r e s o l v e d . S o m e t h i n g  
which Professor Nove calls planning by 'campaigning'.^^
The Soviets directed large chunks of their total investment
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to certain industries interpreted as having "key status" 
by the authorities. This policy then caused severe 
shortages and stresses within the economy which, as a 
consequence, created fresh bottlenecks and therefore new 
targets for the Soviet planners.
The level of interdependence between various industries 
is an important indicator as to the appropriateness of any 
particular 'campaign'. Thus, external economies would be 
gained by the economy if it invests in those industries 
exhibiting high linkage effects. Hirschman documented two 
types of linkage : (i)the input provision or backward 
linkage effects, and (ii)the output utilization or forward 
linkage e f f e c t s . F r o m  a development perspective, it is 
backward linkages which have the greater stimulative effects. 
The advantage of an industry with high backward linkages 
relates to the part it plays as an inducement mechanism 
to the development of a feeder-network of ancillary 
industries (in addition, of course, to industries supplying 
the basic raw materials). If the expansion of a particular 
industry leads to a general increase in economic activity 
embracing a considerable number of subsidiary and basic 
industries, then it must be classified as a "key" industry 
meriting a high priority in development.
Under this definition, the machinery branch must be 
considered a 'key' industry. The strong backward linkage 
effects of the machine building industry stem from the
fact that it has a high ratio of purchased inputs to the
63value of its total production. During the initial Five- 
Year Plan of the Soviet Union, the investment emphasis 
was on heavy industry and, in particular, machine- 
fabrication. The annual average growth rate for Soviet 
heavy industry between 1928/29 and 1937 was 17.8 per cent 
with the machinery industry registering 18.9 per cent.
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The logic of Hirschman's unbalanced growth theory 
with its associated concept of 'linkage* has relevance to 
India. Since the doctrine focuses on the structural and 
dynamic forces at work in an economy rather than on the 
enlargement of overall industrial capacity, a further 
justification for emphasizing the development of producer- 
goods industries can be advanced in terms of the dynamic 
externalities involved in the manufacture of machinery.
Finally, to close the section, a brief mention should 
be made concerning the role of the machinery industries in 
the saving of foreign exchange.
(ii) The Foreign-Exchange Aspect
Recalling the discussion of the Fel'dman/Mahalanobis 
growth models, it was mentioned that they operated under 
the assumption of a-’closed' economy. In these circum­
stances, a country without well-developed metal, machinery 
and subsidiary industries (the complex of the so called, 
heavy industries) is unable to produce a sizeable quantity 
of capital goods and thus, to invest a high fraction of its 
income however high its potential saving propensity may 
be.^^ Obviously though, the 'closed' economy assumption is 
unrealistic as in the early stages of both Soviet and Indian 
development a significant measure of capital-goods were 
imported. The ticklish issue can be side-stepped if instead 
of 'closed' economy is read 'foreign exchange constraints'. 
The models then take on a greater element of reality.
Quoting again from Mrs. Stewart on this point, ... "In an 
'open' economy, an upper limit to possible investment is 
imposed not by domestic I-capacity, but by that capacity 
plus foreign exchange available to buy I-goods from abroad. 
Assuming zero local I-good capacity, then foreign exchange
availability provides the upper constraint on possible
6 5investment."
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The implication of this is that it is not now essential 
that all the capital-goods required for investment in the 
early stages of industrialization be produced domestically. 
In fact, most developing countries would not even possess 
the means of producing the 'first generation' machinery 
on which all machines have to be manufactured. Under these 
circumstances, where not even a nucleus of a machine tool 
industry existed, it would have to be assumed that some 
foreign exchange is available which the economy could use 
to import machine tools. Raj believes this is a fairly 
realistic assumption to make, since most developing 
countries have some foreign exchange available, either 
through aid or trade.^ In this way, he states, ... "the 
allocation of a high proportion of investment to the 
machine tool sector would then be reflected in the growth 
path corresponding to the case in which the bulk of this 
foreign exchange is used for importing machine tools.
Once the domestic machine building industries "come on 
tap.", however, the growth rate of the economy will then 
mirror more accurately their performance. Thus, the 
development of local machine-making capacity may finally 
be justified on the grounds that foreign exchange to an 
underdeveloped country is a scarce resource, and once past 
the import-substitution phase, its use can be economized 
through the non-import of machinery.
Section 3 : Import-Substituting Industrialization :
But Was There an Alternative Path?
(i ) The Crucial Assumption
However, once the import-substitution phase has passed 
there is now much evidence to suggest that industry would be 
left in a disastrously high-cost, inefficient and uncompetitive 
state. But, of course, this is to argue with the advantage
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of hindsight. In the early 1950s, import substitution was a 
bold new strategy which had worked well for the Soviet economy 
two decades before. Besides, since the early part of this 
century India had been pursuing the conventional market economy 
approach to development and had been patiently getting nowhere. 
To gauge the results of India’s two-sector growth strategy 
depends on the standard of comparison chosen ; clearly, if 
the touchstone is the country's past history, then, as was 
noted in the earlier discussion to Table 3, the economy under 
the planning regime performed reasonably well; however, if 
the comparison is with other countries during their development 
phase (see Table 1) and the presently newly industrializing 
countries of South East Asia, then the results are less 
satisfactory. But in terms of the Indian Government's 
own planned targets the capital goods strategy would have 
to be described as a failure, if the decision was based on 
the growth rate alone. Given this unexciting growth per­
formance, it has to be asked whether India might not have 
done better if it had embarked on a different path to 
industrialization?
At the sake of being tiresome, the critical distinction 
in the growth strategy adopted by the Indian and Soviet 
authorities is that between the consumer goods industries 
and the producers' goods industries s the, by now, well- 
known contrast between 'machines’ and 'machines producing 
machines'. In the closed-economy model that Soviet industrial­
ization represents, the lack of opportunity to import capital 
goods to initiate growth foreclosed that path as an 
alternative strategy of development. But did the closed 
model approach to trade, which made sense to the Soviet 
Union, necessarily apply to India's circumstances? After 
all, it is only on a closed-economy criterion that it 
becomes essential to develop the machinery industries via 
a Soviet-type strategy. In a closed economy without the 
opportunity for international trade, capital goods must be 
produced if the savings of an economy are to be translated
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into investment. Capital goods production in this case 
determines the level of investment. This is the situation 
India's planners 'believed' they faced at the start of their 
industrialization campaign; and the justification for this 
view may have lain with the desire to achieve a high degree 
of autarchy in the economy or more likely to the general lack 
of confidence in the export earning capacity of the Indian 
economy at that time.
Mahalanobis, in his two-sector growth model, assumed 
that India was a closed economy; it was, without doubt, a 
crucial assumption. But what was the basis to this 
judgement? Very little, it would appear from Bhagwati and 
Desai, who have argued that Mahalanobis was ignorant to the 
fact that emphasis on indigenous production of capital goods 
presupposes constraints on domestic and foreign transformation 
In criticising Mahalanobis on this point, the authors have 
written :
"... It seems likely that, being a physicist by 
training and a statistician by practice, he directly 
identified increased investment with increased 
availability of capital goods, which in turn he 
identified with domestic production thereof, ignoring 
foreign trade in particular. It is interesting that 
the Second Plan did not explicitly state the rationale 
of the shift to heavy industries in terms of foreign 
trade constraints, so that the later justification 
of this strategy by alluding to 'stagnant world 
demand* for Indian exports comes somewhat close to 
post facto rationalization. Indeed, the Second Plan’s 
examination of export earnings through the Plan is 
so cursory that it is difficult to believe that the 
stagnant world demand for Indian exports' assumption, 
by virtue of which the shift to heavy industries was 
later sought to be justified, was seriously made : such 
a crucial assumption, if made, would surely have been 
examined more intensively."^^
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The fact should also be noted that both India’s balance of 
payments position and its export earnings were satisfactory 
during the period of the First Five-Year Plan. It does 
seem strange, therefore, that the country’s export potential 
could be viewed with such pessimism at the start of the 
Second Plan. In fact, during the last four years of the 
First Plan, India's foreign exchange reserves actually 
increased. Government planners may have felt that a dramatic 
decline in India's foreign exchange reserves was a pre­
requisite for obtaining the Rs 12 billion in foreign assistance 
called for in the Second Five-Year Plan.^^ The assumption of 
Mahalanobis was that foreign aid would become available to 
fill the gap between the import requirements of the nascent 
capital goods sector and the level of export earnings.
As it happened, this reasoning was not altogether unjustified 
in view of the escalation of the aid programmes subsequent 
to the 1956/57 crisis in the balance of p a y m e n t s . T h e  
inflow of external loan assistance, however, has created 
problems of its own : the cost of credit financed imports has 
often been significantly higher than of those purchased 
through its foreign exchange earnings; and the debt service
has imposed on India a burden which over the years has become 
72truly onerous. It seems, then, that Mahalanobis' assumption 
that India was a closed-market was based on a false premise, 
so that India may well have possessed a viable alternative 
option to have developed its machine building sector and 
indeed its economy through foreign trade. In this way, 
some of the costs associated with excessive import- 
substitution could have been avoided. The economic literature 
is replete with the various inefficiencies and costs engendered 
through inward-biased growth strategy; it would be well,at 
this juncture, to review some of the more obvious of these 
costs.
(ii) The Costs of Inward-Biased Growth Strategy
There now exists quite a large body of writing on the 
inherent costs involved in persistent import substitution
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strategies. The studies on the seven countries contained 
in Little, et al, indicated that ... "industrialization 
sheltered by high levels of protection has led to the creation 
of high-cost enterprises; these enterprises are producing 
expensive products, many of which are for use by a restricted 
middle class, and so production is rapidly coming up against 
the limits of the home market".... Moreover ,.. "The increase 
in cost and over-valuation of the currency have also dis­
couraged exports, both agricultural and industrial. The 
import of raw materials and capital goods has resulted in
foreign currency costs as high and sometimes in excess of
73the savings made on the imports of finished goods."
In a most widely regarded study on the role of import
substitution in industrialization, Chenery argues that
import-substitution would not be effective unless there was
some change in comparative advantage during the process of
growth; it is therefore deemed a supply rather than a demand
e f f e c t . H o w e v e r ,  if import substitution is pushed too far
this will result in a neglect of comparative advantage.
There are numerous examples of enterprises or industries
established by governments with little or no regard given
7 5to their economic feasibility.
A major element to the arguments favouring import
substitution is that it economizes on foreign exchange by
the reduction in imports. In general the evidence points
to the fact that in recent years where import substitution
has taken place this saving of foreign exchange has been
successfully achieved, although in some countries, for
example Brazil, Israel and Chile, the foreign exchange
savings have been very considerably reduced, if not eroded,
by increases in imports of raw materials. That many
industrial ventures lose foreign exchange is essentially due
to a poor selection of projects and industries to develop :
indiscriminate and high protection is both a cause and a
77result of this poor selection. A major negative effect
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of industrialization by import substitution is that there 
is an inherent bias against exports. The problem is that 
governments pursuing inward-looking developing strategies 
have not only emphasised the role of saving above the 
earning of foreign exchange but the policies employed have 
actually made the task of exporting that much worse. 
Essentially, inputs whose importation is controlled and 
restricted become more expensive, leading to higher 
production costs; but also, where the currency is 'over­
valued', this reduces the exporters' return on a given 
quantity of exports in relation to what would have been 
earned under free trade. This state of affairs naturally 
affects the development of a competitive export sector.
In the Indian economy, since the commencement of the
Second Five-Year Plan, a significant characteristic of the
import substitution strategy has been the high degree of
excess capacity that has emerged in the industrial sector.
As Chaudhuri has observed, this was ... "the result of
severe import controls and the limited ability or willingness
of the Government to use the fiscal or monetary instruments
of control to ease pressure on resources originating from
non-developmental expenditure in the private and public sectors
The absence of any degree of external competition has enabled
the growth of very inefficient firms. In some lines of
production, levels of domestic costs two or three times as
79high as comparable world prices are not unknown." There 
is also the complaint that Indian planners have over­
emphasised the objective of minimising long-run average 
costs with the consequence that, at least in the machine tool 
sector, the technical mix of factors of production was 
planned on such a basis as to allow for substantial idle 
plant capacity even for high levels of d e m a n d . F u r t h e r m o r e ,  
aside from the traditional discussion of delays, lack of 
co-ordination among different licensing agencies and similar 
administrative deficiencies which reduce the efficiency of 
a QR-regime the Indian import control policy has also been 
alleged to have operated in the ultimate analysis, without
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any economic c r i t e r i a . T h e  now famous 'rule of the thumb'
metaphor usually being coined to describe the process here.
The diversion of resources away from India's export sector,
at least up until the late 1960s, has been excessive.
Whether India's foreign trade policy is evaluated (1) according
to technical economic criteria such as efficiency (allocation
of resources and ability to minimize costs) and impact on
domestic savings or (2) from the vantage of India's triad
of growth, equity and self-reliance, the conclusion is that
India has gone well beyond what ’infant-industry' loaic 
82would justify. The loss of efficiency associated with 
India's congenitally ill-formed and complex trade regime 
is regarded by many economists as staggering.
(iii) The Process of Export-Expansion
In actual practice, Indian planning today steers clear 
from excessive pre-occupation with self-sufficiency as a 
result of the necessity to export more.^^ The devaluation 
of the rupee in June 1966, quite apart from the con­
temporaneous measures taken to liberalize import and industrial 
licensing, was perhaps the most dramatic episode in the 
shift of Indian economic policies towards greater and more 
sophisticated reliance on the market m e c h a n i s m . T h e  
import entitlement schemes (which, by then, covered about 
80 per cent of exports) were abolished, and replaced by 
export subsidies which, however, applied only to non- 
traditional exports covering only a small fraction of total 
e x p o r t s . C a s h  subsidies paid to exporters of selected 
products were designed to provide compensation for the 
relatively high cost of domestic tradable inputs, as well 
as subsidization of the infant stages of export marketing.
The enthusiasts for the alleged benefits of the present 
international division of labour have in the main con­
centrated on the cost advantages that follow from continuing
to export agricultural raw materials and finished products
8 8based thereupon and to import capital equipment. An
-42-
alternative pattern of economic expansion is provided by the
possibility of industrial exports in which some primary-
89producing countries could have a comparative advantage.
Like import substitution it allows industrial output to 
grow more rapidly than domestic demand for manufactures, 
and is therefore another means through which the expansion
90of employment might overtake the growth of the labour force.
The increased attention given to the implementation of 
export promoting strategies of manufactured goods is some­
thing which occurred in several Latin American countries in 
the sixties. The original 'phase' of developing their
economies was the traditional one of inducing expansion
. 9 1through the export of primary commodities. Hirschman 
describes the historical transition of their economies 
thus :
"...The phase of export-propelled growth ... in 
Latin America lasted roughly from the middle of 
the nineteenth century until the Great Depression; 
and it took another twenty years, from 1929 to the 
Prebisch Manifesto of 1949, before the end-of-export- 
propelled-growth became official Latin American 
doctrine. Then came the next phase of Latin American 
growth ... via the domestic market. It gathered 
strength during the Depression and World War II, 
flourished briefly in both theory and practice 
during the fifties and was pronounced either dead 
or a dud in the sixties. It looks, therefore, as 
though the acceleration of technical progress in 
the developed countries were Qsic] matched in the 
underdeveloped ones by an increasingly rapid 
accumulation of failures in growth experiences."^^
There may be some exaggeration of the announced failures 
of import substituting industrialization, nevertheless, 
the fizzling out of the 'Brazilian economic miracle' was 
a great disappointment to Latin American observers who
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had begun, somewhat prematurely, to draw parallels between 
Brazil and other more successful late industrializers such 
as Japan, Russia and Germany. It was from the import 
substitution 'hot-house' that Brazil and several Latin 
American countries moved, in the sixties, to embrace the 
strategy of export substitution.
It can be argued that an export substitution process 
has some distinct advantages over an import substitution 
regime. Some of the more significant benefits claimed are 
that :
(i) The resources used in import substitution could 
have earned a greater amount of foreign exchange 
through export expansion than the foreign exchange 
saved on import substitution that relies on high 
effective rates of protection.
(ii) To the extent that it rests on exogenous world
demand, the process of industrialization through 
export substitution is not limited to the narrow 
domestic market of the import substitution process.
(iii) If indivisibilities and/or economies to scale are
important, an export oriented strategy will provide
better incentives for expansion of capacity in
existing lines. As such, an export-oriented growth
strategy is better suited to achieving whatever
economies of scale are present than is an import
substitution strategy where firms are generally
limited in their horizons by the size of the 
93market.
(iv) Export substitution aids employment creation in the 
urban-industrial sector by the avoidance of 
agricultural bottlenecks. By exporting manufactured 
goods the developing countries are able to import 
agricultural commodities and thereby keep the real
94wage low as expressed in terms of industrial goods.
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More generally, there is evidence that the shift to
95trade strategies have led to an increase in growth rates.
A recent study has further indicated that once allowance is
made for the direction of trade, the labour-abundant
developing countries would be well-advised to specialize
96in the export of labour-intensive products. There is 
now much optimism that a comparative advantage can be 
acquired by many countries of the third world in the production 
of manufactures or semi-manufactures that haé traditionally 
been regarded as developed country activity. It may be 
expected that eventually a given technological advantage 
will be dissipated and will give way to conventional 
factor-cost advantages, so that the new line of production 
may become more accessible to developing countries.
Indicative of this has been the rapid advance in recent 
years of exports from some LDCs of what were formerly 
considered to be fairly sophisticated products ; photographic 
and cinematographic supplies, watches and clocks, medical
and pharmaceutical products, plastic materials, and tele-
97communication apparatus.
The Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson postulate predicts 
that more industrialized LDCs will export relatively 
capital-intensive goods to less industrialized ones, but 
certainly not the reverse; and the theory has little to
9 8say about trade between equally industrialized economies.
However, there is some recent evidence which indicates that
semi-industrialized countries are finding the best markets
99for their manufactures amongst themselves, A major 
reason for this could, of course, be the diversionary 
effect of non-tariff barriers erected by the advanced 
countries against the labour-intensive exports of the 
developing ones. For example, the history of British policy 
towards textile imports from less developed countries and 
the EEC restrictions on their ‘generalised’ system of 
preferences is proof of this.^^^ Trade diversion of this 
nature appears to have assisted the trade in capital
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goods between underdeveloped regions. Capital goods
generally enjoy less protection than other commodities
in Latin America and this also may be a factor in India’s
exports of capital goods to other developing countries
under bilateral trading arrangements (e.g. Algeria,
Kenya, etc.). Exports of machine tools from Argentina
and Brazil flow largely to other less developed countries.
The Taiwanese machine tool industry also exported almost
exclusively to other less developed countries in the early 
1011970s. Exports of capital equipment under turn-key
arrangements may be the next step in the cycle; a development 
in which India should have a headstart with ready experience 
of this type of project in the Philippines and elsewhere.
Frances Stewart has argued for a reorientation of
trade which encourages export substitution in the direction
of South-South trade, perhaps by the establishment of
regional economic g r o u p s . T h i s  could be a positive
step. Balassa's review of the experience of the Latin
American Free Trade Association and the Central American
Common Market with intra-industry trade renders rather a
positive picture of its welfare effects in terms of
specialization, the realization of scale economies,
103'X-efficiency', and * learning-by-doing’ , It may be that
through such trading agreements the ’revealed* comparative 
advantage (the low cost of skilled workers and appropriateness 
of the exported technology) in manufactured exports by 
developing countries will be maximised.
However, before closing this section on India having 
followed an alternative industrialization strategy, a few 
observations are called for. The point ought to be made 
that ’switching’ from inward-oriented growth strategies 
to those of export substitution will not for many economies 
be a costless exercise once the former strategy has been 
followed. One Indian commenter even holds the extreme view 
that an implication of India's industry development
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policy ,.."which neither the Government nor its critics have 
realized is that a policy stressing the development of an 
investment goods producing sector as a strategic factor in 
the development process yields an overall strategy which is 
to a substantial measure i r r e v e r s i b l e . T h i s  is, perhaps, 
too severe a standpoint. The actual course an economy 
requires to take should only be charted by reference to 
detailed assessment of available alternatives and it is 
quite probable that for many countries the appropriate 
strategy may lie within the two extremes of import substitution 
and export substitution. Changing comparative advantages 
could provide the dynamic benchmark to government policy.
Import substitution as a strategy of industrialization
may still have a role to play, albeit in a more limited
form, for the still emerging third world countries. The
fact that there has been a remarkable degree of criticism
of import substitution in Latin America, Pakistan and India
does indicate that there is real substance to the concern
being expressed. But the rapidity of the reversal in the
climate of opinion makes one rather suspect that import
substitution industrialization had, ’from its very onset',
both positive and negative aspects, with the latter simply
105coming into view a few years after the former. It would
also be pertinent to enquire whether import substitution 
strategies may be a necessary pre-condition for the export 
expansion of manufactures at a later stage in a country's 
industrialization. In the case of Latin America,
C. Diaz-Alejandro had this to say;
"Granting that old and new primary products remain 
a key element in Latin American export plans 
. . . j^even for the big four Latin American countries, 
primary products accounted for more than half of 
the export expansion between 1960 and 197l] 
and that misguided import substitution policies 
could have only hurt their prospects, it may still 
be argued that import substitution was a necessary 
pre-condition to the expansion of ’manufactured’ 
exports. This viewpoint may be summarised by the 
dictum that ’Brazil could not have exported
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Volkswagen without having import substituted them 
first.* It can also be noted ... that 'only* the 
biggest countries which followed aggressive import 
substitution policies, have been able to achieve 
substantial exports of manufactures outside Latin 
America
Furthermore, it needs to be said that the line between economic
growth and export expansion is not a determinate one. While
it is true that most of the countries which experienced rapid
growth rates in GNP "per capita* between 1960 and 1969,
experienced rapid growth in manufactured exports, it is also
true that many of the slow growing countries also experienced
107rapid growth in manufactured exports.
Thus, the issue remains contentious. However, it could 
be argued that a strategy of export-promotion although not a 
sufficient condition for economic growth might just be a 
necessary one for 'long-term* growth of the economy. Back in 
the early 1950s, India's policy-makers did not view industrial­
ization through trade a feasible option. On the basis of 
Mahalanobis' 'stagnant export earnings' assumption, the choice 
was made to pursue a programme of planned industrialization 
through the operation of a two-sector growth strategy. Even 
though, from the discussion contained in this section, the 
closed-economy assumption may well have proved unfounded, 
this study now takes it as given, examining the development 
of the Indian machine tool industry under the economic 
conditions that were imposed by the rigorous import sub­
stitution policy of the time. Before moving on to the 
methodological and empirical aspects of India's experience 
in this respect, it is necessary to describe and evaluate 
a 'model' peculiar to the development of the Soviet Union's 
machine tool industry. It is to this objective that 
energies are now devoted.
Section 4 : The Question of Efficiency
(i) The Soviet Approach
The success of the Soviet model of economic development 
has been strongly argued. There is no doubt that the aim of 
rapid growth was very quickly achieved; and that rapid
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independence. But an additional factor existed which has 
not thus far been mentioned: it concerns not so much the 
problems of how to increase the supply of capital but how 
to economise on its use. It may be because it is an 
inevitable condition of production that the factor has 
not received the attention in the economic literature 
which it perhaps deserves. Whatever the reason though, 
there is a case for believing that the Soviets were also 
successful in attaining high levels of operational efficiency, 
and never more so than in the machine tool industry.
Conceptually, machine tool production is the most 
important of all machine building activities. In this 
concluding section, therefore, an examination of the Soviet 
development of this core industry is undertaken which will 
act as a frame of reference for the later analysis of 
India's machine tool sector, especially in the context of 
productive efficiency. Such an appraisal also has the 
additional advantage of highlighting what could have been 
possible solutions to problems that were common to India's 
fnachine tool industry in the course of its economic 
development. Particularly since metal-fabricating units 
in both countries developed under conditions of central- 
planning and thus, operated in a similar economic environ­
ment, The specificity of the discussion to machine tools 
is further based on the fact that they are the 
technological 'embryo' from which all other mechanized 
activities derive. The development of the industry is, 
therefore, of the utmost importance in a country's thrust 
for industrialization. Support for this view is enlisted 
from Granick who has commented on the significance of the 
industry In Soviet Planning policy, ... "The machine tool 
branch has been regularly described in Soviet priority 
statements as the very heart of the machine building 
industry. For this is the branch which produces the machines 
which are needed to make all other types of machinery. It 
is the core industry of an autarchic investment programme. 
This Soviet viewpoint fits neatly into Stalin's "key sectors 
of the economy" approach to economic development, Stalin 
believed that a major task of planning was to determine
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which sectors were the key ones at any moment of time and
to concentrate on expanding them rather than on spreading
thin the country's resources in a balanced growth type of
development policy. The machine tool branch would appear
108
to be a natural 'key sector'."
The emphasis given by the Soviets' to the growth of their 
tool industry has certainly proved a success in regard to 
production figures. By 1958, it had emerged as the largest 
manufacturer of machine tools in the world, in respect of 
the volume produced annually. In 1964, the industry's 
production was about three-quarters, by value, of American 
machine tool production; slightly greater than the production 
of West Germany, and equivalent to the combined machine tool 
output of Great Britain, Japan and France. The increase 
in the numbers of Soviet machine tools produced has also 
been significant. In 1928, the Soviet Union produced only 
2,000 metal-cutting tools; this output increased to 38,400 
In 1945; 156,000 in 1960; and about 200,000 in 1967.^^^ It 
has also been calculated that the annual average rate of 
growth of Soviet tool output over the period 1928-55 was a 
phenomenal 16.3 per c e n t T h e s e  statistics offer some 
clues to the strategy of Soviet planning regarding the 
development of the industry. However, to gain a fuller 
understanding requires that the central features of the 
machine tool industry's production organization be 
identified. This is a task which will now be undertaken 
and as the examination progresses, it will become apparent 
that the development path the Soviet machine tool industry 
followed is far removed from the traditional stereotype 
usually associated with the branch.
(ii) Production Organization
Several factors which figured prominently in the 
expansion of the Soviet machine tool industry can aptly 
be described as the three 'S^s' in its industrial policy.
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namely: specialization, standardization (and inter­
changeability of components), and scale. These three 
factors are interrelated and taken together constitute 
a peculiarly Soviet approach to the question of attaining 
an efficient organization of production in machine tool 
manufacture.
One of the initial areas of conflict in which Soviet
strategists become embroiled was the choice of technique
in the manufacture of machine tools. At the time, the
question probably involved a choice between projecting the
"gigantomania approach" into machine tool production with
its attendant features of large-scale units employing
advanced capital-intensive technology or, in marked contrast,
sticking to international convention with numerous small
units invariably employing non-specialized equipment. The
contentiousness of the issue was not solely confined to the
debate over size and technique but extended also into the
area of product-mix. This was because, conventionally,
machine tool production was not only characterized by a
myriad of small plant but additionally, within each range
of output, the individual firm possessed a fairly broad 
112product-mix. By its very nature then, the traditional 
model was unamenable to the basic technological approach 
of the Soviet Five-Year Plans which concentrated on the 
creation of huge, specialized factories.
The outcome of this conflict was a victory for the 
protagonists of the Soviet philosophy of large-scale 
development. Consequently, in stark contrast to the 
practices of Western machine tool procedures, the 
authorities attempted to rationalise the range of machine 
tools manufactured in the Soviet Union. M. Berry, in a 
recent report on the industry, has described the main tenets 
of the policy in the following way: ... "Production was 
based on the "tipazh" or range of types and sizes, the idea 
being that in a planned economy there was no need to produce as 
many types and sizes as in a market economy. Instead, it
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was considered possible to plan scientifically which types
and sizes should be produced to satisfy the main needs of
the country - which should be imported and which should not
113
be produced until later." Soviet economists believed 
that specialization could be advanced a great deal further 
than it had been in Western tool firms. Pertinent to this 
point is a statement by Granick, ... "The head of the 
[sovie-^ machine tool branch declared Qin the early thirties] 
that out of 500 to 600 machine tool firms in the U.S. and 
Western Europe only five or six had as many as two to three 
thousand workers apiece. Even these few had a broad 
product-mix. The typical plant employed only three to 
six hundred manual workers .... two other Soviet writers 
declared in 1935 that experience showed that the optimum 
size of plant in the machine tool industry employed a 
labour force of twenty-five hundred to three thousand. 
Therefore, the emphasis given to large-scale plants occurred 
simultaneously with specialization by product, through the 
reduction in the number of types and sizes of machine tools 
produced in each factory. The motive behind this policy 
was to capture not only the economies of specialization 
customarily associated with the manufacture of machine tools 
but also economies of scale through techniques of mass 
production.
This argument, concerning increasing the scale for
the production of a narrow range of machine tool products,
is supported by the results of empirical work conducted by
Pratten of Cambridge University. A conclusion of his study
having regard to this point suggested that, ... "there
were substantial economies [to be madej , but these
economies were not all attributable to economies of scale
in the traditional sense; they included the economies of
breaking bottlenecks, using machine capacity more fully,
115and learning through time." Pratten's findings were 
based on cost and price movements, recorded by firms in 
his sample which during the past had varied output. For
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the purposes of making these estimates, Pratten made two 
assumptions which are congruent with the Soviet strategy 
of machine tool manufacture in the thirties.
Firstly, he assumed that only a limited number of 
standard models are manufactured,so that each firm obtains 
the economies of longer runs as its output increases. This 
assumption is in accordance with the Soviet policy on 
specialization which was pursued with great vigour. The 
standardization and interchangeability of components were 
major facetsof this approach. The Soviets, it would 
appear, realized from very early on that proliferation of 
different components for a multiplicity of machine tool 
products was wasteful of resources. It has been found, 
for instance, that from 5 to 10 per cent of all components 
designed in industry are unnecessary, and occasionally as 
many as 20 per cent.
Zamilin in 1955, offered a practical definition of
standardization as it refers to engineering : ... "the
replacement of a superflous variety of items designed for
any particular purpose, with a more rational and optimal
117number .Of types." This definition, although similar
118to that stated by Britain's Lemon Committee in 1949 , is
as Hill points out restrictive, since it only considers 
the 'variety reduction' or 'simplification' aspects of 
standardization policy. Other Soviet writers have used 
broader definitions to include another important feature of 
standardization - the regulation of quality characteristics. 
This aspect of standardization has particular significance 
in a centrally planned economy where there is no market 
incentive to improve quality. Quoting again from Soviet 
sources. Hill puts forward a definition of the associated 
concept of 'interchangeability' as ... "the ability of a 
component to work satisfactorily in a given assembly without 
subsequent machining or hand fitting when the items to be 
fitted together have been manufactured independently.
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The advantage of standardization and interchange­
ability of components is that it permits increased production 
runs. To capitalize on this advantage a variant of 
standardization evolved which came to be known as modular 
design. This is a principle which can readily be applied 
to the manufacture of machine tools, as a UNIDO Report 
explains, ... "a group of metal-cutting machine tools may 
be designed as a single family, utilizing standard stands, 
drives, clutch assemblies, workpiece-holding devices, tool 
pads etc., and keeping the non-standard sub-assemblies of 
each machine to an irreducible minimum. In this way,
production runs for most components and sub-assemblies
121
are considerably lengthened." According to Soviet policy,
the manufacture of these standardized components was to
take place in specialized factories, producing them in
large quantities. This was the policy, though in practice,
122
reality was very different; it is a problem that will be 
discussed later in the section.
Pratten's second assumption dictated that firms with
different levels of capacity, design their plants to produce
this output at minimum cost. Again, it must be noted that
Soviet production practices in respect of machine tools
were consonant with such an assumption. The point is best
explained by reference to simple production theory. In
most American and European tool plants a high degree of
flexibility is built into the production technology. This
implies that high efficiency at many possible levels of
output is attained at the cost of not attaining the highest
123possible efficiency at any one level of output. Flex­
ibility in technique also ensures that plants are able to 
overcome imperfect adaptability, that is, without flex­
ibility, production at any level other than optimum would 
involve unprofitably high marginal costs. This Western- 
type machine tool plant characterized by its small scale 
and relatively wide product-mix is represented in Figure 3, 
by the shallow, bowl-shaped average cost curve AC(1). In
_ 5<L
contrast, the U-shaped curve AC(2) illustrates the typical 
Soviet machine tool factory. Due to the inflexibility of 
its production technology, the bottom of the Soviet AC(2) 
curve lies below the lowest point of its counterparts 
curve in the West.
Figure 3 Comparison of Production Optimums in 
Machine Tool Manufacture
AC(3)
Price/
Cost MC AC(1) AC(2)
MC
Output
The differences in the shape of the cost curves are
related to the types of economy in which the■respective
machine tool plants operate. In the capitalist economy,
it is rational to build flexibility into the unit. This
is due to uncertainty concerning the level and composition
of future output. By contrast, in a planned economy
oriented to attaining a particular goal, uncertainty is
considerably reduced and the construction of plants which
yield minimum average cost only over a narrow range of
output becomes rational. In these circumstances, long
production runs of technically invariant tools becomes a
sensible policy. A feature of this Soviet strategy was
that if a customer of a machine tool required that it be
modified, the onus was on him, not the tool manufacturer,
125
to make the adaption.
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It will be noticed that Figure 3 depicts a further 
cost curve AC(3). This is the case of an Indian-type 
machine tool unit which has developed along lines that are 
alien to both Soviet and Western experience. The Indian 
plant is representive of a high-cost producer due to such 
factors as low batch sizes; a high underutilization of 
capacity, and a non-competitive market in both the machine- 
tool and machine-building sectors. Moreover, 'international 
demonstration effects' are reflected to a considerable 
degree in the product-mix of many of the larger Indian 
machine tool concerns. This is a development inappropriate 
to the technological requirements of the majority of the 
machine tool users in the country. It is also a considera­
tion which brings the discussion conveniently around to 
examination of the next positive element to emerge from 
the Soviet model having regard to the fact that ... "there 
has been no history of copying foreign technology in such
a way as to substitute capital for labour.”
The transplantation of advanced labour-saving
technologies can be Justified only for those poor'countries
which have similar factor proportions to those of the
advanced nations. This will be a rare situation. Soviet
policy over its initial Five-Year Plan reflected an
awareness of this fact: a dualistic strategy was pursued,
not only between 'key' industries and industries held to
be of lower priority but also within plants as to 'key'
processes and other auxiliary activities* The 'key'
industry argument was touched on earlier in Section 2
but to recap, these were the industries given high-growth
status in the Soviet plans and were allocated investment
funds accordingly. Thus, ... "the 'key' industries
utilised to the maximum the advantage of borrowing the
most advanced technologies developed in economies with
very different factor endowments" ... but, and this is the
other half of the Soviet dualistic policy ... "they allowed
for these differences by utilizing manual labour in
auxiliary operations and by aiming at high performance
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rates per unit of capital instead of per man." The
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amount of labour employed in these auxiliary processes was 
significant. A very high percentage of all workers - 
almost half of the wage-earners in the machine tool
128
industry in 1948 were employed in these operations.
It should not be thought that there is anything in­
herently irrational in mechanizing only part of the 
operation of a factory. As Gerschenkron has pointed out, 
it may well be that the main production line is mechanized 
because by saving the scarce kinds of labour, it affords
the greatest economy, while auxiliary tasks can be per-
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formed by unskilled peasants. But this is only part of 
the picture. Mass production techniques, necessitating 
the installation of specialised automatic machinery, on 
which a narrow range of machine tool output was produced 
meant that the skill requirements of the operators were 
considerably reduced. On the other hand, the tool industry's 
customers, the great majority of machinery-fabricating 
shops serving local markets right across the Soviet Union 
used basic general-purpose machine tools. The advantage 
here, was that it brought the mass of the industrially 
employed population into contact with machinery. Even 
in the large factories of the heavy machine construction 
and aviation industries, continuous-flow operations were 
not considered until 1939, and only then on the basis,
... "that output per machine tool should not be allowed 
to drop; if such a drop occurred in the case of any 
individual machine tool it was recommended that this
machine be returned to the previous system of one-machine-
,,130 
one-operator."
This 'technological dualism' between the machine tool 
industry and its machine building customers is corroborated 
by Sutton in his mammoth study of 'Western Technology and 
Soviet Economic Development'. In Vol. Ill of the study 
he gives three quotations of statements made by independent 
observers (as recent as 1956) concerning the character of 
the installed machinery at one Soviet machine tool plant -
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Ordzhonikidze in Moscow. The first statement is of no
interest to the present discussion but, ... "the second and
third statements identify its [installed capital as being of]
Western origins and makes it clear that in this plant, at
least, production .... is based on equipment imported from
the West. In other words, "the machines that build machines
originated in the West."^^^ Moreover, Sutton in Vol.II of
his work, also provides support for the argument regarding
the labour-intensive nature of the Soviet machine tool
industry's output. Commenting on a table of the composition
of Soviet machine tool production between 1932-45, reproduced
as Table 5 below, Sutton states, ... "Between 1932 and 1945
approximately one half of the steadily increasing machine
tool production was composed of just two elementary types :
simple lathes ... and vertical drilling machines" ... and
his conclusion in the next paragraph reads ... "thus, the
structure of machine tool production in 1945 is quite clear,
output was concentrated on producing very large numbers of
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very simple machine tools."
Table 6 : Composition of Soviet Machine Tool 
Production 1932-45
Tools Produced 1932 1940 1945
Total Machine Tools 
Produced 19,978 58/437 38,419
Group A : Lathes (not 
turret or semi-automatic) 7,145 11,523 13,063
Group B : vertical 
drilling machines 6,838 15,251 7,168
Groups A and B as 
per cent of total 72.8% 45.8% 52.7%
Source : A. Sutton : 'Western Technology and Soviet
Economic Development', 1930-1945' Vol.II 
Loc.cit., p.139.
Clearly, the Soviet planners interpreted production 
technique as basic to the industry's efficiency. In their 
view, considerable economies of scale could be achieved
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through standardization of components and products, and
by the use of automatic, capital-intensive equipment on
which the machine tools were to be manufactured. The
belief was, that as long as the price of the machine tool
was low enough, sufficient numbers could be purchased to
justify the heavy expenditure on automatic equipment. It
was no coincidence either, that the machine tools that were
mass produced, corresponded to the needs, and resource base
of the Soviet economy. At first sight, such a policy of
capital-intensive machinery in the 'key' processes of
machine tool plants would seem inconsistent with the
Soviet objective of lowering the capital-output ratio.
The point can be contested on two grounds. Primarily, it
was the case that the productive processes in machine tool
units were capital-intensive in nature but to compensate
this, the auxiliary operation, as has been noted, remained
essentially labour-using. Moreover, there seems little
justification for the presumption that the use of equipment
with labour-saving or automatic features generally leads
to an increase in the capital-output ratio. It should not,
as Granick has argued, ... "be assumed that an equipment
stock of old fashioned types of machines can be employed
with a lower capital-output ratio than is achieved by a
3 33stock with more modern equipment." ' He cites three factors 
in support of his argument:
(i) In American metal-working since World War I,
modernization of equipment has been accompanied 
by a reduction in the capital-output ratio in the 
industry as a whole. Such overall reduction has 
occurred despite an accompanying substitution of 
capital for labour in the industry.
(ii) In advanced capitalist countries, where it may be 
expected that the relative scarcity of production 
factors is reflected in the choice of equipment, 
one might look for major differences in the type 
of equipment used in Europe as compared to the 
United States. But a strong impression drawn from 
various reports of the Anglo-American Council on
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Productivity is that basic production equipment 
does not differ particularly between the two 
countries in most industries. There is no 
indication that lower British wages led to the use 
of less modern production equipment.
(iii) Finally, a few isolated Soviet studies indicate 
that, under specific Soviet conditions, use of 
more modern equipment may lead to the reduction of 
capital-output ratios. Thus, when the quantity of 
production is sufficient - broaching not only yields 
a higher labour productivity and greater precision 
than the alternative process of milling but also 
provides a lower capital-output ratio.
Thus,it might be that the introduction of labour-saving 
machinery in 'key* processes could initiate a process of 
capital-saving through improvements in levels of efficiency,
But, it should be admitted that the Soviet strategy 
is not without criticism. Two alleged deficiencies are 
briefly noted. Firstly, mention is made of a criticism 
by Nove in his book, 'The Soviet Economic System'; his 
objection, in fact, covers two issues, though they are 
closely related. One, stresses the excessive expenditure 
in money and labour-time on repairs while the other 
attacks the slowness in the replacement of old machines 
by n e w . I n  reply to the first criticism, it needs to-be 
stressed that the provision of a mechanized base to a 
country the size of the Soviet Union was a daunting task 
and thus, the replacement of obsolescent or obsolete 
machine tools would perforce be a gradual process.
However, it may well be that obsolescence due to rapid 
innovation, has not been allowed to play such a prominent 
role in Soviet industry, as it has in the West. The 
Soviet machine-making industries lacking an atmosphere 
of competition will not, as a consequence, place such a 
degree of emphasis on the concept of rapid replacement. 
There is also the additional and important point which 
Granick makes that, ... "a country in which labour is dear
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compared with capital will inevitably scrap equipment at
an earlier stage than will a country concerned primarily
135with economizing capital."
The second criticism of the Soviet industrial system 
has regard to the high level of integration within their 
plants. Due to the lack of a specialized feeder-network 
of ancillary industries,the Soviets initially opted for 
factories which had a 'closed cycle* of production thus 
inhibiting the movement towards improving the division of 
labour in the economy. This is therefore a valid 
criticism, for even as recently as 1955 the majority of 
machine tool manufacturers tended to produce approximately 
four times as many standard components as they purchased.
In the early years of Soviet planning there was an 
attempt to implement a policy to establish large specialized 
component factories. However, by the 1950*s this institut­
ionalised sub-structure of industry was still far from 
satisfactory. Thereafter though, the authorities made 
concerted efforts to re-kind^e their earlier verve and by 
the middle of the next decade, significant progress had been 
claimed. In terms of the production capacity of component 
factories, an increase was planned which, by 1965, would have
e n a b l e d  them to satisfy 47 per cent of the industry's demand
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for these items, compared with 21.5 per cent in 1957.
Finally, certain measures to improve specialization in the 
manufacture of components had, by 1968, made some impact 
as Berry has detailed, ... "of the 82 specialized factories 
20 produced only one type, 38 produced two or three types,
1
13 produced four types and 11 produced five to nine types."
(iii) Soviet Policy on Innovation
An important aspect of Soviet thinking concerning the 
development of machine tool production centred on the role 
of innovation. Through the process of planning the Soviets 
had specified the types of machine tools that were to be
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manufactured in the country and those that were to be 
imported. As was stated earlier, this approach was based 
on the concept of the "tipazh". From the beginning of 
planning, the types of machine tool products to be 
included in the ’tipazh* mirrored the Soviet authorities* 
desire to take advantage of particular factors, e.g. the 
surplus rural labour in the industrialization of the 
economy. However, a consequence ,of incorporating the 
*tipazh* concept into planning strategy meant that the 
state now assumed overall responsibility for ’invention - 
innovation*. This requirement is an expression that in' 
a centrally planned economy, competition does not exist - 
a fact of great significance to machine tool production.
According to the *Brown-Rosenberg* paradigm outlined 
in Chapter 2, innovation in machine tool manufacture occurs 
in response to the exigencies in demand from the machine 
tool users of the machine building industry. The paradigm 
attempts to describe these innovational motivations from 
within a capitalistic context. In a non-market economy 
such as the Soviet Union the situation is somewhat different, 
as a recent OECD report states, ... "In spite of the increas­
ing importance in Western research eind development of the 
government sector, the growing role of government policy 
and the great importance of large oligopolistic firms it 
remains true that for a substantial part of private and 
some state industry in all Western countries, it is the 
spur of competition on the market which presses firms to 
develop improved products and to cut costs by developing new 
production processes; if a firm does not seek to maximise 
its profit in the simplest terms of our economics text­
books, it at least seeks to maintain its share of the 
market; it is primarily in response to the challenge of 
the market that research and experimental production 
facilities are developed. Even in the case of companies 
which work mainly for the state, the wish not to lose 
development contracts to one *s rivals often still plays
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a major part. In the Soviet system as it emerged, about
1930, in the course of the industrialization drive, and
as it still exists today - the drive for technical progress
comes not from a competitive market but from central 
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government." Thus, the Soviet machine tool industry 
operates in an industrial environment very different to 
that of Europe or America. ' In particular, no special 
relationship' exists between the tool producers and their 
machine tool using customers. In fact, not only is there 
an absence of interaction between the machine tool and 
machine building industries but also between units within 
them. Hence, the critical factor for innovation .to 
take place in'the Soviet Union, as Berry has 
poignantly remarked .. "would appear to be the identity 
of interests between the state and its economic organization 
.., This means that the state takes on itself the risk 
involved, and those responsible for carrying out the work 
are not involved in any risk since they are merely carrying 
out the instructions of the plan. In their case failure is 
often penalized as little as success is rewarded — they 
are not true entrepeneurs."
A determinate approach toward innovation emerged 
simultaneously with the introduction of the 'tipazh' and 
the other related policy aspects covering machine tool 
production in the Soviet Union. It was in the early 
thirties that machine tool design and manufacture was estab­
lished as a centrally administered industry when the Chief 
Administration of the machine tool industry was set up.
This body was originally responsible to the peoples 
Commissariat of heavy industry but later became a separate 
all-union industrial ministry. The technical administra­
tion of the ministry was responsible for all the research, 
development and design work carried out by the industry.
The cornerstone to the ministry's innovation policy was 
its desire to avoid the costs of research and development. 
Indigenous design work was delegated to a series of
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'special design bureaux' (spetsial 'nye konstructorskie
Byoro - SKB) each of which concentrated on the design of
1 41a limited range of machine tool types. In all
probability though, the primary function of the SKB's
were as 'copying offices' where selected foreign machine
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tools were 'stripped, analysed, and tested.' Then,
after adaption to suit local factor conditions, the modified 
machine tool was ready to be considered for inclusion into 
the industry's production programme. There can be little 
doubt, therefore, that innovation in the Soviet machine 
tool industry was, in substantial degree, reliant on progress 
elsewhere.
It must be stated though, that it was not a whole­
sale transfer of technology but rather a selection of 
those 'bits of the package' deemed relevant to the Soviet 
pattern of development. This selectivity may have been, 
in part, due to the conservatism of the machine building 
industry. Machine builders perceived that little or no 
immediate advantage could be gained by them through the 
introduction of new techniques. Thus, unlike the dynamic 
elements of innovation fostered in the capitalist model, 
through the interaction between the machine tool producer 
and his customers - a dysfunctional relationship existed 
in the Soviet Union. The fact remains, however, that 
machine tool technology in the early stages of Soviet 
development did match the needs of its users. Even as 
recently as the 7th-Plan Period (1959-65) when all orders 
for machine tools were aggregated, 70 per cent were found 
to be for universal machines, i.e. labour-using machinery.
A related point connected to the role of the 'copying
offices' regards what may be termed as 'scaling-up 
143innovation'' On a general level, for a machine tool 
project or any part of that project to be viable in the 
Soviet Union, it must first be amenable to mass techniques 
of production. In this respect, all that indigenous 
technical progress may in effect have been, is a logical scalin 
up through numerous design modifications, of an original 
'classic' Western technolgy - being appropriate to the
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Soviet strategy of conserving scarce capital resources.
Hence, technical progress in the Soviet Union conforms to,
... "the application of engineering and experimental 
resources to a given known technology" and thus,
,.. "is not innovation in the sense that innovation
144
establishes nev; and formerly unknown technological horizons. 
This fact is important because it illustrates the apparently 
co-ordinated programme of action the Soviets pursued in 
terms of machine tool manufacture. Only in this instance, 
the objective was avoidance of the huge costs involved in 
research and development.
The inference to be gained from the foregoing exam­
ination of the major tenets of the development of the 
Soviet machine tool industry is that it was geared to 
producing low-cost machinery appropriate both to creating 
a mechanized base to the economy and to absorbing the 
abundant labour resources. It was an approach which led 
Granick, ... "to the tentative conclusion that capital- 
saving is the motivating principle for Soviet technical 
change,
(iv) The Soviet Model of Machine Tool Production :
A Cognitive Framework of Reference
The aim of this chapter has been to provide a 
foundation for the empirical analysis of the 'techno- 
economic development of the Indian machine tool industry'. 
Inherent in the Soviet strategy of industrialization has 
been the objective of expanding the rate of investment 
(savings ratio) in line with formal growth theory. This 
is a policy goal which is well documented in the economic 
literature. There has been a further goal though, of 
attempting to lower the economy's capital-output ratio 
which has received minimal attention by theorists of 
economic development. The policy reasons for this latter 
goal derive from the generally accepted view that economic 
growth, although fundamentally a function of the volume 
of capital used, is equally determined by the efficiency 
of its application. It was from this stance that the 
Soviets recognised the crucial importance of machine tool
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manufacture. Thus, efficiency in this core industry was 
essential.
The Soviets made no attempt to follow the conven­
tional model of machine tool production as it emerged in 
capitalistic countries. Instead, an alternative industrial 
philosophy was substituted which placed emphasis on the 
concept of what is currently termed 'total factor productivity* 
In a theoretical sense, this residual - a proxy for 
efficiency - is a 'pot pourri' of various economic factors. 
Nevertheless, the early Soviet strategy of machine tool 
manufacture appeared to encompass three of the more 
significant components comprising the residual : 
specialization, standardization and interchangeability of 
components, and scale. An additional aspect influencing total 
factor productivity in the Soviet machine tool industry 
concerns the role of innovation. The institutionaliz­
ation of innovation was, it must be noted, again a 
consequence of the Soviet approach towards conserving 
capital. By copying selected foreign designs the Soviets 
avoided the enormous expenditures that research and 
development involves. An additional advantage of the 
policy was that scientific effort could be directed 
towards fulfilling the requirements of the machine build­
ing industry in totality, rather than the cosmetic wants 
of a limited number of manufacturers.
The strategy of development followed by the Soviets 
in respect of their machine tool industry presupposes 
high rates of capital formation; priority of basic capital- 
goods industries; an import-substitution policy in 
international trade; utilization of underemployed 
agricultural labour for capital formation; and, a product- 
mix orientated toward labour-using machinery. It is a 
'model' of machine tool production of great originality 
and pertinence to other developing countries with large 
populations and similar resource endowments: It would 
make sense for India, China, or Brazil though not for
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Bangladesh or Sri Lanka.
In fact, the Indian machine tool branch in the early 
fifties was well placed to have emulated the Soviet
experience; however, its development took the more 
conventional Western course.
Although the structure of the industry with a hand- 
full of enterprises accounting for over 80 per cent of 
output value, closely conforms to the large machine tool 
parks in the Soviet Union, specialization has not been 
pursued to the same extent. In fact, one firm, Hindustan 
Machine Tools Ltd. (HMT) claims, that it produces the 
widest range of machine tools in the world. A feature 
incompatible with individual production units in either 
the Soviet or Western models.
Also, in the Indian industry, production is organised 
on a batch basis as per the Western experience of satisfy­
ing the particular requirements of each customer. This 
pattern of production is inappropriate to the economic 
conditions pertaining to India. Small production runs 
mean that overheads cannot be spread which, in turn, raises 
the cost of the final product. The lack of standard­
ization and interchangeability compound the issue.
In consequence, it seems that the Indian machine 
tool manufacturers fail to obtain economies from either 
specialization or scale.
This fact alone is clearly disturbing but worse is 
the part foreign technology has been allowed to play in 
the industry's product-mix. Technological change in the 
machine tool industry's product range has, to a consider­
able extent, been achieved via collaboration with foreign 
tool companies. However, whereas in the Soviet model the 
substitution of capital for labour was not the 'modus 
operandi' of the development approach, the opposite seems
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to have been true in the Indian case.
Armed with this appraisal of the early Soviet 
approach to machine tool manufacture, the study now 
moves forward to examine the development of India's 
machine tool sector. Chapter 2 provides an outline of 
the methodological approach to the study. A paradigm 
of innovation in machine tool production as based on 
Western practices is constructed. But, even though the 
industry has consistently emphasised the importance of 
product-innovation, in reality, only limited progress has 
occurred; the improvement of technology coming about 
instead via foreign collaboration. The paradigm would 
therefore seem to breakdown under Indian economic 
conditions. However, to argue on the basis of this, that 
India's choice of machine tool manufacturing strategy was 
inappropriate would be a premature rationalisation of the 
problem. An equally important element in the decision 
must surely have been the need to secure maximum levels 
of efficiency in the production process. Given that this 
was the case, the aim of this ptudy becomes an attempt to 
reach some determination on the success of this issue. 
Contrary to what might be expected though, this is not a 
straightforward exercise because, in similarity with the 
Soviet pattern of development, the industry was set two 
other goals besides capital-saving (the inevitable con­
dition) : rapid growth of output and technological self- 
sufficiency. Chapter 3 assesses the progress India's 
machine tool manufacturers have made toward the goal of 
growth whilst Chapter 4 does the same for the goal of 
self-sufficiency. The efficiency objective is explicitly 
analysed in Chapter 5. A multi-directional approach has 
been followed because it is felt there exists no single 
method that is capable of providing a satisfactory 
appraisal of the problem. Thus, a number of analytical 
techniques have been incorporated into the Chapter in an
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attempt to reach an evaluation of operational efficiency 
based on a comprehensive approach to the subject. 
Specifically, the chapter undertakes an examination of: 
single-factor productivity indexes; an aggregate pro­
duction function; a capacity utilization study; and 
finally, a survey of the progress that the branch has 
made in research, design and development work. The 
intention is that, in summation, all these various per­
spectives on the question of technological development 
will afford a more reflective and accurate picture of the 
state of efficiency reached by the industry. The study 
closes with a final chapter which attempts to bring 
all the various strands of the analysis together. From 
this, judgements are offered on the success and appropriate­
ness of the development strategy that the Indian machine 
tool branch pursued.
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Chapter 2
Scope and Methodological Approach of the Study
The importance of the machine tool industry to a 
developing country's quest for industrialization is high­
lighted when attention is directed to the fact that 
any artifact of modern civilization is made either on a 
machine tool or on a machine made by a machine tool.
Hence, machine tools can rightly be described as 'mother 
machinery' and basic to the concept of modern economy. 
Supporting the machine tool and essential to it, of 
course, are various processes which include casting, 
forging, stamping and so forth. These operations produce 
the raw metal embryo from which the machine tool manufac­
tures the components involved in the fabrication of 
machinery. In this way, all ideas and technical progress 
are tempered by the efficiency of the machine tool 
industry and its allied processes.
For the developing countries, there are three major 
reasons why they should attach a high priority to the 
possession of indigenous machine tool capacity:
Firstly, it is clearly the case that the economic 
health of the machine tool industry is inexorably linked 
to the level of mechanization in the economy. The demand 
for machine tools is positively related to economic growth 
and as this is, in turn, affected by the attractiveness 
of investment, the promotion of efficiency in this 'core' 
industry becomes of paramount concern. Improvements in 
the operating efficiency of machine tool production 
should, through an 'economic rippling' effect, raise the 
marginal efficiency of capital in the rest of the machine 
building sector. This will have favourable repercussions 
on investment opportunity and hence also on the pace of 
industrialization,
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Secondly, the machine tool industry may be looked 
upon as constituting a pool or reservoir of skills and 
technical knowledge which are employed throughout the 
entire machine building sector of the economy. The 
industry has been described by Rosenberg as a 'trans­
mission centre* in the diffusion of new technology as it 
deals with processes and problems common to an increasing 
number of other machine building industries. Moreover, 
this pattern, peculiar to the machine tool industry, 
i.e. the distribution of its sales to all other machine 
building industries, has, if. viewed from a long-term 
criteria, a significant impact on the degree of 'techno­
logical cross-fertilisation'. That is, the original 
innovation in the machine tool industry's product induces 
increased competition among firms comprising the market 
for machine tools and may therefore influence further innova­
tion in the tool branch, so benefiting all its customers.
Thirdly, from a development strategy point of view, 
developing countries possessing indigenous machine tool 
capacity are in a position to cbntrol the product-mix 
to suit their own requirements. As most developing 
countries suffer from acute unemployment, it is not un­
reasonable nor uneconomic due to their factor endowment, 
to suggest that machine tool output should be concentrated 
around appropriate, labour-intensive technology. This is 
especially the case when it is considered that the 
majority of world machine tool exports today consist of 
highly capital-intensive technology. Circumstances will 
arise, of course, where advanced technology with its 
attribute of enhanced accuracy will need to be allocated 
manufacturing capacity. But the creation and level of 
this capacity ought to be decided in the light of such 
considerations as effective demand and comparative cost.
If a machine tool manufacturing base is created and
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accorded 'key' status, thus ensuring the availability 
of scarce investment resources, special consideration 
could then be given to the design and production at 
optimal efficiency, of techniques most appropriate to 
the economic conditions prevailing within the economy of 
a developing country. Although it is being argued that 
the product-mix of the machine tool industry should, in 
the main, be geared to 'appropriate' technology, it 
should not be assumed that this also applies to the 
equipment with which this output is manufactured. V/liat 
is being put forward for examination is a model whereby, 
in its most crudest form : labour-intensive machine 
tools are produced in a capital-intensive way.
Even though the significance of the machine tool 
industry in the process of industrialization has been 
recognised in the economic literature, the subject has 
received only limited empirical investigation. This 
study then, is an attempt to redress the situation by 
examining the experience of India in its efforts to 
establish and develop machine tool capacity. India is 
chosen because it is a good example of a developing 
country which recognised at the start of its industrial­
ization programme the strategic importance of an indigenous 
machine tool industry. On this interpretation, policies 
were formulated which gave considerable emphasis to the 
growth and development of machine tool output.
An added justification for undertaking the study 
is that, in a poorly documented field, it might enable 
other developing countries planning the creation of their 
ov/n machine tool industries, if not to avoid, then at 
least to be made aware of the difficulties that are 
likely to be encountered. The major object in what is, 
in effect, unchartered territory is to examine the approach 
to, and efficiency of machine tool manufacture in a country 
such as India. The approach is mainly empirical with the
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emphasis being to study, measure and explain the actual 
conditions, relationships,and trends which have had a 
bearing on the development of the machine tool industry. 
Their significance can then be assessed in terms of India's 
industrialization and economic growth.
Section 1 : Empirical and Definitional Aspects 
of the Study
(i ) Data Base
There has never been a study on the development of 
the Indian machine tool industry. One effect of this 
situation is that there are almost no primary, sources 
of academic writing on the subject. For information, 
therefore, there was no alternative but to approach, via 
a survey, the industry itself. So to begin the chapter, 
a description is given of the organizational aspects of 
the research by briefly detailing the scope of the data; 
the approach to the fieldwork; and finally, the problems 
encountered during the period of survey.
This study limits itself to an examination of the 
machine tool industry in the organised industrial sector 
of India which according to the Directorate General of 
Technical Development (DGTD) comprised in 1977 of 120 
machine tool manufacturing units with a production 
capacity of Rs.llO crores. The term 'organised 
industrial sector' requires clarification; the simplest 
way of achieving this, is through an explanation of the 
coverage of the government's statistical surveys of 
industry.
The principal data-source for India's industries 
is the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI). The statistical 
records of the ASI became available in 1959, replacing 
the previous, less comprehensive, 'Sample Survey of
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Manufacturing Industries’ which were begun in 1950. For 
the machine tool industry under the ASI criteria, all 
factories in what is referred to as the ’census sector' 
are completely enumerated. The census sector being 
defined as those units employing 50 or more workers with 
the aid of power or a 100 or more workers without the aid 
of power. In addition, there is what is termed the 
’sample sector’,and the ASI covers this on a sample basis. 
Establishments in the sample sector are defined as those 
employing 10 to 49 workers with the aid of power or 20 
to 99 workers without power. Thus, the ASI data includes 
all establishments except those employing less than 10 
workers using power, and less than 20 workers without 
power. These exceptions in most instances are usually 
referred to as the ’informal' or ’tiny' sector. The 
•organised industrial sector' then, given that it is 
inconceivable that machine tools can be manufactured in 
the absence of power corresponds to the ASI coverage of: 
those companies employing 50 or more workers in the 
census sector and 10 to 49 workers in the sample sector.
The original intention of the study was to utilize 
the ASI s t a t is t ic sa nd  supplement it with the more 
disaggregated data that could be obtained from a survey 
of the major companies in the organised sector of the 
machine tool industry. Certain statistical information was 
to be sought in an attempt to establish comparative 
efficiency levels on a sectoral (public versus private) 
basis. At the same time, data of a more qualitative nature 
would be gathered to assist in the formulation of assess­
ments on non-numerate areas of enquiry. To assist in 
this aim, the decision was taken, after discussion 
with ASI personnel in India, to structure the numerical 
parts of the questionnaire so that they closely resembled 
the format of the ASI's own questionnaire. The rationale 
behind this move centred on the possibility of utilizing 
the ASI's fieldwork operations.
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The ASI’s survey of the machine tool industry is 
conducted by its field officers who visit each company 
in the sample. With the assistance of representatives 
of the company a standardized questionnaire is then 
completed. The companies are legally obliged to co­
operate with the ASI staff and to provide any data as 
is required to compile the return. At the same time, 
a copy of the questionnaire is prepared for the benefit 
of the participating company. On examination, this copy 
of the ASI questionnaire was found to contain most of the 
statistical information sought by this study. Thus, the 
fact that the terminology and layout for the quantitative 
sections of the present study’s questionnaire were 
influenced almost entirely by the design of the ASI 
document can be justified on two grounds:
(i) from a purely operational point of view it meant 
that the statistical data required to complete 
the questionnaire already existed in final form 
in the files of the companies' copies of the ASI 
returns; and further, that
(ii) analytical technique would be strengthened by 
introducing a greater measure of consistency into 
the numerical data since now, the statistics from 
the survey would also conform to ASI definitions.
However, at the close of the survey, although more 
than sufficient material was obtained for a descriptive 
appraisal of the economic state of the machine tool 
industry the same, unfortunately, could not be said about 
the statistical side of the research. In consequence, 
while much of the qualitative information contained in 
the tables which thread their way through this study 
derive from the survey, the statistical data, by contrast, 
originates from the aggregated ASI data published by the 
government (Appendix 1). The quantitative analysis is
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thus constrained to that extent.
It is also worthwhile to mention that in many 
respects the data in India, as in other developing 
countries, is open to question regarding its accuracy. 
Therefore, it should be emphasised that such inferences 
as may be gained from the analysis should be interpreted 
as illustrative rather than conclusive; the aim being 
to argue general tendencies as against clinical state­
ments of fact,
(ii) The Fieldwork
The Social.Science Research Council had agreed to 
finance a survey period of nine months from the October 
of 1977 to end-June 1978. During that period, study 
accommodation had been arranged at the Indian Institute 
of Science which is situated in Bangalore. For the 
purposes of conducting a survey of the machine tool 
industry, Bangalore is an excellent base : not only because 
of its geographical location but also because it is the 
hub of machine tool activity in India, playing host to 
the headquarters and two units of the massive public 
sector undertaking, HMT, and also the offices of the 
Central Machine Tool Institute (CMTI).
The first draft of a questionnaire was prepared at 
the University of Glasgow during the summer of 1977. 
Although, over the course of the first six weeks in 
Bangalore, the rough outline of this document was mod­
ified three times. Initially, alterations were made after 
consultation with interested parties at the Institute of 
Science. The Director of the CMTI, Mr. Vishvesveran 
also provided useful suggestions on the form the question­
naire should take. In addition, much advice was gained 
from discussions with the staff at the local ASI office 
in Bangalore, the outcome from which has already been
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described. The final alterations to the preliminary 
questionnaire came about through a pilot survey of five 
small and medium sized firms in the Bangalore area.
The problems that arose were due mainly to the ambiguity 
of certain questions, all of which were subsequently 
clarified. On top of that, one or two questions were 
dropped altogether because they were revealed as either 
inappropriate or irrelevant to the circumstances of the 
industry.
In the December of 1977, one hundred copies of the 
final questionnaire were printed and made ready for the 
survey proper. This form of return (Appendix 2) was 
divided into three parts : (1)an introduction; (2)the 
questionnaire itself; and (3)a section itemizing topics 
for discussion at the interview situation. The question­
naire section was further sub-divided into the following 
areas of enquiry, seeking information on : employment, 
production, technology, capacity utilization, research 
and development, and other miscellaneous data.
Originally the names and addresses of approximately
one hundred and twenty firms in the organised sector of
India's machine tool industry were obtained from a pub-
1
lication housed in the library at India House, London. 
However, on arrival in India and after a closer examin­
ation of these companies' manufacturing activities, it 
was decided to restrict the sample to roughly eighty 
firms by eliminating those that were involved in the 
production of machine tool accessory equipment such as 
carbide tips, welding machinery, inspection equipment 
and measuring instruments. The evaluation of each 
company's product range was facilitated by reference to 
the members directory of the Indian Machine Tool 
Manufacturers Association (IMTMA). This directory was, 
thus, the source for the eighty or so firms selected
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for survey. Moreover, as the members of IMTMA are 
recognised as producers of ’quality’ machine tools it 
was felt highly likely they would also be included in 
the ASI survey. A judgement later to be vindicated.
For the purposes of the survey, four geographical 
areas of concentrated machine tool production were 
identified; they were located in (1) Bombay/Poona,
(2) Delhi, (3) Ludhiana (Punjab), and (4) Bangalore/ 
Coimbatore. Ninety per cent of the firms surveyed were 
situated in these four regions. Those firms which fell 
outside these four areas and were deemed important enough 
for inclusion were mainly those with relatively large 
market share. Examples of such firms include Mysore 
Kirloskar based at Harihar, the largest manufacturer of 
machine tools in the private sector; Praga Ltd., of 
Secunderabad, and the Heavy Engineering Corporation at 
Ranchi, which are both in the public sector. A further 
ten companies of lesser, though not insignificant, 
importance were contacted through a postal survey.
These companies were sited in scattered areas of India 
and were, in consequence, impractical to visit.
Numerous problems were encountered during the survey 
and although none proved insurmountable they did form 
a source of constant irritation. In the initial instance 
of establishing contact with a company, the first step 
was naturally to telephone and arrange, at a mutually 
convenient time, an interview with an agent. Fore­
knowledge of the name of the appropriate person to 
interview was always an advantage and even more helpful 
was the consent of the secretary of the Indian Machine 
Tool Manufacturers' Association (IMTMA), Mr. Sulakhe, to 
allow his name to be used as a mode of introduction.
Before arriving at the company though, there were
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normally difficulties encountered with establishing its 
location. Taxis could be used of course, but for Bombay, 
Delhi,and Calcutta which are all comparatively expensive 
cities, this method of transport would have been unreal­
istic on the budget at hand. Therefore, much effort was 
expended, particularly in the metropolitan areas of these 
cities, by using public transport and/or the services of 
the rickshaw wallahs to travel to the various companies. 
Problems also arose from the fact that the list of members 
of the IMTMA was some years out of date. The seriousness 
of this deficiency became painfully obvious when,after 
spending many hours attempting to locate a company,it was 
found that one of the following had occurred: the firm 
had ceased manufacturing machine tools and now concentrated 
instead on allied engineering activities; it had moved 
location; or finally it had ceased production altogether. 
Such disconcerting discoveries occurred on numerous 
occasions over the period of survey.
The interviews by contrast were, given a power-cut 
or two, conducted without major problems. Only for a 
limited number of firms in Ludhiana were there difficulties 
with language and these were usually small family concerns 
of minor significance to the industry as a whole. All 
the companies contacted held files on the ASI questionnaire 
although in many cases their copies only went back three 
or four years. At a number of the larger multi-product 
organisations, manufacturing an assortment of engineering 
items besides machine tools, it was found that the 
statistics contained in the copies of the ASI questionnaire 
related to the aggregated data of all the operations of 
the firm. This was clearly unsatisfactory as it would 
have produced an upward bias in the value of machine tool 
production of the firm. In these cases, requests were 
made to the companies concerned to calculate as far as 
v/as feasible - in the sense of the work involved and the 
accuracy of the estimates obtained - figures which
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represented the contribution of machine tool manufacture 
within the activities of the company. In the event, 
these requests were usually acceded to but in cases where 
the company was unable to comply or the accuracy of the 
estimates were in doubt, the firm's involvement in the 
survey was, without exception, not continued with. 
Follow-up contacts with recalcitrant companies were made 
by post, telephone, telegram and even, in a great many 
instances, by re-visiting the factory.
On return to Britain it was felt useful to survey 
six machine tool enterprises which in the recent past 
had, or in some cases still have, collaboration agreements 
with Indian concerns. The questionnaire used in this 
survey (Appendix 2) was divided into two parts. Part A 
sought descriptive information regarding the problems, 
if any, of the collaboration agreement. Part B, on the 
other hand, contained several tables which were judged to 
be of importance in attempting a comparative analysis of 
various economic variables in the industries of both 
countries. Unfortunately though, in similarity to the 
experience in India, there was a poor response to the 
quantitative part of the questionnaire. Where tables 
utilizing survey data are included in the text, an 
indication of the response rate to that particular 
question will also be given. The response rates for the 
Indian and British surveys as a whole are listed below:
Response Rates to Machine Tool Industry
Surveys in India Britain
Interviews 65 6
Completed questionnaires
returned 40 4
Response {%) 61.5 66.7
Postal contact 10
Completed questionnaires
returned 0
Response {%) • 0
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(i i i) Definition of a Machine Tool
A spiral staircase involves problems of definition
although easy to recognise, once seen; the machine tool,
2
in contrast, is difficult in both respects. It is 
important, therefore, that there exists a clear under­
standing of what is meant by the term 'machine tool', 
not only from a general point of view but also in the 
particular operational context of India.
During the early industrialization of Britain and 
America the demand for machine tool technology usually 
existed before the tool itself. The products of the 
industry were, and still are, built to the responses 
and requirements of its customers. There is no gain 
saying that James Watt built the first workable machine -' 
the steam engine, without also mentioning that the 
successful arrival of this engine was delayed for years 
as he was unable to obtain sufficient compression from 
the fit between piston and cylinder. To quote from 
Hine ... "he [Watt] tried in many ways to fill the gap 
by stuffing it with anything available : cloth, leather, 
tallow - all to no avail. If the piston could not be 
made to fit the cylinder, it could not produce power."
John Wilkinson solved the problem by inventing the first 
effective machine tool ... "a horizontal boring mill with 
a boring bar supported outside of the work and thus 
independent of the irregularities of the rough cut 
cylinder.
Wilkinson's boring mill is an example of a machine 
tool which progressively 'cuts' metal and produces waste 
in the form of chips. Other machine tools to be found 
in this category include lathes, planing, drilling and 
grinding machines. Allied to this group is a category 
of machine tools which 'forms' metal into various shapes 
and sizes. Examples of forming machine tools are presses.
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shapers and hammers. There are two important character­
istics of these cutting and forming tools which set them 
aside from other machinery. Namely, that they are 
installed (immobile in the short-run) and that they are 
power-driven. From this, it is clear then, that a 
handsaw, even though it cuts metal, is not a machine 
tool because it is neither fixed nor power-driven.
Equally, a portable drill is not a machine tool because 
even though it cuts metal and is power-driven, it cannot 
be regarded as immobile. Thus, machine tools are 
defined as: metal-cutting and metal-forming machinery 
of an installed nature and having the facility of being 
driven by power.
The aforementioned factors are composite to the 
American National Machine Tool Builders Association's 
definition of a machine tool as ... "a power driven 
machine not portable by hand, used to shape or form 
metal by cutting, impact, pressure, electrical techniques 
or a combination of these processes."^ Floud in his 
history of the British machine tool industry uses a sim­
ilar defination but in this case particular mention is 
made of the role of the operator, thus ... " [[machine 
tools a.re[J contrivances in which a cutting tool is used 
to bring a piece of metal to the shape, size and degree 
of finish required by the operator and which to some 
degree reduce the manipulative skill and physical strength
5
he needs to achieve his object." On observation, there 
does appear to be a glaring error in this definition 
with the omission of explicit mention of metal-forming 
machine tools; this cannot be justified. Similarly, 
neither can a Soviet definition which deals with the 
subject in a highly superficial manner, defining a machine 
tool as ... "A machine for making articles of a given 
shape, size and accuracy (according to blue-prints) by 
removing metal from work pieces."^ It is interesting to 
note, however, the attention that the same author later gives 
to the Russian Experimental Machine Tool Research
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Institute's method of sub-defining machine tools according 
to their degree of functional specialization. As per:
(i) General purpose : Machines used to work a wide
(universal) range of parts; and machines
used for a particularly wide
range of work are known as
multi-purpose.
(ii) Specialized : Machines used for articles
similar in shape but different 
in size,
(iii) Limited purpose : Machines capable of a narrow
range of operation on a wide
variety of work pieces.
(iv) Special purpose : Machines for making parts of
one size and type, '
Whilst the term machine tool normally encompasses 
non-portable, power-driven, metal-cutting and metal- 
forming machines, complications invariably arise when the 
definition is placed into an operational context. In 
India, the DGTD has, for statistical purposes, categorized 
machine tools into two groups of A and B. Included in 
group A are the familiar collection of metal-cutting arid 
metal-forming machine tools, while group B consists of 
a motley assortment of ; secondary metal-forming machines, 
machine tool accessories, portable tools, plastic extrud­
ing and injection-moulding machines, woodworking machines, 
foundry moulding machines and some other metal-working 
and forming machines not included in group A. The 
National Sample Survey Organisation, a government body in 
the industrial statistics wing of the Central Statistical 
Office aggregates the data from both groups when publish­
ing its Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) Report for 
industry no.357 - 'manufacture of machine tools, their 
parts and accessories'. This fact must be borne in mind 
because a potential area of confusion exists here. The 
reason being that although numerous documents and reports 
in India refer to the ASI data, the comparative inter­
national statistics of the machine tool industry compiled 
annually by 'American Machinist' relate only to group A
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production figures including those of India, In the 
present study, all references to machine tool output, 
exports etc. will, unless otherwise stated, be in terms 
of the ASI definition.
(iv) The Machine Building Industry
In formulating a methodological approach to appraise 
the contribution the machine tool industry makes in the 
process of industrialization,it will be helpful if the 
analysis is articulated in terms of the relationship 
that it holds with the industries using its products.
The theoretical implication of this is to breakdown the 
capital goods sector, in the Marxian scheme of repro-
7
duction, into two sub-branches. One is devoted to the 
manufacture of capital goods for use in this sector t 
the machine tool industry, and the other to manufacturing 
capital goods directly for the consumer goods sector : 
the mechanical engineering industries. It is ari approach 
reflected to some extent in the philosophy of early
Q
Indian planning. Moreover, this dichotomy allows dis­
cussion to be directed toward the interdependence between 
the machine tool industry and the mechanical engineering 
sector which is fundamental to an understanding of the 
crucial role machine tool production plays in the 
process of innovation.
Mechanical engineering is a sector which possesses 
key status in the initial and on-going phases of 
industrialization. This is reflected in Rostow's 
assertion that engineering goods are a leading force in 
propelling a country forward in its drive for economic 
maturity. Thus, ,., "after the railway take-offs of the 
third quarter of the 19th century - with coal, iron and 
heavy engineering at the centre of the growth process - 
it is steel, the new ships, chemicals, electricity and 
the products of the modern machine tool that came to 
dominate the economy and sustain the overall rate of
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growth." That Rostow's supposition is reasonable is 
based on the fact that in recent times, of the nascent 
modern industries of the developing world, mechanical 
engineering is a sector which has attained high relative 
rates of output growth.
Perhaps the most important single unifying factor 
linking the varied output of the mechanical engineering 
sector is concerned with the processing of metals and in 
particular with the transformation of metals into 
machinery for further use in the operation of a myriad 
other industries. This transformation of raw or semi­
finished metals into machinery is carried out by machine 
tools. Thus, the machine tool industry occupies a 
central position within the total capital goods sector.
At the same time, it cannot easily be distinguished from 
many of the other branches of engineering activity since 
the processes of production are very similar, since most 
engineering firms are capable of making or at least 
modifying machine tools to suit their own purposes and 
since historically, many machine tool firms have also made 
other types of engineering products or have turned to 
machine tool production from other branches of engineering. 
The development of the American machine tool industry is 
a case in point: ... "Whereas the production of heavier, 
general-purpose machine tools-lathes, planers, boring 
machines - was initially undertaken by the early textile 
machine shops in response to the internal requirements 
of their own industry and of the railroad industry, the 
lighter, more specialized high-speed machine tools - 
turret lathes, milling machines, precision grinders - 
grew initially out of the production requirements of arms 
makers. Somewhat later, the same role was played by the 
manufacturers of sewing machines and, toward the end of 
the period under consideration, by the demands of bicycle 
and automobile manufacturers."^^ Equally, the British 
machine tool company, Alfred Herbert Ltd., grew out of
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a steam engine building firm. The company commenced
machine tool production when Alfred Herbert secured the
agency for a French patent of great value in the manufacture
of tubes for the fast expanding cycle trade in Coventry
at the turn of the century. On the basis of his profits
from this patent the company began to make the machine
12tools for the cycle trade. Finally, in India, there
are the examples of Mysore Kirloskar and Coopers Ltd.
These firms are among the largest private sector machine
tool manufacturers in the country, and both started life
in the early thirties as general engineering concerns.
The process by which the machine tool industry has
developed and the process by which it has developed its
products is, therefore, one of constant interaction with
the other many branches of engineering which supply its
customers, inspire its inventions and train its labour
force and on whose investment plans its prosperity 
13depends.
Definitions of the mechanical engineering sector
are, however, many and varied. The Association of Indian
Engineering Industry includes thirteen major industrial
14groups in its definition. An analagous situation
exists in Britain. The first British Census of Production
classified the output of the sector under forty separate 
15headings. Even the 1973 census recorded mechanical 
engineering as possessing twenty groups of industrial 
activity with a further twelve sub-headings contained 
t h e r e i n . F o r  the purposes of this study, mechanical 
engineering is felt to be too broad a concept. It is a 
system of classifications which aggregates the engineering 
production statistics of such multifarious activities as 
the manufacture of watches and clocks to - in the case of 
India - the repair of bicycles and cycle rickshaws.
Machine tool production on the other hand, is characterized 
by the fabrication of metal and electrical accessories 
into industrial machinery. Hence, it would be more
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appropriate when analysing the relationship of the 
machine tool industry with the mechanical engineering 
sector, to place emphasis on those industries which 
perform similar metal-transforming functions. Therefore, 
the following major industry categories within the Indian 
engineering sector have been grouped together to form 
what will be termed as the ' machine building industry' :
35 manufacture of machinery, except electrical machinery;
36 manufacture of electrical machinery, apparatus,
supplies and parts; and,
37 manufacture of transport equipment and parts.
Although all three, groups are clearly members of the 
engineering sector many countries identify electrical 
machinery and transport equipment as distinct production 
divisions separate from the 'machinery' industry. In 
the current study, all three groups will be combined to 
provide a conceptually rigorous definition. The just­
ification for this approach is that it follows conventional 
practice. The method conforms to the approach of: three major
studies; two referring to the Soviet machinery industry,
17and the other to the Chinese. According to Rothstein,
the industry group entitled 'machinery' in the Soviet
industrial statistics included the following sub-groups :
machine tools and tools, prime-movers and electrical
equipment, general machine building and production of
technological equipment for individual branches of the
economy, transportation machinery, automobiles and tractors,
18and agricultural machinery. Moorstein, in his study of
Soviet 'machinery' defined the concept according to
Soviet statistical conventions including not only machinery
(except electrical) but also electrical machinery and
19transportation equipment. Finally, Cheng's study of 
the machine building industry in Communist China contained 
a similar definition as those of the above authors where 
the electrical and transportation industries were again 
explicitly included alongside the machinery (except
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electrical) industry.
Section 2 : The Theoretical Framework
(i) Towards an Understanding of Innovation in 
the Machine Tool Industry
It should by now be understood that the machine 
building industry is composed of firms engaged in a multi­
tude of metal fabricating operations. The feature common 
to all these enterprises is the machine tool with which 
their products are manufactured. Indubitably, there 
exists a special relationship between the machine tool 
producers and the machine building industry which comprises 
the most important of the machine tool users. This nexus 
needs to be emphasised because the development of the 
machine building industry is influenced to a considerable 
extent by the choice and quality of the productive capital 
at its disposal. Furthermore, if there is limited recourse 
to machine tool imports then the ability to effect technical 
progression in the industry will be constrained ultimately 
by the competence of the indigenous machine tool manufac­
turers. Certain stimuli to innovation both internal and 
external to the machine tool industry emerge from this 
pattern of industrial involvement. The mechanics of the 
inter-play which are discussed below, are important because 
they highlight the central role machine tool production 
can play in a country's efforts to industrialize.
The major motivation for internal technological 
change within the machine tool industry stems from its 
unique 'reproduction function'. That is, the industry 
produces machine tools which are themselves used for the 
production of other machine tools. Although the production 
of machine tools for use in other industries is more 
important quantitatively, the reproduction function of 
the industry is especially significant for economic growth.
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This is because the reproduction characteristic motivates
the machine tool industry to improve technology for
20producing its own machine tools.
In addition to the internal motivation to innovate, 
there are also two external stimuli which induce innov­
ation in the machine tool industry's products. Both are 
transmitted from the machine building industry and both 
are the consequences of opposing extremes in the level of 
demand for the tool manufacturers' output. As this 
interaction holds textual importance for the present 
study, it will be worthwhile devoting time to a descript­
ion of the processes involved in each of these external 
motivations.
21Quoting extensively from an article by W.H. Brown, 
the bare theorectical bones of the first external motiv­
ation are obtained. Brown's paper is a report on his 
empirical research into the determinants of innovation in 
the American machine tool industry. A theory of innovation 
is formulated which crystalises around the hypothesis 
that ... "the introduction of new machine tools and the 
timing of their introduction can be understood as a 
planned attempt on the part of the machine tool firm
to increase demand for its product ... when the demand
22for machine tools falls." It will be useful to identify 
and briefly discuss the theorectical building blocks 
Brown uses to construct his hypothesis.
Early on in his thesis, Brov/n asserts that ... "the
specialization of machine tool firms has important
23implications for the process of innovation." His 
argument is that the demand from the machine building 
industry is limited by the specialized nature of a machine 
tool firm's product. The theory is supported by empirical 
data Brown gained from interviews with machine tool 
companies. It appears they think of the demand for their
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products in terms of 'feast or famine* which in con­
junction with their behaviour of 'stocking-up' the 
market induces them to believe the amount of tools they 
sell now will affect the amount that can be sold later. 
Therefore, in order to expand, the machine tool firm must 
create a fresh market by developing ... "a new design 
[[which] must offer an improved method of operation.
Brown produces varied evidence which taken together 
tends to justify his contention that not only have machine 
tool firms been able to deliberately render the machine 
building industry's production machinery obsolete but 
more importantly, they possess the ability to hasten 
obsolescence.
To increase demand then, innovation must occur.
However, the introduction of a new design involves costs
and Brown distinguishes two types. To quote ... " [there
are] direct costs which are associated with the research
and design process involved in moving from the shelf of
ideas to the actual design, and costs which are associated
25with the production of a new machine." Thus, a definite 
stimulus is required in order to induce machine tool firms 
to innovate. It is at this point that the special relation­
ship between the machine tool industry and the machine 
building industry becomes explicit. This is because the 
stimulus to innovate derives externally from the slacken­
ing demand of the machine building industry. Quoting from 
Brown again, ... "the costs associated with new design 
have an important influence on the timing of innovation.
A positive incentive is necessary before a machine tool 
firm will introduce a new design. This incentive is to be 
found in the desire to maintain or increase sales.
Bro\m provides further support to his argument by stating 
that during periods of high turnover the engineering 
personnel in the machine tool industry are fully occupied 
with problems associated with current production whereas 
when demand is depressed they have more time to concentrate 
on designing new and improved machine tools.
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To summarize Brown's theory: demand for a machine 
tool firm’s output is limited by its degree of special­
ization. Thus, for it to maintain or increase its share 
of the market, innovation must take place. It is when 
the expected loss in revenue and hence profits from the 
falling demand for machine tool products becomes greater 
than the estimated costs of investment into new designs 
that the incentive to innovate becomes overwhelming.
The motivation to innovate is, therefore, external to the 
machine tool firm and originates from the static or dec­
lining investment of its machine building customers.
The second external motivation inducing machine tool
firms to innovate also has, as its source, the machine
building industry. To attempt a reasoning on this model,
discussion is again directed to the example of the American
machine tool industry; however, it applies equally to the
British. In this case, an article by Rosenberg entitled
'Technological change in the machine tool industry - 
271840-1910' weaves a theory of innovation into the key.
f
factors involved in the industry's development.
Rosenberg commences his examination of the 'port­
entously rapid' rate of technological innovation which 
accompanied American industrialization with an analysis 
of the development of the metal-using industries. The 
growth and increasing specialization of firms in this 
sector were characterized by the emergence of similar 
productive processes common to a large number of industries. 
Rosenberg ascribes the process to the application of 
decentralised power sources in the working of metals.
He believes that this generated the employment of 
... "similar skills, techniques and facilities at some
of the higher stages of production for a wide range of
28final products." The argument is important because it 
meant that some of the vertical sequences of production 
in various industries became related or 'technically
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convergent' in Rosenberg's terminology. As he states,
... "it is because these processes and problems became 
common to the production of a wide range of disparate 
commodities that industries which were apparently un­
related from the point of view of the nature and final
uses of the product became very closely related (technically
29convergent) on a technological basis."
The evolvement of technical convergence was also an
important pre-condition which permitted growing industries
30to pursue what Stigler terms 'vertical disintegration'.
That is, the opportunity for firms to develop and 
specialize in the production of a particular sequence in 
the vertical operations of enterprises in separate ind­
ustries. Rosenberg emphasises, moreover, that vertical 
disintegration without technical convergence would have 
been insufficient to have initiated the enormous growth 
in the American *machino-facture' sector during the years 
under consideration. He suggests that the latter concept 
is of primary importance.' Quoting again, ... "the
degree of specialization achieved owed its existence, 
in large part, to the fact that certain technical proces­
ses were common to many industries. Individual firms 
producing nothing but milling machines could not have
emerged in an economy where only firearms manufacturers
31employed milling machines." The machine tool industry 
both evolves from and facilitates this process by 
specializing in the production of a fine range of 
heterogeneous output in response to the specifications 
of its customers. Thus, it may be said that the product 
specialization of the firms comprising the machine tool 
industry is a direct consequence of the expansion and 
vertical disintegration taking place in the machine 
building industry.
Integrated within the machine tool industry's high 
degree of product specialization is a 'learning process'
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which imbued its workers with a heightened dexterity
32in manual skills. The dynamic externalities of this 
learning process are germinated in machine tool production. 
Once the new skills and techniques have been developed 
in response to the demands of particular customers, the 
machine tool enterprise then transmits them through the 
enhanced efficiency embodied in the design and/or improved 
manufacture of its products to other machine tool-using 
firms in the economy. The upshot of this diffusion is a 
continuum in the cycle of learning in the machine tool 
industry. This becomes evident if attention is focused on 
the industry’s unique role in the solution of technological 
problems and the transmission and application of innovation 
throughout the entire machine building sector. These 
technological externalities derive from the machine tool 
industry being looked upon as a ’transmission centre’ in 
the spreading of new technology. Moreover, the distrib­
ution of its sales to all types of enterprise within the 
machine building industry has, if viewed from a long 
term criteria, a significant impact on the extent of 
’technological cross-fertilization*.
In any one sector, however, innovation in a machine
tool company's product will induce increased competition
between rival firms in the machine building industry.
The more buoyant and competitive the market is, the
more likely it is that rival firms would be forced to
improve existing production technology in order to
maintain their competitive position. The process will,
due to heightened profit potential, motivate further
innovation in the tool industry. Thus, Rosenberg’s 
33analysis provides the second external stimulus to 
machine tool innovation which occurs, pari passu, with 
the increasing rivalry of units in the machine building 
industry.
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Although, not specifically referring to the machine
34tool industry, a study by Schmookler reinforces the 
foregoing analysis by arguing that demand-side consider­
ations are the major determinant of variations in an 
industry's inventive efforts. By utilizing the abundant 
data on the American Railroad industry, Schmookler 
discovered a close relationship between increases in the 
purchase of railroad equipment and components, and 
slightly lagged increases in inventive effort as measured 
by new patents on such items. The lag is important 
because it suggests that it is variations in the sale 
of equipment which stimulates inventive effort. In 
addition, for a number of industries he finds a very high 
correlation between capital goods inventions for an 
industry and the volume of sales of capital goods to 
that industry. Schmookler's thesis therefore tends to 
lend credence to the 'competitive pressures' theorizing 
contained in external motivation (2),
It should be noted in passing that Rosenberg in a
separate article qualified Schmookler's findings on the
overriding importance of demand in the promotion of
invention-innovation by suggesting that ... "it is
precisely because of the versatility of man's enlarged
inventory of scientific and technical skills that demand-
35side forces retain their primacy." Further, he argues 
that the 'supply' of invention and innovation is not 
perfectly elastic as Schmookler implies because it depends 
on the perception of entrepreneurs to the costs - equivalent 
to those described in Brown's model - involved in its 
successful undertaking. Bearing this qualification in 
mind, regarding the capability and costs of a machine 
tool firm to innovate, then all contributers to the dis­
cussion would concur, it is demand - an external force, 
which stimulates innovative effort.
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The features common to both Brov/n and Rosenberg's 
theorizing stress the centrality of specialization and 
the costs of undertaking innovation. Of no less import­
ance is the implicit emphasis both studies give to the 
atomistic structure of the machine tool industry. Thus, 
in contrasting these opposing theories, it appears that 
the crucial difference lies in the respective assumptions 
regarding the timing of the introduction of the innovation, 
In Brown's model,a 'mature* machine tool industry's 
motivation to innovate turns on the vagaries of cyclical 
activity. Specifically, this will only be during periods 
of falling demand when the industry attempts to maintain 
profits, or at least market-share, through the creation 
of a new market. Rosenberg's analysis, by comparison, 
reflects rising demand and competition in the industry 
either in the initial industrialization of a developing 
country or via the upswing of the business cycle in a 
modern economy. Both points of view, however, have 
reference to Schumpeter's most prominent economic hy­
pothesis in respect of inventive activity - that it is 
motivated by the prospect of maintaining or acquiring 
monopoly p r o f i t s . T h e r e f o r e ,  the indeterminancy 
associated with the difference in the timing of inno­
vation is undermined,to some extent, by the consistency 
of the underlying influence in both models, i.e. the 
desire to maintain or acquire monopoly profits. With 
this in view, it now becomes possible to synthesise the 
tv/o theories into a single paradigm which in the next 
section can be tested against the developmental exper­
ience of the Indian machine tool industry.
(ii) The Relevancy of the Brown-Rosenberg 
Paradigm under Indian Conditions
A stage has now been reached where this theoretical 
framework can be rationalised in terms of the specific 
scenario of Indian industrialization. Initially, one of 
the aims of this study was to test the validity of the 
Brown-Rosenberg paradigm against the evidence of
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innovation in the development of the Indian machine tool 
industry. But this approach is untenable as only a 
cursory glance at the industry's patent registrations 
will reveal. Table 7 shows the patent registrations only 
for the years after 1945, as prior to this no Indian 
patents for machine tools existed. 'Total Patents' 
include those of foreign companies who have no manufact­
uring facilities in India but wish to protect their 
product from being copied. The evidence on patent 
registrations indicates that the Indian machine tool 
industry's innovative performance has been negligible.
Table 7 : Patents Issued for Machine Tools for Cutting
and Working Metal (Patent Classification No.129)
Drilling Machine 
Milling Machines 
Planing,
Slotting Machines 
Turning Machines
Shaping and
Total
India
15 
 ^8
9
20
52
Total
99
53
50
135
337
% Share of 
Indian Patents 
to total______
15.1
15
18 f 
14.8
15.4
Source : Registration Catalogues, Government of India 
Patent Office, Calcutta.
a Jan. 1955
b Jan. 1955
c Jan. 1955
d Jan. 1955
April 1974 
April 1973 
Oct. 1973 
June 1975
In fact, the situation is worse than it appears because 
included under the Indian patent registrations are firms 
with foreign collaborations. A proportion of these 
Indian patents, therefore, will not represent indigenous 
innovation but rather the attempts by Indian firms and 
their foreign partners to halt encroachment of their 
market through local firms copying their product. Thus
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the Brown-Rosenberg model of innovation breaks down in 
the context of the Indian machine tool industry; but why 
should this be the case? Three reasons are put forward 
for consideration though not necessarily in order of 
importance.
Firstly, it is implausible to believe that vertical 
disintegration in the machine building industries of the 
developing world can tal<e place merely through a trans­
plant of foreign technology. More likely an 'evolutionary 
process' is required whereby existing patterns of production 
are gradually transformed to incorporate not only those 
firms which would emerge to specialize in the various 
sequences of production that are common to many metal- 
using industries, but for the development of a network of 
specialist ancillary industries also. However, for a 
country to move from a pre-industrial manufacturing 
structure it is necessary to create a high level of 
demand for machinery producers' output. In stating this, 
it must be noted that an important assymmetry exists 
between the minimum market size requirements of the machine 
builders and those of the consumer goods industries. For 
specialization to be effective in the former, a large 
market possibly greater in size than that required to 
achieve all the economies of scale in the consumer goods 
industries is essential. But for countries like India 
with relatively low levels of capital accumulation, this 
minimum size in the machine building industry's market, 
as yet, does not exist.
It is in this respect that the dictum of Adam Smith 
... 'the division of labour is limited by the extent of 
the market' is depressingly relevant to the circumstances 
of the Indian machine tool industry and constitutes a main 
cause of divergence from the conventional model. In fact 
Smith was reasoning on two interrelated though nonetheless
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distinct economic concepts.: the division of labour and 
the extent of the market. It will be interesting to 
note the contribution of Allyn Young on this subject in
his original though widely disregarded article written in
371928. Young translated the substance of Smith's .
'division of labour' into a contemporary context by
observing that it is associated with the use of specialized
machinery, thus ... "with the division of labour a group
of complex processes is transformed into a succession of
simple processes, some of which at least lend themselves
to the use of machinery," On the further question of
what is meant by the 'extent of the market', Young had
this to say ... "but just what constitutes a large market?
Not an area or population alone but buying power, the
38capacity to absorb a large annual output of goods."
Clearly, Young's clarification of the extent of the 
market was not in terms of physical size but rather in 
the degree of effective demand - a fact of unlimited 
significance to India.
In a recent study. Professor Alice Amsden elaborated 
on this point by distinguishing between Smith's narrower 
concept of the 'extent of the market' and what she refers 
to as 'market type'. The Professor defined market type 
in terms of the concentration of purchasing power. She 
offers an explanation which is now quoted in full, thus,
.,. "the distinction [[between the extent of the market 
and market type] is worth making explicit, for two 
markets of equal purchasing power may contain far dif­
ferent capacities to consume a range of goods, or products 
with relatively high income elasticities. Assume 100 
economic units in market A each with an income of 010,000. 
Assume 1000 economic units in market B each with an 
income of 01,000. Although purchasing power in the 
two markets is equal, obviously.a market of type A is a 
better candidate than a market of type B for this absorption
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of non-essential goods with high unit costs, irrespect­
ive of hov/ great increasing returns may be and hence,
39relatively high prices."
Young and Amsden's interpretation of Smith's famous
statement has profound ramifications for the development
of a machine tool industry. They both suggest that
effective demand is a vital factor in the process of
specialization,as Professor Amsden has stated, ... "during
the [Taiwanese machine toolj industry's formative years,
the material conditions of machine tool users retarded
40the division of labour in machine tool construction."
The role of demand as a constraint on the development of 
India's machine tool industry will be examined in Chapter 5 
of this study. Nevertheless, some statistics are given 
at this juncture to highlight the low relative level of 
fixed capital formation in the Indian machine building 
industry.
On initial assessment, the Indian machine tool 
industry's growth performance is most satisfactory and 
does not appear to have been constrained either by the 
'extent' or the 'type' of market in which it operates.
Only for the years 1967 and 1968 did the industry suffer 
negative rates of growth in what has otherwise been a 
continually rising trend in the growth of output value. 
Since 1960, the gross output value of production grew 
from Rs.535 lakhs to Rs.5317 lakhs in 1974, recording 
an annual average growth rate (in constant prices) of 
12.8 per cent which is spectacular when compared to, for 
instance, the American growth figure of 5.3 per cent over 
the same period. It must be stressed though, that the 
annual average rate of growth may not be a precise yard­
stick for international comparison since rates of growth 
are notoriously dependent on the levels of production 
already achieved. A high production level tends to be
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associated with lower growth rates. Starting from a 
very low base the Indian machine tool industry would 
have been expected to achieve a higher rate of growth 
compared with 'mature' countries like America. Actual 
production levels provide a different kind of comparison. 
The gross output value of the Indian machine tool industry 
in 1975 was only 15.5 per cent of that in Britain; 5 per 
cent of that in the Soviet Union; and even less, below 
4 per cent,in America and West Germany, India's share 
in the world production of machine tools was, in the 
same year, a meagre 0.74 per cent. This indicates power­
fully the low level of absorption for machine tools in 
the Indian machine building industry.
A second area of divergence from the Brown-Rosenberg 
paradigm is the lack of product specialization. Since 
the inception of HMT in 1955, the market for other machine 
tool manufacturers has been squeezed with the resultant 
effect that the industry has suffered a cumulative 
contraction in its degree of fragmentation The natural 
corollary to this process is that the machine tool industry 
has exhibited a high degree of concentration. HI4T, in 
1976, accounted for roughly 45 per cent of the total value 
of output in the industry which, with Praga Ltd. and Heavy- 
Engineering Corporation, brought the public sectors con­
tribution to over 50 per cent. A further five firms from 
the private sector accounted for 35 per cent, with the 
remaining 15 per cent produced by the numerous small scale 
f i r m s . W i t h  only a handful of units producing 85 per 
cent of the output value of production very little basis 
exists for specialization to develop. HMT dominates 
machine tool production. It grew from an annual producer 
of 400 lathes in 1955 into one of the world's ten largest 
machine tool houses in 1976, manufacturing the world's
42
widest range of more than seventy types of machine tools. 
Not only has specialization been constrained under these
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circumstances but with the emphasis on 'internalizing' 
all production processes the growth of an infrastructure 
of ancillary producers has also not developed. Hardly 
any vertical disintegration has been achieved over the 
past three decades. All the major units in the industry 
possess blast furnaces and produce their own castings and 
in many cases precision components still have to be 
imported.
The third and concluding area of divergence hinges 
on the extent of institutional interference in the market. 
This phenomenon contrasts sharply with the competitive 
philosophy of the machine building industry in America, 
the country to which the Brown-Rosenberg paradigm relates. 
The central authorities control and manipulation of the 
Indian market may be viewed from both a domestic and a 
foreign trade plane.
In Indian planning, the growth objective has always 
been of primary importance and so from the domestic 
perspective, a comprehensive system in industrial licensing 
in combination with public sector control enabled the 
authorities to pursue a pre-determined pattern of invest­
ment. Competition-was minimized by capital good licensing 
and Actual user (import) licensing on a 'fair share’ 
basis among rival firms in the industry. These admin­
istrative controls had the effect of eliminating free 
entry by new firms as well as inhibiting efficiency 
induced expansion by existing machinery manufacturers.
The dictate that each manufacturer was entitled to his 
share of Actual user licenses, and no more, ensured that 
efficient firms could not, legally at least, enlarge
output from existing capacity by competing away the
43scarce inputs from less efficient firms.
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The foreign trade aspect of institutional inter­
ference has been via the policy of import substitution.
This particular type of government intervention expanded 
through the imposition of elaborate administrative 
machinery originally aimed in 1955 at obtaining direct 
and comprehensive control over foreign exchange utiliz­
ation. In effect, however, these measures inaugurated a 
rigid 1-8 programme which proved an enormous stultifying 
influence on competition in the machine building industries 
In order to obtain imported goods the twin principles of 
'essentiality' and 'indigenous non-availability' imparted 
considerable difficulties for the acquisition of quality 
inputs necessary for the manufacture of precision tools 
and machinery in general. Further, the import-allocation 
system, reflecting as it does the emphasis on attainment 
of technological self-sufficiency, virtually eliminated 
all forces of competition. Foreign competition was ruled 
out because of the principle of 'indigenous non­
availability' : every item of indigenous production, no 
matter how much its cost of manufacture exceeded the 
c.i.f. price,was automatically shielded from competition 
through imports, indeed the onus was placed on the buyer
to show conclusively that he could not procure the item
44from domestic producers.
It is clear then, that competition, another requisite 
of the Brown-Rosenberg paradigm, has been notably absent 
in the development of the Indian machine building 
industry. There can be little doubt that a significant 
degree of inefficiency was introduced into the market as 
a direct result of government interference. The per­
vasiveness of this aspect is considerable when it is 
realised that the majority of the larger machinery 
industries established (and many of those planned) in 
the developing world are public sector projects.
The inescapable conclusion to the above discussion
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is that the motivations to innovate which are so important 
in the conventional model of machine tool production have 
been absent in the Indian case.
(iii) The Soviet Strategy : An Alternative Model?
The discussion of the Brown-Rosenberg paradigm has
shown innovation in the machine tool industry to be
determined by external stimuli. It suggests that the
dynamism of the machine building industry is a key
variable influencing the industry's 'will to innovate'.
However, because the paradigm breaks down in the case
of India there must be considerable suspicion as to
its applicability in countries having different economic
conditions to that of America during its period of
development. For the developing countries of today,
perhaps a greater relevance should be attached to the
'economics of replacement' in which the replacement cost
of a still operational tool becomes the crucial factor.
This argument acts as a starting point for the present
study; it suggests that in a capital-scarce country like
India the replacement cost of machine tools should not be
so high as to prove prohibitive. In a country where
tools of up to sixty year vintage are common, the
entrepreneurs investment decision turns on the question,
.,. "does the reduction in costs attributable to the new
machine compensate for the replacement of a tool which is
45still physically productive,"
This alternative conceptualization of the problem 
looks at innovation as but one ingredient in the 'total 
productivity-mix' : the efficiency of machine tool
manufacturers, reflected through the prices of their 
products, now assumes primary importance. It is a global 
approach having reference to all facets of the problem 
of improving productive efficiency in the machine tool 
industry.
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However, complications arise with this analysis
because since independence successive Indian governments
have interpreted, indeed couched, the development of the
machine tool industry not only in terms of an implicit
(profit-maximising) efficiency criterion but on a whole
matrix of national aspirations. Figure 4 shows,
schematically, the goals set for the industry by the
central authorities. It may be observed that improving
efficiency has had to vie with two other major objectives
namely, growth and self-sufficiency. The machine tool
industry was, early on, recognised as a key sector at the
heart of India's development programme. Thus, rapid
improvements in standards of living and employment were
to be achieved through the industrialization and
technological development of the economy. This was to be
financed by the surplus from the agricultural sector
(which would itself benefit from increasing mechanization);
the foreign exchange savings; and, it was anticipated,
foreign aid, A fourth objective impinged on India's
military defence capability through the mechanization
46of the armed forces.
It could be argued that the attempt by the machine 
tool industry to simultaneously achieve maximum levels 
of growth, diversification and efficiency in production 
was counter-productive. Certainly, the drive for self- 
sufficiency in the supply of most types of tools would 
have conflicted with the other two goals. Moreover, 
although government policies were formulated to assist 
the growth objective, in truth, they had more of an 
impact on the operational efficiency of the sector; 
deleterious though it was. Thus, with the forces of 
competition constrained and with the relatively low 
levels of demand inhibiting 'the division of labour, the 
conditions necessary for the proper functioning of the 
Brown-Rosenberg paradigm were absent. Hence, as 
Table 7 has shown, innovation did not take place.
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In view of the machine tool industry's lack of 
innovative flair, the question is broached ; did the sector 
follow the most appropriate path for its development?
With the advantage of hindsight the argument could be advanced 
that it did not. Perhaps the development of the Indian 
machine tool industry in the fifties and sixties would have 
been better served if it had emulated the archetypal Soviet 
model of the thirties? On a comparative basis, not only did 
the Soviet model of machine tool production have to operate 
according to the similar planning goals of growth etc., as 
its more contemporary Indian counterpart, but, in addition, 
the economic conditions of the two countries during their 
respective periods of industrialization may also have been 
fairly close, i.e., capital scarcity, shortage of skilled 
personnel, potentially vast internal market, and so forth. 
Furthermore, the fact that both industries were fostered 
under a regime of industrial autarchy is also of considerable 
relevance.
It should be emphasised, however, that temporal 
comparisons of this kind can be little more than generalised 
approximations. Most importantly, it is impossible to be 
dogmatic about the relative levels of industrialization in 
the Soviet Union of the 1930s in comparison with that of 
India in the 1950s. Emphasis on similarities as against 
divergences between the two countries in the respective time 
periods should be carefully avoided, especially in :
the degree of autarchy imposed; the buoyancy of agricultural 
output; the extent of the skill and technological base; and 
the basic infrastructural characteristics of each economy. 
Given the above qualifications, there is, nevertheless, a 
good case for considering whether a Soviet machine tool 
manufacturing strategy during India's industrialization effort 
might have been a more appropriate course of action for the 
authorities to have followed.
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A major aim of this study, then, is to examine the 
relevancy of the Soviet machine tool production model under 
the economic conditions of India in the 1950/60s. To do 
this rigorously the following approach of using contrasting 
hypotheses will be used:
(i) that India's machine tool sector should have 
pursued the Soviet model of machine tool 
manufacture whatever the economic conditions 
were. Here, the advantages to be derived from 
large scale, serialised production would have 
risen above the other constraining influences in 
the economy;
against the alternative stance:
(ii) that the Soviet model would have been
inappropriate to the Indian machine tool 
industry, not least because of possible 
divergences in the conditions and circumstances 
of the Soviet Union in the 1930s with India 
in the 1950/6ÜS, but also due to the various 
inefficiencies that were introduced into India’s 
industrial environment from the import 
substitution policies that were followed at 
that time.
It has been postulated that a major element of the 
Western approach to machine tool production has been the 
emphasis given to product-innovation ; this has been represented 
by the construction of the Brown-Rosenberg paradigm. From 
this it has been shown that the paradigm has broken down in 
India’s tool sector as evidenced by the paucity of patent 
registrations. There is a complication here, however, in 
that patent registrations may not adequately reflect the 
degree of technical change that has taken place in the industry 
There is the belief that in developing countries incremental
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learning curves might provide a more accurate measure of 
productive improvement. This line of thought will be more 
fully examined in Chapter 5. Suffice to say at this point 
that it perhaps may be more fruitful to view innovation as 
encompassing all those influences which have a positive 
affect on 'total factor productivity’. Attention is thus 
shifted away from solely innovation to the global efforts 
at reducing the costs of machine tool production : a form 
of 'capital-saving' which has been much neglected by economists 
concerned with economic development. Rosenberg was the first 
to recognise this when he wrote in his pathbreaking article, 
'Capital Goods, Technology and Economic Growth*,
"What is important is not just the development 
of capital-saving innovation - although this is 
certainly very important. What is also important 
is improving the efficiency with which the existing 
types of capital goods are produced. Underdeveloped 
countries have been deficient on both accounts but 
the latter deficiency has received practically no 
attention. They have, therefore, missed a major 
source of capital-saving for the economy as a 
whole. "
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Chapter 3
Development of the Machine Tool Branch :
The Goal^^ ^ of Growth
Machine tool manufacture was of negligible importance 
at the time of India's independence in 1947. However, 
with the government's formulation of an economic strategy, 
as expressed in the country's rigorous planning regime 
since 1951, the importance of the sector has elevated 
considerably. In essence, this is merely a reflection of 
the rationale of Indian economic development in respect 
of its two-fold linkage between the production of indige­
nous technological capacity and the drive towards self- 
sustaining economic growth. In similarity to the Soviet 
experience of the 1930s, the Indian policy-makers assumed 
the two concepts to be highly interrelated; moreover, the 
performance of the latter aim was held to depend on the 
successful implementation of the former. Thus it was, that 
economic growth : the most fully articulated objective of 
Indian planning, and also regarded by many as the most , 
important, hinged on the development of the heavy machinery 
building industries.
The point to be emphasised is that India, at the 
commencement of its Five-Year Plans, was an extremely 
poor country. Any attempt to raise real income per head 
through distribution was, therefore, unrealistic. The 
only logical alternative was to substantially increase the 
level of output in the economy thereby generating the 
expansion in employment and income necessary for higher 
consumption to be achieved. But this begs the question 
as to why aggregate output was low in the first place?
In the planners' view, the chief limiting factor was the 
low level of capital stocks of the economy and the chief 
imperative was to increase the capital stock through a 
high rate of investment.^ This, in general terms, was the 
genesis to India's two-sector growth model : the
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’Mahalanobis Strategy'. Output capacity in the economy 
was adjudged to be constrained by the low level of capital 
formation and, in consequence, the production of capital 
goods was to be given priority in the allocation of 
investment resources. The appropriateness of such a 
policy is highlighted when it is considered that the 
Indian economy of the time was to all extents and purposes 
'closed' because of the paucity of foreign exchange 
holdings. In addition, by reference to Chapter One, it 
will be recalled that Mahalanobis recognised the important 
distinction between the two types of capital goods :
(i) those that produce consumer goods, and (ii) those 
that produce other capital goods. As the objective of 
the authorities was the long-term maximization of growth 
then greater significance is necessarily attached to the 
production of those capital goods belonging to the second 
category : 'machines producing machines'. Under these
circumstances, the scale of investment priority in the 
economy in descending order of importance would be : the 
machine tool industry; the machine building industry; 
and finally, the consumption good industries. In short, 
the growth in the productive capacity of the machine tool 
industry was the lynchpin to the Mahalanobis strategy 
because,in an essentially 'closed' economy, capital 
accumulation would not be possible in its absence.
In the light of this introductory statement, the 
aim of this chapter, given the parameter of growth as one 
of the machine tool industry's primary goals, is to 
examine and detail the major issues of its development 
up to and including the present time : to paint a 
statistical and institutional picture that will serve as 
a backdrop for the analysis of 'self-reliance' and 
'efficiency' in later chapters. In order to achieve this 
aim the chapter is split into three sections. The first 
section considers the growth trends of the industry 
leading up to and during the period of planning. An 
attempt is also made to document the main conditioning
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factors believed to have had an important influence on 
growth performance since the introduction of centralized 
planning in India. In this context, two factors of 
particular significance are elucidated : the emergence of 
an omnipotent public sector, and a planning strategy 
which;,perforce, had to be implemented within the context 
of a mixed economy. Section two opens with a concise 
appraisal of the concentration of industry in the machine 
tool sector. This is followed by an analysis of the 
present economic status of the industry in terms of its 
organization of production. Finally, the third section 
offers an insight into the role of foreign collaboration 
as a vehicle for the technological development of the 
industry, with particular attention being paid to the case 
of HMT.
Section 1 : Aspects in the Growth of Machine Tool Capacity
(i ) Historical Origins
Machine tool manufacture is one of the newest 
branches of 'modern' industry in India; it is at the 
same time, however, also one of the smallest. The fact 
that even as late as 1960 machine tools accounted for 
only 0.3 per cent of manufacturing output value belies 
the important strategic nature of the machine tool industry : 
it is primigenial to the process of industrialization.
Prior to the period of planned industrial development, 
indigenous machine tool manufacture was, indeed, severely 
limited. Nevertheless, it is significant to note that 
the beginnings of the industry go as far back as the latter 
part of the 19th century. A brief examination of the 
historical origins of machine tool production will 
therefore contribute to an understanding of the present 
status of the industry.
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The earliest recorded production of machine tools 
in India was in 1890, A number of Workshops in the un­
divided Punjab had begun to manufacture machine tools to 
satisfy their own requirements. Consequently,none of these 
machines found their way onto the market; a pattern of 
development not dissimilar to the origins of machine tool 
manufacture in Britain and America. These Punjabi 
artisans pioneered the manufacture of basic machine tools 
such as : 'deep gap' cone pulley lathes and 'deep throat'
drilling machines, which were then used for the fabric­
ation of simple machines like chaff cutters,cone crushers,
2and oil expellers. Although the numbers of these manu­
facturers were very small and their products poor in 
quality they can be recognized as the forefathers of the 
machine tool industry in India.
The commencement of the 1st World War induced a 
limited number of small firms to produce machine tools 
specifically for manufacturing shells; however, at war- 
end in 1919 this activity ceased. Thereafter, it was not 
until the late 1930s that the production of machine tools 
for non-military purposes began to make some sort of im­
pact. Again, in repetition of the events in the 1890s, 
a small nucleus of the larger general engineering concerns 
began to manufacture basic, general purpose machine tools. 
In 1937 for instance. Cooper Ltd., commenced production 
of simple cone-pulley lathes and pillar-type drilling 
machines. In the following year, the same company intro­
duced into its product-mix a shaping machine. Also, 
around this time, another company : Kirloskar Bros., 
began development work on centre lathes; the first being 
commercially produced in 1938. Although these begin­
nings were significant, they should, nevertheless, be 
kept in perspective : it has been quoted that up until
the 2nd WôflLd War only one hundred machine tools were pro-
3duced annually in India. The Calcutta Institute of
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Management has suggested three reasons for this apparent 
low level of output : firstly, that there was little 
metal-working activity in India at that time; that imported 
machine tools were freely available; and finally, that 
the major users - the railroads and larger engineering 
concerns - were mostly foreign owned and, in consequence, 
preferred imported machine tools.
The start of the 2nd World War set in motion 
dramatic changes in what, up until that time, could only 
be flatteringly referred to as a machine tool industry.
The war years were to witness not only a surge in the 
production of tools, intended primarily to assist in the 
war effort but also the imposition of a skeletal planning 
apparatus. It will be useful for later discussion to 
reflect on this period of change.
For the era preceding 1939, on account of the insig­
nificant size of Indian production, the country's machine 
tool requirements were generally met by imports. In 
response to the outbreak of war (India was of course a 
Crown Colony of the British Empire and as such, was more 
or less committed to contributing toward the allied 'war 
machine'), Indian industry expanded capacity to manufacture 
defence equipment and products which could no longer be 
imported. These events resulted in a greatly increased 
demand for machine tools; a situation not eased by the 
difficulty of importing the same. The Indian government's 
reaction to the problem was to pass the 'machine tool 
control order' and appoint a machine tool controller to 
regulate what imports there were; to make a survey of 
the capacity available for machine tool manufacture; to 
improve the quality of Indian machine tools; and, to
procure the best quality machine tools for the armed
5forces, ordnance factories and war industries. With 
these aims in view, a system of licensing was introduced 
with licenses being granted to producers of machine tools 
who possessed the necessary plant and skilled technicians.
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In the early stages, these licenses were granted freely, 
mainly with the intention of rapidly creating a reasonable 
capacity to serve the needs of a war orientated economy.
It was felt that later, with the return of peace and 
normalcy in international trade, attempts could then be 
made to rationalize and reorganise the industry on more 
scientific lines.
The small amount of machine tool imports India had 
been receiving prior to 1943 disappeared altogether at 
the beginning of that year. Two factors were the basic 
cause of this import scarcity : the entry of Japan into 
the war, and the closing of the mediterranean route to 
shipping. Great reliance had been placed on these meagre 
imports to supplement indigenous machine tool manufacturing 
capacity; a direct consequence of their loss was that 
serious bottlenecks in the maintenance and replacement of 
machinery in India’s industrial undertakings ensued. 
Domestic machine tool capacity was therefore expected to 
supply all the country's requirements and to facilitate 
this, various schemes were put into force to regulate and 
control still more strictly the manufacture and distrib­
ution of machine tools produced in the country. A number 
of general engineering concerns were encouraged to under­
take the manufacture of quality tools to augment the 
production of those firms which were already established 
producers. In this respect, governmental intervention 
could be traced back to the decision made through the 
machine tool controller, to implement measures which 
would directly affect the expansion of machine tool pro­
duction. The more important of these policies can be 
listed as follows:
(i) the future import of machine tools into the 
country was to be strictly controlled and 
• import licenses issued only for high priority 
contracts, and for such machine tools as could 
not be manufactured in the country;
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(ii) the government agreed to purchase the entire 
production of its leading manufacturers
providing that certain defined quality standards 
had been reached;
(iii) the services of a team of technicians from the 
United Kingdom were to be obtained to provide 
assistance to local machine tool manufacturers; 
and finally,
(iv) the government offered the services of the
machine tool (inspection) branch belonging to 
the Industries and Supplies Department, to test 
and inspect the machine tools manufactured in 
India, which were then to be classified as 'graded* 
or'non-graded* depending on the quality.^
During the six years of World War II, the machine 
tool industry's output increased at a phenomenal rate. 
With the cessation of hostilities in 1945 however, the 
high level of demand was not sustained; foreign machine 
tools again became freely available whilst the demand 
for indigenously produced tools correspondingly fell.
As a direct consequence of the liberalization in foreign 
trade, machine tool production in India deteriorated from 
a peak of Rs. 11.2 million in 1945 to Rs. 2.9 in 1950.
The serious decline in the fortunes of the industry
was recognised early on by the government which in 1945
set up a machine tool industrial panel to prepare a
comprehensive plan for its future development. In
addition, in 1947 the government, under pressure from
the machine tool manufacturers, referred their case to
the newly constituted Tariff Board which after consider-
7ation recommended protection.
It seems clear, therefore, that the early post-war 
years carried the Indian government's encroachment into
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the market place still further. Indeed, the process 
markedly accelerated after independence and particularly 
so in the mid-fifties when the programmes of planned 
industrialization were formulated with emphasis given to 
the development of the capital-goods industries,
(ii) Overview of Growth Performance During the
Planning Period
The production of machine tools in India has grown 
steadily since the early fifties. In 1942, the country's 
entire output amounted to only 273 tools at a nominal 
value of Rs.6 million. With the spread of hostilities to 
South-East Asia, however, production was to rise spec­
tacularly to reach 3,669 tools by 1945, thereby increasing 
the value of output almost twenty-fold over the three 
year period. The return of peace to the region caused 
a decline in the demand for military hardware and hence, 
for the machinery by which it was produced. Naturally 
enough, this *trickling-down' process eventually affected 
the demand for machine tools which also fell in pro rata 
proportions. Indeed, the machine tool industry did not 
regain its war-end level of output even by the final year 
of India's First Five Year Plan. Thereafter though, the 
situation changed dramatically. Table 8 traces the growth 
of indigenous production as also total consumption 
(including imports) throughout the 1941-75 period. From 
the table it is evident that the growth in machine tool 
production accelerated sharply with the implementation 
of the 'Mahalanobis strategy* in the Second Five Year 
Plan; but even this was shaded by the performance of the 
industry in the ensuing Third Plan when roughly twice as 
many machine tools were constructed than for the whole 
of the preceding twenty years.
From 1960-74, the rate of growth of the machine tool
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Table 8 Machine Tool Production and Consumption in India
Imports Indigenous Total Consumption
Value in Value in Value :
Nos. Crores Nos. Crores Nos. Crores
1941 .58 n.a. n.a. .68
1942 .57 272 .06 .63
1943 .54 1713 .64 1.18
1944 1.33 2170 .78 2.31
1945 1.82 3669 1.12 2.94
TAL 1941/45 5.14 7825 2.60 7.74
1946 1.83 4125 .91 2.74
1947 3.68 .46 4.14
1948 4.14 .55 4.69
1949 4.19 .47 4.66
1950 2.49 .29 2.78
)TAL 1946/50 16.33 2.68 19.01
1951 1826 2.50 1143 .47 2969 2.97
1952 1614 2.21 1070 .44 2684 2.65
1953 2287 3.13 1070 .44 3357 3.57
1954 2813 3.85 1216 .50 4029 4.35
1955 4485 5.29 2003 .74 6488 6.03
3TAL 1951/55 13025 16.98 6502 2.59 19527 19.57
1956 7352 8,37 2943 1.20 10295 9.57
1957 15339 11.32 3015 2.51 18354 13.83
1958 11953 12.21 3868 3.76 15841 13.97
1959 9072 11.61 4071 4.39 13143 16.00
1960 8225 13.21 5332 6.18 13557 19.39
)TAL 1956/60 51941 56.71 19249 18.04 71190 74.76
1961 11920 17.89 8511 7.76 20431 25.65
1962 10706 18.95 10293 10.88 20999 29.83
1963 10399 31.51 11058 15.44 21457 46.95
1964 7650 33.53 13370 18.90 21020 52.43
1965 9642 32.32 15423 22.26 25065 54.58
DTAL 1961/65 50317 134.20 58855 75.24 108972 209.44
1966 7409 41.04 14931 25.78 22340 66.82
1967 6311 36.43 12330 21.58 18641 58.01
1968 4877 36.25 7879 17.14 12756 53.39
1969 2056 15.12 10445 21.92 12501 37.04
1970 1818 14.65 11654 28.94 13482 43.59
OTAL 1966/70 22481 143.49 57239 115.36 79720 258.85
1971 2940 17.75 11447 37.11 14387 54.86
1972 2298 19.29 8750 34.47 11048 53.76
1973 1884 17.35 10178 44.16 12062 61.51
1974 2105 22.92 13549 64.53 15654 87.45
1975 1780 33.18 12191 77.88 13971 113.06
OTAL 1971/75 11007 110.49 56115 258.15 67122 370.64
Source : D.S. Mulla & Co.
Files, Bombay.
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industry was 10.8 per cent as against 5.7 per cent for 
all industrial production. The trend of output value, in 
constant prices, rose continually only until 1967 when 
growth was arrested; thereafter it oscillated for 5 years 
as the Indian economy struggled against a severe recession. 
The connection between a country's economic climate and the 
rate of growth of machine tool production is well estab­
lished, and it is therefore obvious that the lull in the 
demand for machine tools during the years 1967-72 directly 
resulted from the recession in the Indian economy over the 
same period. By definition, a recession implies a sharp 
decline in industrial investment and, thus it was, that in 
India between 1966/67 and 1972/73 net domestic capital 
formation (as a percentage of N.N.P. at factor cost) fell
7
from 17 per cent to 13.7 per cent.
The mode of analysis can be cast in more specific 
terms by referring back to the methodology of this study 
as outlined in Chapter two. Of particular importance was 
the discussion concerning the relations of the machine tool 
branch to the machine building industry. It will be inform­
ative to explore this relationship further by comparing 
the respective growth trends of each sector. Figure 5 
depicts the comparative growth of the two sectors through 
the medium of production indexes. It is interesting to 
note the parallel trends that both the machine tool and 
the machine building industry appear to take. The belief 
regarding the linkage between the two sectors is reinforced 
by observation of the time-lag between the fall in the 
machine building industries output in 1966 and the induced 
decline in machine tool manufacture one year later. There­
after, the divergent paths that each industry follows 
appears to indicate that the machine building industry 
increased its production by utilizing more intensively 
the existing machinery rather than through its replacement 
or expansion. Moreover, the dependency of the machine tool
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branch on the fortunes of its customers : the machine 
building and associated metal-using industries, is further 
revealed by the similarity in the annual average rates of 
growth of the two sectors at 10.0 and 10,3 per cent 
respectively.
Figure 5 : Index Numbers of Production For Machine Tool
Output
and Machine Building Industries 1960-72
(Base Year = 1960 : Semi-log scale)
2 ,60
2 ,50
2 .40
2 ,30
2,20 (1) Machine Tool 
industry
(2) Machine Building 
industry
KEY
2,10
2.00
1960 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 Years
Source : (1) Appendix 1, Table A.
(2) 'Handbook of Statistics 1973', AIER, Calcutta,
(1974) p.9, Constituent members of the machine 
building industry weighted by their share in 
total machine building output.
Examination of the Indian machine tool industry's 
growth in production indicates, both absolutely and in 
relation to industry as a whole, that the period since the 
Second Five Year Plan has experienced a rapid increase in 
output value. However, such a conclusion should be of no 
great surprise when it is considered that the pursuance 
of the objective of establishing and developing indigenous 
technological capacity necessitates the rapid build-up of
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a machine tool manufacturing base. Growth is, in any case, 
a function of production levels already achieved and the fact 
that India ranked 11th in world machine tool production in 
1966 slipped to 16th in 1975 below countries such as : 
Brazil, Poland and Spain, seems to suggest that other newly 
industrializing countries are experiencing relatively 
faster growth in machine tool output.
(iii) Hindustan Machine Tools (HMT)
The emergence of a 'public sector’ in the Indian 
machine tool industry can be ascribed to four separate 
factors. Firstly, at the time of independence in 1947, 
the new administration found itself with around Rs.4000 
million worth of surplus war materials which included 
considerable numbers of machine tools. The 'War Disposals 
Utilization Committee', set up in 1948 to advise the 
government on the best way of using these stores, suggested
among other things, the establishment of a machine tool
8 . ' factory. Secondly, the partition of the Punjab as an
agreed condition of independence meant that, at a stroke,
eight important machine tool units were lost to India.
Hence, at the commencement of the country's First Five
Year Plan in 1951, there existed just 14 producers of
'graded' machine tools, possessing an aggregate annual
capacity of only 3000 machines. In fact, for that year
alone : out of a total requirement of Rs.29.7 million of
machine tools, the indigenous industry was able to supply
only Rs.4.7 millions worth; the remainder, amounting to
almost 85 per cent was imported. A third reason for the
creation of a public sector in the tool industry was
advanced by the authorities during the early years of
independence and called attention to the growing demand for
more sophisticated, precision tools; a demand not being
satisfied by the private sector units. It was proposed
that a government owned undertaking should be established
to cater exclusively for this type of demand whilst leaving
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the range of less expensive tools entirely to the private 
sector. Finally, the Kashmir war heightened the awareness 
of the Indian government to the fact that machine tools 
were not only requisite for industrialization but also for 
the manufacture of military hardware.
The decision to build a public sector machine tool 
plant was officially confirmed in 1949. At the same time, 
it was announced that the project would be undertaken in 
collaboration with a Swiss firm : Messrs, Oerlikon Machine 
Tool Works. Oerlikon had been preferred to Czechoslavakian 
participation because the company had already assisted in 
the establishment of a number of ordnance factories in the 
country. Four years were to elapse before, in the February 
of 1953, the factory was formally registered and christened 
Hindustan Machine Tools Ltd. A further three years were to 
go by before the first batch of five 'H-22 lathes' were 
produced in the May of 1956.
Right from the initial years of this collaboration 
little consensus existed between the Indian and Swiss 
managements as to the appropriate industrial strategy to 
be pursued. The Indian management, which had originally 
wanted to produce at least four varieties of machine tools, 
eventually gave ground and the Swiss policy ; specializing 
in the production of a single machine, the H-22 lathe, in 
batches of 400 per year, was approved. However, this early 
skirmish between the protagonists for specialization and 
those against, was to spill-over into full scale confront­
ation several months later when, with a new Managing Director, 
HMT decided to buy out Oerlikon's 10 per cent share hold­
ings in the company and embark upon a major programme of 
diversification. This policy was achieved through a whole 
series of foreign technical collaborations; a process which 
is described in some detail in Section three.
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At the twilight of India's Second Five Year Plan with 
its emphasis on the promotion of capital goods industries 
HMT, with government agreement, decided to expand prod­
uctive capacity. From Table 9 it can be seen that HMT's 
output value had grown rapidly between 1956-61 from 
Rs.3.09 million to Rs.42,47 million. Indeed, the company
Table 9 : H.M.T. Machine Tools1 Production 1956-75
(Rs. millions)
HMT's production to
Year Production countrv production {%)
1956 3.09 26
1957 11.92 47
1958 17.67 47
1959 19.62 45
1960 31.02 50
1961 42.47 55
1962 55.29 51
1963 86.69 56
1964 93.43 49
1965 111.91 50
1966 122.10 47
1967 93.1# 43
1968 97.50 57
1969 123.80 56
1970 151.20 52
1971 209.90 57
1972 193,40 56
1973 229.80 52
1974 315.90 49
1975 422.40 54
Source ; S.M. Patil : 'Indian 
Growth *, Op.cit.,
Machine Tool Industry and 
Table 1
now accounted for 55 per cent of India's total production 
of machine tools. To meet the growth in demand, HMT 
commissioned the construction of a second plant in 
Bangalore which came 'on tap’ in the May of 1961, Over 
the same period an industrial estate was built around 
HMT I and HMT II with approximately fifty small scale units 
spread across an area of some 20 acres. To serve the
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continuing demand of Indian industry which during the first 
three Five Year Plans grew at a rate approaching 9 per cent 
per year, HMT III at Pinjore (in the then Punjab) began 
producing in the October of 1963; HMT IV at Kalamassery 
(Kerala) followed in 1965; and, HMT V at Hyderabad 
(Andrya Pradesh) in 1967, HMT VI, the erstwhile Machine 
Tool Corporation of India Limited based at Agmer (Rajasthan) 
was absorbed into the company much later in 1975.
HMT, after experiencing continuous growth since its 
inception suffered a serious reverse in fortunes during the 
years 1967-8. This was a period of severe recession in 
India's industry which dramatically affected capital goods 
investment - notoriously a major casualty when general 
economic activity is depressed, A decline in the level of 
public expenditure coupled with the formal declaration of a 
'Plan holiday' in April 1967 compounded the problems facing 
the company. It was under these circumstances that the 
management of HMT decided to adopt a strategy of aggress­
ively diversifying out of machine tool production. The aim 
was seemingly to hedge against the volatility of demand in 
the market for machine tools.
In fact, HMT during these recessionary years owed its 
continued viability to the profitability of a watch factory 
established in Bangalore in 1961, The venture was initiated 
with the collaboration of the Citizen Watch Company of 
Japan with an original capacity of 360,000 watches per year. 
Further expansion in the production of horological equipment 
took place during 1972-3 when a second watch-making unit in 
Bangalore was set up to manufacture automatic watches; a 
third unit in Srinagar was added during 1973-4 for producing 
hand-wound watches. In 1969, HMT IV at Kalamassery began 
to manufacture printing machinery with the assistance of an 
Italian collaboration. Also in the same year, an agreement 
was concluded with a Swiss concern for the manufacture of
138.
cold chamber die casting machines; this was to take place 
in a division attached to HMT I and II in Bangalore. In 
1971, HMT III at Pinjore became the home for the production 
of tractors in collaboration with a Czechoslavakian company. 
Finally, in 1973 in collaboration with a Hungarian firm,
HMT V at Hyderabad established a facility for producing 
glass, lamp components, and lamp-making machinery. However, 
although the list of HMT's 'supplementary' activities 
ceases at this point, various other lines for future 
production have been mentioned, namely : coal-mining 
machinery, automobiles, and power generation equipment.^
Concomitant with the expanding gamut of industrial 
activities taking place within the company was the growth 
in the services it could provide to other enterprises 
both in India and abroad. Under the auspices of its 
'project consultancy wing* HMT has offered assistance 
ranging from a techno-economic feasibility study of a 
proposed machine tool accessories plant for the state 
government of Maharastra (in similar vein, the consultancy 
wing is at present involved in the preparation of 
feasibility reports for Tanzania, Kenya and Nigeria) to a 
complete 'turn-key' project for the establishment of a 
machine tool plant in the Philippines.
In terms of the growth of output value, the perfor­
mance of HMT has been phenomenal. From 1960 when 
production stood at Rs.31.02 million, the company's output 
value increased at an annual average rate of growth of 
11 per cent (based on constant prices) to reach Rs.422.4 
million by 1975. However, these figures tend to conceal 
two important developments that have taken place within the 
company, especially since 1970 :
(i) Firstly, as Table 10 illustrates, although the value 
of production from 1969 to 1976 has grown annually 
at 13.5 per cent, the numbers of machine tools produced
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over the same period have registered only a modest 
2,4 per cent rate of growth; the growth in the 
numbers of machine tools sold actually declined 
by 1,5 per cent. These trends appear to suggest 
that HMT's production strategy since the late sixties 
has been to concentrate on the sophisticated end of 
the technological spectrum. Indeed, the production 
of special purpose machinery and transfer lines 
since the seventies is by itself a reflection of 
the changing composition of output.
Table 10 : HMT's Production and Sales of 
Machine Tools 1969-76^
Production* Production 
Production Sales (current (constant
Year (Nos.) (Nos.) prices) prices)
1969 2334 2275 127.6 134.9
1976 2757 2042 571.0 326.6
A.A.G.(%) 2.4 -1.5 - 13.5
Source : HMT Annual Company Accounts
Note Î + relates to accounting years 1969/70 - 1976/77
* Rs. millions
(ii) Secondly, the relative share of HMT's productive 
operation has progressively changed : in 1960-61, 
the manufacture of machine tools represented 100 
per cent of output value. The contrasting figure 
for the year 1977-78 was 40 per cent which clearly 
indicates the shifting operational priorities of 
the company.
(iv) The Apparatus of Industrial Planning
The fact that the development of the Indian machine 
tool industry took place in an environment characterized by 
a high degree of planning is indeed of some significance.
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Naturally, as a capital-goods producing industry both 
public and private enterprises were, from a strategic 
perspective, ear-marked for preferential treatment; but 
in addition to this, the industry was nurtured under a 
regulatory framework that was designed to protect it from, 
amongst other things, the extremes of foreign competition 
during its period of infancy. Thus, leaving aside the 
question of foreign trade policy until Chapter 4, the 
intention at this stage is to present an aperçu of the 
industrial controls and regulations which have been 
especially important to the business of machine tool 
manufacture in the country.
Throughout the course of planned industrialization 
in India, investment in the public sector of the machine 
tool industry has been subjected to direct measures designed 
to influence the nature and pattern of manufacture in the 
organized sector. Although investment in the private - 
sector has also not been exempt from the physical 
controls of the planners. On reflection, the government's 
assault on the prerogatives of private sector enterprise 
in the machine tool sector was not surprising in view of 
the orientation given in successive plan documents towards 
'a socialist pattern of society'. As such,it prescribed 
the institutional context in which development would occur; 
the emphasis being on the public sector as the pre-eminent 
agency of industrial development.
It is instructive to establish the very important 
point that unlike the U.S.S.R. which is a centrally planned 
state, India is a mixed economy possessing a centrally 
co-ordinated planning apparatus. There is a crucial 
difference, and it lies in the fact that the Indian 
government has 'direct' control only over that part of 
the economy constituting the public sector. The impact 
of the government on decision-making in the private sector 
units hinges, to a large extent, on a system which offers
141
'economic carrots' as a means of inducing compliance 
with the dictates of the plans. But, as Chaudhuri 
argues: "while it [the government] can devise alter­
native systems of incentives and disincentives, it cannot 
determine the degree to which allocative decisions in the 
private sector would respond to any such s y s t e m s . " I n  
consideration of this deficiency, it is necessary to make 
a distinction between government policies which act on 
the total level of demand for resources and those that 
impinge on the allocation of resources without directly 
affecting the level of demand. • Basically, the former relates 
to activities within the agricultural and intermediary 
industries, e.g. rationing of food grains and energy dis­
tribution; and as such fall outside the purview of this 
discussion. It is the second type of policies, e.g. 
licenses and directives that are of concern here.
These types of controls were devised by the Planning 
Commission in the formulation of the Five Year Plans and 
were to operate primarily through the twin strategy of 
target-setting and an exhaustive system of licensing. , 
Specifically, these mechanisms of control were designed to 
influence and determine : (i) the pattern of investment
11down to product level; and (ii) the choice of technology.
The relevance that this discourse, on the apparatus of 
industrial planning, has on the development of the machine 
tool industry, thus becomes clear : the planning system 
bears not only on the basic fabric of the tool industry, 
in terms of both process and product technology but also 
on the efficiency of the productive structure which ensues.
Though not wishing to spend too much time on a dis­
cussion of the government's target-setting policy its 
importance, nevertheless, should be noted as the process 
of license-issuance took place underneath its umbrella. 
Bhagwati and Desai point to two major failings regarding 
the target-setting policy. Firstly, the targets were not
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treated as approximate orders of magnitude but were 
rigorously interpreted as full-scale objectives, lapses 
from which were considered to be 'failures of planning'. 
Secondly, there is the criticism regarding the lack of 
any economic criteria in establishing the targets or, 
alternatively, of their having been revised in any sys­
tematic fashion to meet contingencies such as shortfalls
12in foreign exchange. These complaints may have been 
justified during the first three Five Year Plans but the 
authorities recognizing the difficulties, subsequently made 
strenuous efforts to rectify the situation. The actions 
of the government, in this context, are reviewed later, 
after the role of industrial licensing has been assessed.
The instrument of control that has probably had the 
most impact on the development of the machine tool industry 
is the system of licensing, introduced under the Industries 
(Development and Regulation) Act 1951. The Act provided 
the armoury of controls required to implement the Industrial 
Policy Resolution of 1948 and the later Resolution of 1956. 
Broadly stated, the objectives of the resolutions were : 
the control of growth and the industrial composition of 
output capacity; the saving of foreign exchange; the control 
of monopoly and encouragement of smaller industrial units; 
and finally, the control over the location of industry.
The Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956 laid down three 
classifications of industry according to their strategic 
value to the overall plan. In essence, these divisions 
bore close resemblance to the previous classification in 
the 1948 Resolution save that now, they were more sharply 
defined and less ambiguous regarding the role of the state. 
The 1956 categorization of industries was as follows:
(i) Schedule A : those which were to be the exclusive 
responsibility of the state;
(ii) Schedule B : those which were to be progressively 
state-owned, and in which the state would
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generally set up new enterprises but where 
private enterprises would be expected only to 
supplement the efforts of the state; and
(iii) Schedule C : all the remaining industries and
their future development would, in general,
be left to the initiative and enterprise of
13the private sector.
In spite of the apparently definitive nature of these 
industrial groupings, history has shown that they were 
not water-tight compartments : depending on the exigencies 
of the time, industries could change status and qualify 
to produce a product in a different category.
Investment, in an * ex ante' sense and above a certain 
l i m i t h a d  to be licensed. In the main, this related to 
the expansion of capacity or the creation of new capacity.
The government, through the 1956 Industrial Policy Resolution, 
established an industrial licensing Committee for machine 
tools; termed the 'Machine Tool Committee' its function was 
to act as arbiter on the whole question of capacity for 
the industry. Unless a license was granted by the committee, 
every machine tool producer in the organized sector was 
permitted to manufacture only those types and sizes of 
machines assigned to it. In addition to this, a 'Development 
Council for Machine Tools' was created by the authorities 
in 1958, Its duties included assessing the demand for 
machine tools and recommending the types to be manufactured 
in India.
Implementation of the recommendation of the 'Committee' 
and the 'Development Council', in effect, gave each firm 
a virtual monopoly on the types of machine tools assigned 
to it for manufacture. Quite the reverse, from the point 
of view of economic efficiency, of what the Indian govern­
ment had supposedly intended from its intervention in the
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market. The strategy behind such moves was presumably 
to reduce the potential excess capacity that competing 
manufacturers would have induced under the conditions 
prevailing in the Indian economy during the period in 
question. However, a by-product of this policy was the 
creation of an artificial pricing system based on monopoly 
power; the fact that the entry of new firms into the 
markets for particular machine tools was not permitted 
must naturally have suppressed competition with the obvious 
deleterious repercussions on efficiency. Moreover, because 
the process of licensing became a highly centralized pro­
cedure it appeared to provide larger firms with the leverage 
to increase their monopoly power. The large enterprises 
possessed both the administrative resources and the economic 
muscle to undertake the necessary 'chivying' for their
applications to proceed to a successful conclusion. It
15has also been suggested, that large firms have regularly 
used subsidiaries to obtain licenses, which they have not 
taken up, in order to foreclose lines of manufacture to new 
entrants. Finally, in combination with the long delays 
involved in the process of approving or rejecting applications 
and so compounding the uncertainty over investment oppor­
tunities, there has been the absence, when the application 
has reached the stage of evaluation, of any explicit guide­
lines or consistent criteria of social profitability against 
which projects could be measured. Some of the principal 
delays were caused by the copious amounts of paper work 
necessitated by the application having to pass through 
various stages of clearance. Dependant on whether it 
involved foreign exchange for imports; a collaboration with 
a foreign company; and, the need to raise domestic capital, 
the application would then have to pass through each of the 
corresponding stages : the Import Licensing Committee; the 
Foreign Collaboration Committee; and, the Capital Issues 
Committee. Notwithstanding the pronouncement of the 
Import Licensing Committee, the D.G.T.D, would still have 
to clear the proposed project from the 'indigenous angle';
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that is, certification was required that the imported 
materials were not available from domestic suppliers.
In 1967, the Indian government received the Hazari 
Report which subjected some of the more glaring in­
efficiencies of the industrial planning strategy to close 
scrutiny and found that : "industrial licensing which was 
supposed to act as an instrument of industrial development... 
[had become] ... an i m p e d i m e n t . A s  a result of the 
publication of this Report, the government appointed a 
Committee to examine the working of the licensing system 
over the previous ten years; it was to be under the
chairmanship of a Mr. S. Dutt. The Dutt Committee submitted
18its report in 1969. The report was, in effect, a massive 
condemnation of the licensing system; it lead to the growth 
of monopoly and economic concentration in the hands of a 
few large business houses. The recommendations of the 
Committee attempted to reconcile the objectives of the 
planners with a mixed economy framework; a greater 
emphasis, indeed urgency, being given to the promotion of 
economic efficiency. A major plank in this new approach 
was the delineation of a 'core' sector consisting of 
industries defined to be not only of critical and strategic 
importance to the economy but also possessing the greatest 
linkages with the other sectors of industry. Further, the 
concept of the 'joint sector' was advanced; its purpose 
was to develop undertakings where both the public and private 
sector could act as partners in any given project. This 
recommendation of the Dutt Committee assailed the principle 
established in the formulation of the 1956 Industrial Policy 
Resolution regarding the reservation of industries of basic 
and strategic importance solely for the public sector.
In the February of 1970 the government, on the basis 
of the Dutt Committee's findings, responded by announcing 
a new initiative on industrial licensing policy. The
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government accepted that there should be a list of 'core* 
industries which were to be classified into eight separate 
groups; the sixth group was termed as 'heavy industrial 
machinery' which presumably included machine tools. In 
addition to the core sector, all new investment over 
Rs.5 crores was deemed to be in what was termed the 'heavy 
investment sector' : leaving aside industries which were 
specified to be the exclusive monopoly of the state 
(industries in the 'core' list as are included in 
Schedule A of the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956) 
the large industrial units were now permitted to apply 
for projects in the 'core' and 'heavy investment' sectors. 
The principal aim of this directive was to check the 
proliferation of large 'industrial houses' in a disparate 
number of products and industries by instead concentrating 
them in a few areas of lumpy investment. Finally, the 
exemption limit from licensing provisions, including the 
introduction of new capacity as well as the extension of 
existing enterprises, was to be raised from Rs.25 lakhs 
to Rs.l crore of fixed assets (land, buildings and 
machinery).
An amendment to the industrial licensing regime was 
announced in the February of 1973. The statement modified 
the 1970 Policy Resolution by widening its scope to include 
those industries which hold direct linkages with the core 
industries as also those industries which have consistently 
demonstrated high export potential. The machine tool 
industry was now explicitly defined in group seven of the 
revised list. Liberalization of licensing procedures was 
also promised to some of the larger private sector concerns 
on the premise that it would assist the units to utilize 
their capacities more fully (based on the assumption that 
it had been the restrictive licensing programme that had 
acted as the major constraining force on the utilization 
of capacity); and, from a paternalistic perspective, it
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would allow companies which had ignored the licensing 
regulations to legitimize their 'illegal' activities and 
thus, return to the fold,
A further policy amendment of 1975, increased the 
liberalization of industry; it de-licensed 21 industries 
(mainly consumption orientated) and permitted the unlimited 
expansion beyond licensed capacities to foreign companies 
and large industrial houses in 30 other industries (including 
heavy industrial and chemical equipment).
To summarize: the major and ongoing objective of 
industrial licensing has been to assist in the rapid 
development of the Indian economy through the concentration 
of resources in those sectors considered to be of the 
greatest strategic value. Although this was the primary 
aim, there was also the additional motive of controlling 
the growth of monopoly power. Substantial difficulties, 
however, have been experienced, in the implementation of 
industrial licensing through the need to link the above 
aims with the efficient operation of industry. In respect 
of the machine tool industry, it is fair to say that such 
a marriage has not been easy.
Section 2 : Present Economic State of the Industry
(i) Structural Characteristics of the 
Machine Tool Branch
Structurally, the machine tool industry is dominated 
by HMT which with two other major units in the public sector 
contributed more than 50 per cent of total output value in 
1976. Currently, there are approximately 120 firms in the 
organized sector with the public sector and a further five 
private companies accounting for roughly 85 per cent of 
output value. A multitude of firms produce the remaining 
15 per cent of output; mostly small enterprises concerned
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19with the manufacture of basic, general purpose machinery.
Although this study has confined itself to analysing 
the organized segment of the machine tool industry it 
should be noted, in passing, that the 'informal* (un­
enumerated) sector consists of many hundreds of machine 
tool shops, each employing perhaps no more than 10 to 15 
workers and serving primarily the local market. Many of 
these units will be family businesses, and two-thirds or 
more will be found in the P u n j a b . T h e  survival of these 
firms depends solely on the prices of their products (the 
quality of which is generally held to be quite low), some­
times undercutting comparable tools in the organized sector 
by as much as 50 per cent. A case in point refers to a 
company surveyed in Ludhiana, in the Punjab. It began life 
in the late fifties originally as a manufacturer of textile 
machinery. At an early stage the need arose for a broaching 
machine. HMT was then the only manufacturer of such machines 
and quoted a price of Rs.7.5 lakhs plus a delivery time of 
one year. Due to the lack of finance, the firm in Ludhiana 
decided to manufacture the tool itself (as a small-scale . 
firm it was thus outside the government's licensing 
regulations)% it was finished in a period of three to four 
months at an estimated cost of only Rs.4 lakhs.
In terms of international comparisons, the concentrated 
structure of India's machine tool industry is in sharp 
contrast to its counterparts in the West, or the*East.' In 
the United States in 1958, there were 505 establishments 
having 10 or more employees engaged in the production of 
machine tools. But although these were large concerns, 
unlike India's HMT, none dominated the production of all 
or most of the major categories of machine tool; instead, 
each displayed a high degree of specialization in its 
particular field. This is witnessed by the fact that in the 
same year : three firms were pre-eminent in the field of
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gear-making machinery; three firms made most of the milling
machines; and two firms produced most of the internal
■ ^  21 grinders.
In the Soviet Union a somewhat similar special­
ization obtains, although at a much higher scale of 
operation. Of the 170 plants that comprised the Soviet 
machine tool industry in the early 1960s, sixty were 
specialized producers. Almost all of the gear machinery 
was made in three plants; most of the milling machines were
made at Gor’kiy and Dimitrov; and, almost all radial drills
22were produced at a plant in Odessa.
The above sketch of the structure of India's machine 
tool branch acts as a prelude to an examination of the 
industry's organisation of production. Prior to this, 
however, a brief mention should be made concerning the 
structure of output. It is pertinent to note that apart 
from the purely quantitative increase in the industry's 
output since the late fifties, there has also been con­
siderable diversification in the composition of the same. 
Besides the manufacture of a broad variety of general 
purpose machine tools, the machine tool industry also 
produces such specialized machinery as : single-and 
multi-spindle automatics, drum turrets, copying lathes, 
horizontal boring machines, vertical boring mills, bed- 
type milling machines, gear hobbers, gear shapers, unit
heads, special purpose machines, transfer lines, hydraulic
23and mechanical heavy duty presses, and so forth. Clearly, 
there has been considerable improvement over the twenty year 
period in the sophistication of machine tool output. Although, 
from visiting most of the major machine tool enterprises in 
India, it is unmistakëable.to the author that the 
technological transformation^^ of the product-mix occurred 
only in the few large firms of the public and private 
sectors. Nevertheless, due to the concentrated structure 
of the industry, it is a segment which accounts for the
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greater proportion of total output value,
(ii) Organization of Production
The goal of growth within the overall development of 
the machine tool industry cannot satisfactorily be analysed 
by studying only the changes in the quantity and quality 
of the output. Equally important to an evaluation of the 
progress the branch has made towards industrial 'maturity' 
is an assessment of the organization of its production.
The 'Western' model, characterizing the development 
of machine tool capacity in the capitalist countries over 
a century ago, revealed a number of distinct trends, 
Rosenberg^^ writing on the evolution of the American 
machine tool industry emphasized the linkage between the 
growth of all manufacturing industries and the derived 
demand for machine tools. The emergence and development 
of the machinery producing sector caused what the same 
author has termed 'technological convergence' where pro­
duction processes of apparently unrelated industries with 
differing products, became common. The 'fons et origo' 
of the machine tool sector was, therefore, due to a market 
of minimum economic size being established for its products. 
Just as.the division of labour into machine tool manufacture 
had initially come about through the increasing demand from 
the growth of the machinery building industries, so it was 
that the technological development of the tool industry 
was itself fuelled by the demand nexus forged with its 
customers. As the machine building industries advanced so 
they ... "became needful of ever more sophisticated and
specialized capital equipment, they coached and compelled
9 A
machine tool builders to advance along with them."
Gradually then,over time, the process of industrialization 
began increasingly to connote 'intensive' as opposed to 
'extensive' development. In this way, other forms of 
technological specialization became feasible in activities 
such as Î casting, forging, welding, heat treatment.
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electro-plating, and assembling. As a result of ...[this]
... intensive division of operations, serialization of
27parts and components followed.
The precocious development of the Soviet machine tool 
industry, in the thirties, offers an alternative model; 
and for the countries in which it is viable, precludes the 
requirement that the final stage of serialization and 
standardization be reached through evolution. Despite 
the relative backwardness of their economy in the pre­
planning era, the Soviets in a very short period of time . 
managed, through a capital-goods led growth strategy and 
imports of selected technology,to 'evolve' a machine tool 
branch normally only developed during the latter stages of 
industrialization,
Conventionally, one of the reasons for believing that 
India holds a potential comparative advantage in the 
manufacture of machine tools is that economies of scale 
are of limited significance. After all, the putative model 
of machine tool production, even in the advanced countries, 
is characterized by the relatively small batches and 
volumes of output. Accordingly, if consulted, most economic 
theorists would not express surprise that India's authorities 
at the onset of planning gave scant consideration to the 
question of scale in machine tool production. Moreover, 
for India, the conventional approach was additionally 
attractive because it fitted in with the conditions of 
economic life at that time : a low level of capital accum­
ulation due to the small size of the market for producer 
goods; and the depressed purchasing power of the machine 
building and metal-using industries which comprised that 
market.
It might be argued that such a
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viewpoint was both myopic and paradoxical. Myopic, 
because in a country like India with a high elasticity 
of demand for industrial products, one factor should have 
overriding importance as the country strived to lay a 
mechanized base to its economy and that is not diversific­
ation; not customer specification of final output; possibly 
not even high levels of quality, but rather cost and price 
reductions of basic capital-goods. Price, in this sense 
will not only be a prime determinant of the 'extent of the 
market' but would also have instrumental value in the 
overall conservation of capital. If this principle had 
been followed, then the heretical Soviet model based on 
economies of scale might have provided the appropriate 
industrial organization on which India could have moulded 
its machine tool manufacturing practices. Furthermore, 
the Indian strategy may also have been paradoxical because 
a capital-goods led growth theory hinges squarely on the 
supply of producer goods being the crucial bottleneck to 
economic growth. Unlike the Soviet Union though, where 
all enterprize resided within the public sector, India at 
the start of industrialization possessed a predominantly 
private sector economy and was, therefore, unable 'directly* 
to create demand pressures through governmental decree. 
Consequently, although the pursuance of a two-sector growth 
model can provide an answer to the question regarding the 
supply of scarce capital-goods, it is insufficient by itself 
to solve the equally pressing problem concerning the where­
withal of the purchasers of these capital-goods in a low 
income economy.
The ramifications that lead from the aforesaid have 
serious import on the efficacy of the Indian tool industry's 
organizational structure. Of pragmatic significance is the 
interlocking relationship of the various elements in pro­
duction organization; and, at the interface between input 
and output is found perhaps the most important : the 
installed technology, the nature of which characterizes 
the structure of production in the industry. The Soviet 
machine tool industry of the thirties acquired the majority
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of its fixed machinery from Western countries. This was 
done in order to facilitate flow-line production through 
the use of automatic, special purpose machine tools. In 
the context of this study, three factors are interpreted 
as being expressive of the technological level of installed 
equipment in the machine tool plants of India : the origin 
of the machines; their age; and, to some extent, their type.
Table 11 below illustrates, according to the size of 
firm, the survey results concerning the source of the in­
stalled machinery, i.e. indigenous or imported. It is 
interesting to note that some 95 per cent of all firms in the 
sample obtained up to 80 per cent of their fixed equipment 
from domestic sources. This is consistent with the evidence
on the machine tool using industries in general, as shown by
2 8the machine tool census of 1968: Specifically, of the
382,000 machine tools installed, 64 per cent were of indigenous
. . 29origin.
Table 11 ; Domestic Origin of Installed Machinery
Companies
Indian
Origin
(%)
Small Medium
(nos) (%)* (nos) (%)*
Large 
(nos) (%)*
Row Totals 
(nos) (%)+
0 _ _
10 - - - — 2 18.2 2 5.4
20 - - - — — — — —
30 2 8.7 - - 3 27.3 5 16.2
40 2 8.7 1 33.3 2 18.2 5 13.5
50 1 4.3 1 33.3 1 9.1 3 5.4
60 - - — - 1 9.1 1 2.7
70 1 4.3 — - — — 1 2.7
80 2 8.7 — — 2 18.2 4 10.8
90 5 21.7 — — — — 5 13.5
100 10 43.5 i 3 3 . 3 — — 1 1 29.7
Valid 
Cases : 23 100.0 3 100.0 1 1 1 0 0 . 0 37 100.0
Missing 
Cases : 
Sample
1
24
1
4
1
12
3
40
Source; The Indian Machine Tool Industry Survey (1978)
Note Î * based on the total of valid cases in the firm 
size column
+ based on the total of valid cases of all the 
firm sizes.
(Firm size based on capital-investment ; small scale below 
Rs.7.5 lakhs ; medium scale between Rs,7.5 and Rs.25 lakhs ; 
large scale above Rs.25 lakhs).
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À feature of the Table is that the majority of large 
undertakings possessed proportionately more foreign 
technology than that of small firms. Again, the 1968 
census data for all machine tool using industries provides 
corroboration of the survey's results; it concurs that in 
large scale concerns a greater portion of the machine tool 
stock (53 per cent) was of foreign origin; in the small 
scale sector the proportion was much lower (14 per cent).
But it is difficult to draw firm conclusions on the 
significance of these findings because, although firm size 
and scale are unquestionably in positive correlation to each 
other, there exist additional factors, equally important, 
which influence a company's choice of technique. The pre­
ference shown by foreign collaborators for large Indian 
concerns is one obvious example; the differing financial 
abilities as between the small machine tool companies and 
their large counterparts is another.
It will prove helpful to explore one aspect of this 
last factor a little morf closely : credit. Tables 12 a, 
b, and c, denote the major destinations of credit obtained 
for the year 1978. Irrespective of firm size, credit for 
the purposes of fixed capital investment was clearly of 
negligible importance. However, the position of working 
capital is somewhat different. Here, all firms utilized 
their credit to a much greater degree. In the case of 
small firms, some 55 per cent of the total, employed 100 
per cent of their credit solely to satisfy the needs of 
variable capital. Low profitability was the probable 
cause for the poor flow of internal funds. Finally, credit 
for the purposes of research and development was of only 
marginal consideration to all companies.
One side-issue regarding credit has to do with the 
impact of foreign collaboration during the early period 
of the industry's development. Due to the paucity of local
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Table : Major Destinations of Credit Obtained for 1978 
(a) For the Purposes of Fixed Capital
Companies
Credit Small Medium Larae Row Totals
(%) (nos) (%) (nos) (%) (nos ) (%) (nos) (%)
0 13 65 3 75 6 60 22 65
1 —2 4 3 15 - - 2 20 5 14.7
25-49 2 10 1 25 2 20 5 14.7
50-74 1 5 - - - - - -
75-99 - - - - - - - *•
100 5 - — - _i 3
Valid
Cases : 20 100 4 100 10 100 34 100
Missing
Cases : 4 - 2 6
Sample 24 4 12 40
(b) For the Purposes of Variable Capital
0 2 10 — — 1 10 3 8.8
1-24 - - - - - - - —
25-49 1 5 - - - - 1 3.0
50-74 3 15 1 25 2 20 6 18,0
75-99 3 15 - - 4 40 7 21.0
100 ii 55 3 -21 __3 30 17 50.0
Valid
Cases: 20 100 4 100 10 100 34 100
Missing
Cases : 4 *• 2 6
Sample 24 4 12 40
(c) For the Purposes of Research and Development
0 17 85 4 100 7 70 28 82
1-24 3 15 - - 3 30 6 18
25-49 - - - - - — — -
50-74 - — - - — — -
75-99 - - — - - — — —
100 — - — - — — -
Valid
Cases Î 20 100 4 100 10 100 34 100
Missing
Cases : 4 - 2 6
Sample 24 4 12 40
Source : The Indian Machine Tool Industry Survey
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sources of credit, machine tool units had to accept any 
line that presented itself; this was magnified when rupee 
credit was involved. What this meant, of course, was that 
to thwart the probability that the potential collaborator 
might not make the credit available at a later, more suit­
able time, machine tool firms were prepared to saddle 
themselves with excess capacity by investing in machinery 
that was not currently required. The result of this 
practice is that in India it is possible to visit different 
machine tool factories or even separate plants in the same 
enterprize and observe a whole array of installed machinery 
from one particular country. An example of this phenomenon 
relates to the numerous enterprizes possessing equipment 
of predominantly Soviet or East European origin which were 
imported during the rupee credit era of the late fifties 
and early sixties. The implications from such dealings are 
serious : the choice of installed machinery reflecting the 
ease of obtaining the credit rather than its technological 
efficiency.
At the present time, the credit source tends generally 
to be the banking system although state finance corporations 
are a strong secondary source of funds. The cost of credit 
is reasonably high with interest rates averaging around 
15-16 per cent. Small companies though, do enjoy the 
privilege of a concessionary rate some two to three per 
cent below this range.
An important characteristic of the technical level of
the installed machinery is its age. Reference to the 1968
machine tool census shows that only 36 per cent of all
machine tools installed were over 10 years old - the age
at which machine tools are generally considered obsolete,
30and 16 per cent were over 20 years. The census further 
indicated that in practically all types of general purpose 
machinery, Indian-made machine tools predominated. For 
the particular case of the machine tool branch, the
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evidence on these points as obtained from the survey is 
documented in Table 13,. Unfortunately, it has not been 
possible to seggregate the more advanced technology from 
that of the universal, labour-intensive type of equipment
Table 13 : Percentage of Installed Equipment, According
Metal Cutting 
Equipment
Percentage of 
1-5 6-10
Machines
11-15
by Age 
16-20
(Yrs.) 
21+
(1)Lathes 21.7 23.2 45.0 6.2 3.9
(2)Milling Machines
(3)Grinding, 
Polishing and 
Finishing
22 .9 13.3 58.0 3.7 2.1
Machines 
(4)Planing, Slotting 
and Broaching
13.9 10.6 63.2 8.3 4.0
Machines 
(5)Drilling and
21.6 17.2 48.3 7.3 5.6
Boring Machines 
(6)Gear and Thread
17.9 13.7 59.4 5.7 3.3
Cutting Machines 
(7)Cutting-off
13.5 13.5 60.8 5,4 6,8
Machines 
Percentage of
14.0 26.7 48.8 4.7 5.8
all tools
Valid Cases : 34 
Missing Cases : 6 
Sample : 40
19.1 17.2 53.5 6.2 4.0
Source: The Indian Machine Tool Industry Survey (1978)
However, from observations made during the survey, 
automatic machinery appears to figure prominently in the 
capital stock of the larger organisations although for 
the industry as a whole, the numerical superiority of 
general-purpose machines remains unassailable. The really 
interesting fact to emerge from the table is the deter­
ioration in capital replacement since the census of 1968, 
as it relates to the machine tool industry :
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63.7 per cent of all metal-cutting equipment in 1978 now haying 
an age greater than 10 years. But, it would be incorrect 
to describe the age structure of the installed capital 
as critical, because 53.5 per cent of the machine tools 
lie in the 11-15 years age band. Nevertheless, the danger 
signals are there : unless the pace of capital replacement 
is speeded up, the Indian machine tool industry will find 
itself with an antiquated capital stock composed of what 
are already 'second-best' techniques of production. The 
difficulty with this argument, however, is that as excess 
capacity is a significant factor in the industry, there is 
consequently little incentive for entrepreneurs to engage 
in capital replacement.
Thus, it is speculated that the underlying reason for 
this low level of capital replacement is that the machine 
tool industry suffers from a demand constraint. The large 
public sector firms survive because of government patronage 
and, in the case of HMT, through the rapid diversification 
out of machine tool production. Moreover, this trend is 
not confined solely to the public sector but permeates 
throughout the entire industry. In the private sector, 
one medium size firm in Maharastra engaged its workforce 
almost permanently on the manufacture of components for a 
local scooter factory. Although this practice was initially 
to compensate for the slack in machine tool production, it 
was progressively becoming a more important element in the 
company's production make-up. Such secondary operations 
were observed at a number of machine tool concerns of 
varying size : a small firm in Bangalore, for instance, 
was found to be engaged in pressing out watch cases for 
HMT's horological business; and while the entrepreneur had 
ambitious plans for the expansion of this side of his company's 
operations, he could only express pessimism for machine 
tool production. In fact, the foremost problem worrying 
the industry today is the gradual decline in the rate of
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inflow of new orders and enquiries even though the
recent recessionary tendencies appear to have receded,
But, it has become axiomatic to state that the machine
tool industry is the first to suffer and the last to
recover in the event of economic recession. For this
reason, private capital has always been shy in so far as
the machine tool industry is concerned. It is noteworthy
that during the last 15 years not a single machine tool
factory worth its name has been established in the private 
32sector. The Indian government has recognised the
problem by recently making moves to widen the scope of
the existing investment allowance to include various
engineering industries which constitute a very important
33segment of the machine tool industry's customers.
Whatever improvement this will have on machine tool demand 
may be negated, however, by another government proposal 
to allow the freer import of foreign machine tools into 
the country. The objective of the measure is to increase 
competition in the domestic production of machine tools 
and force firms to produce more efficiently. Additionally, 
so it is argued, it will beneficially expose India's ,
indigenous manufacturers to the latest developments in 
machine tool design; this would allow them to keep abreast 
of the rapid progress being made in machine tool tech­
nology abroad. The danger is, though, that it could 
depress demand still further.
The view that there is widespread sub-utilization 
of capacity in India's machine tool units is examined in 
detail in Chapter 5; however, it is not an argument which 
should arouse undue controversy. A report published in 
the early 1970s, stated that t "under conditions of 
normal demand, Indian machine tool manufacturers would 
be producing at rates of 10 to 40 units (counting all 
variants) of each model per month for the standard machine 
tools like lathes, milling machines etc. In the developed 
countries, collaborators and competitors commonly produce
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the same machines at rates of ten times this or more."^"^ 
Returns from this study's survey appear to suggest, however, 
that even these figures are on the high side. Of course, 
the scale of production depends on the types of machine 
tool being manufactured; their technical configuration; 
the demand profile; and many other considerations. But, 
excluding HMT, the average batch size of firms in the 
survey ranged from 5 to 20 machines per month. For many 
of the smaller companies even batch methods of production 
are inappropriate; the manufacture of machine tools being 
carried out on a one-off basis. Production in these firms 
proceeds on a financial knife-edge : with no stocking 
taking place, manufacture is precariously dependent on 
the receipt of the next order arriving on time. Life is 
also tough at the top : . HMT's extremely diversified 
production range, coupled with the division of production 
among six different locations (due mainly to the government's 
policy of regional balance), results in the duplication of 
functional facilities. Thus, despite the large size of 
the company, only limited economies of scale are possible.
Due to the lower volume of production in India, 
and hence smaller batch sizes,the set-up times are spread 
over fewer units; this will have a negative effect on the 
costs of production. In this contexts a U.N. study on 
machine tool manufacture in developing countries once 
stated : "economies associated with the length of pro­
duction run arise partly from the time and expense 
involved in switching the operations of a shop from one 
product to another. The changeover requires laborious 
tooling ; a changing of auxiliary production equipment 
such as moulds and dies for casting and forging, jigs and 
fixtures designed to hold particular workpieces in place 
during machining etc. There is also the fact that the 
efficiency of a production department gradually improves 
as the same tasks are repeated and that every change 
causes a temporary decrease in efficiency. From limited
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evidence, it would appear that the elasticity of labour 
and capital costs with regard to the length of production 
run - the percentage change in these costs as the
35production run is changed by 1 per cent - is about 0,75."
Without obtaining economies of scale in production 
then, the machine tool industry of India has been at a 
serious disadvantage concerning the ability to induce 
increases in demand through cost and price reductions.
In these circumstances, the tenet that the capacity for 
productive capital formation is determined by the volume 
of demand implied in Adam Smith's adage : the 'division of 
labour is limited by the extent of the market', is a 
truism which still holds today. On this aspect, it will 
be both instructive and relevant to refer again to the article 
by Professor Amsden who wrote on the development of the 
Taiwanese machine tool industry. She argued that : "the 
achievement in poor countries of ... cost and price 
reductions may paradoxically necessitate a return to an 
earlier Western technology, embodying a less refined 
division of labour, and the production of a final product 
familiar in appearance and performance to Western con­
sumers of a half a century ago."^^ The Indian and Taiwanese 
machine building and metal-using industries were both,at 
the start of industrialization, composed of low-income 
consuming units. However, in terms of absolute numbers, 
the Indian market more closely resembled the early period 
of Soviet industrialization while the Taiwanese market 
might legitimately be compared with that of the Japanese 
during the 1920s. In a potentially large market such as 
India possesses, a more elaborate division of labour 
should not be incompatible with cost and price reductions 
provided that economies of scale more than offset the 
rise in capital costs that would be involved, i.e. at 
high levels of output, modern technology would have lower 
unit costs of production. As in the Soviet case, such 
cheapening in the manufacture of basic, all purpose machine
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tools could well have been sufficient to attract the 
necessary level of demand required to make this 
strategy effective.
Standardization of components assist in reducing the 
costs of production. The need at this point then, is to 
assess the evidence on the progress the tool industry has 
made towards standardization. It is usual in the liter­
ature to view scale and the standardization and inter­
changeability of parts as concepts that are inseparably 
linked. But, in truth, this need not be the case; 
standardization etc., per se, being a corollary of improved 
production organization. Two types of standardization can 
be distinguished : firstly, the interchangeability and
uniformity of tolerances, threads, and gauges of such
37basic components as nuts, bolts and bearings; and 
secondly, the interchange of the more major parts and 
components used in the fabrication of similar types of 
machinery. In respect of the former, the Indian regulatory 
authorities have been able, since the introduction of the 
Five Year Plans, to impose a high degree of consistency 
in national standards. However, except for HMT, which 
has been greatly involved in work connected with the 
interchangeability of components in its product range, 
there has been little systematic advance towards the 
second type of standardization amongst the large concerns 
in the industry. This is probably a reflection of the 
manifold collaboration agreements that have taken place 
with foreign firms of both East and Western origin. The 
fact that the associated licensed machinery emanates from 
differing engineering cultures; exhibits varying standards 
of accuracy and performance, hardly makes for the standard­
ization of parts and components in India's machine tool 
plants.
Also valuable in helping to promote efficiency in the
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productive operations of enterprizes is the need to 
rationalize stocks of inventory, and input-variety in 
general. A number of the cost problems which tend to 
be associated with batch production techniques can be 
traced to the high variety of components manufactured. 
Therefore, one question put to India's tool-makers was 
whether any attempts had been made to reduce manufacturing 
costs through input rationalization? The replies received 
are detailed in Table 14. From the table it is evident 
that the importance of input rationalization is recognized 
by all firms, thereby transcending size classifications.
Table 14 ; Experience of Input Rationalization
in Machine Tool Production
Response Small
Companies
Medium Large Row Totals
(nos) (%) (nos) (%)
Yes 11 45.8 1 25 9 75 21 52.5
No 7 29.2 1 25 3 25 11 27.5
Planned 6 25.0 2 50 — — 8 20.0
Valid
Cases 24 100.0 4 100.0 12 100.0 40 100.0
Missing
Cases - "** - -
Sample 24 4 12 40
Source : The Indian Machine Tool Industry Survey (1978)
It can be observed that 75 per cent of large firms have at 
some time formulated policies to reduce the variety and 
near-duplication of production materials; an equally high 
percentage applies to small enterprizes. One example of 
the progress that can be made through rationalization is 
shown in Table 15. The table depicts the results of a 
variety reduction study conducted by HMT in 1966. In 
passing, it should be noted that the same study also 
included under its terms of reference, the rationalization 
of tools and equipment resulting in the deletion of some 
55 items from the inventory. As a general statement 
though, there is, in India's machine tool industry, a
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proliferation in input materials and also a lack of 
standardization of components which lowers the efficiency 
of the production organization and adversely affects the 
cost structure of the industry's products.
Table 15 : Results of HMT* s Rationalization Study (1966)
Before After no. of % of
Rational­ Rational­ deleted deleted
Material ization ization varieties varieties
Cast Iron 43 17 26 60
Mild Steel 139 47 92 61
Construction
Steel 288 198 90 31
Tool Steel 50 19 31 62
High Speed
Steel 58 22 36 62
Aluminium
Alloys 55 37 18 32
Copper 21 9 12 57
Bronze 43 10 33 76
Brass 38 10 28 74
Totals 735 369 366 50
Source : HMT News Digest, Vol.l, No.9 (Jan. 1967)
One of the less satisfactory characteristics con­
cerning the development of the Soviet machine tool industry 
was the extremely high level of verticalization in the 
production processes of their factories. The Soviets 
did not believe that internalizing many of the ancillary 
functions of machine tool manufacture was a virtuous 
objective but, in the beginning without the existence of 
support industries, very little else was considered 
feasible. Of course, not only is this the easier path to 
follow thereby avoiding the difficulties implicit in the 
simultaneous creation of both principal and sub-contracting 
plants but it is also fairly typical of the majority of 
newly industrializing nations in the establishment Of 
manufacturing industries. The rationale behind this 
pattern of development concerns the weakness of the supply
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and distribution system, including those feeder industries 
that do exist; this causes severe bottlenecks to occur in 
the principal industry’s manufacturing operations. In 
addition, there is also the very important issue regarding 
the quality of the ancillary industries output. If this 
is sub-standard then another reason emerges for the 
integration of production processes : the ability to 
control the quality of input in production. The evidence 
of vertical integration in the Indian machine tool industry 
is somewhat assorted. Irrespective of size, many companies 
are engaged in activities, such as welding and metal- 
hardening treatment, that would normally be sub-contracted 
out to ancillary industries in a 'mature' machine tool 
industry. The inter-play of market forces (as described 
in detail in the methodology chapter of this study) 
leading to the vertical disintegration of production is 
the culmination of an evolutionary process. The motivating 
force behind this gradual re-structuring of industrial 
organization derives from the increasing specialization 
of particular activities within the total production 
spectrum. The expansion in the division of labour, of 
which the ancillary industries are one aspect, is a 
factor of profound significance : connoting amelioration 
in industrial efficiency. Thus, while verticalization 
is meritorious by ensuring the continuity in the output 
of an enterprize, it will, at the same time, have 
deleterious repercussions on the progress of the sector 
as a whole. In stating this fact, it is difficult to 
justify the logic which prompted many of the Indian 
machine tool manufacturers to comment with pride on the 
integrated nature of their particular organizations.
The buying-out of items is almost seen as an undesirable 
objective. The speculative reason for this perverse 
industrial philosophy could lie in the developing countries 
perception of economic strength as being synonomous with 
self-sufficiency. Ultimately, however this must be harmful 
to economic development. As Harry G, Johnson once argued :
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... "if the sub-structure of efficient supplying firms 
is lacking, and the enterprize is instead obliged to 
go into the business of producing parts itself .,, 
costs of production can rise to incredible heights.
the
..39
An elucidation of the survey data on the possession 
of casting facilities will provide some representation 
of the measure of vertical integration in the machine tool 
industry. Castings are an important constituent of a 
machine tool, accounting for the major share of its total 
weight. Thus, the quality and durability of the casting 
components will have considerable bearing on the de­
preciation and life of the asset. Table 16 lists the 
evidence with regard to the possession of casting fac­
ilities by the machine tool plants covered in the survey, 40
Table 16 Possession of Casting Facilities by 
Machine Tool Firms
Small
Companies
Medium Large Row Totals
Response (nos) {%) ( nos ) (%) (nos ) {%) (nos ) (%)
Yes 7 29.1 2 50 8 66.6 17 42.5
No 17 70.9 2 50 4 33.3 23 57.5
Valid
Cases 24 100.0 4 100.0 12 100.0 40 100.0
Missing
Cases
Sample 24 4 12 40
Source : The Indian Machine Tool Industry Survey (1978)
For small firms, 70 per cent of those interviewed intimated 
that castings were bought out. A possible reason for this 
might be the recognition on the part of the entrepreneur 
of the potentially low utilization of a foundry, due to 
insufficient demand, should it be installed. Medium sized 
firms, on the other hand, exhibited no tendencies, either way 
50 per cent of the companies indicating they possess casting
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facilities; 50 per cent indicating they do not. What is 
really surprising is the data on large firms with twice 
as many enterprises having the facility to cast metal as 
those that buy out. But quality standards are obviously 
much more demanding for the larger organizations with 
foreign reputations to create or maintain, and in this 
sense, the possession of a foundry enables the quality 
of castings to be controlled, thus minimizing the incidence 
of blow holes and other defects.
In"conjunction with the above, an attempt was also 
made to assess the average quality of the ancillary 
industries output; the details of which are contained in 
Table 17 . Although the results of the table are incon­
clusive, it is encouraging to note that only 3.5 per cent 
of respondents defined their ancillary supplies as being 
of low quality. Naturally, the format of the question 
imposes a degree of subjective relativity as to the 
entrepreneurs interpretation of 'quality'. But the 
intention was not to straightjacket the entrepreneur 
by designating strict and exhaustive scales for his 
response, rather some general index of satisfaction was 
sought; and it is in this light that the findings should 
be gauged.
Table 17 Assessment of the Quality of Ancillary Supplies 
to the Machine Tool Industry
Companies 
MediumSmall Large Row Totals
Response (nos) (%) (nos) (%) (nos ) (%) (nos) (%)
Low Quality 1 10 1 3.6
Good Quality 12 80 3 100 9 90 24 85.7
Excellent
Quality 3 20 - - - 3 10.8
Valid Cases 15 100 3 100 10 100 28 100
Missing Cases 9 1 2 12
Sample 24 4 12 40
Source : The Indian Machine Tool Industry Survey (1978)
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To conclude the section, a mention should be made 
regarding the role of auxiliary elements in the industry's 
production system. In an important respect the functioning 
of the auxiliary services in India’s machine tool plants 
is duplicative of the Soviet experience during the early 
part of its industrialization. The requirement in the 
Soviet industry was to economize on the use of capital; 
a dimension back-stopping not only the technological 
development of the direct production processes but that 
of the internalized auxiliary operations also. Integral 
to the 'model' was a dualistic structure of industrial 
organization : capital-intensive production processes 
co-existing with labour-intensive techniques in the 
auxiliary activities. The primary aim of this policy was 
to keep the K/O ratio as low as possible. As far as the 
production processes were concerned the problem was 
approached via the investment into specialized machinery 
and the achievement of high levels of output. For the 
indirect processes however, this strategy was not feasible; 
instead, the alternative approach was pursued of keeping 
the K/O ratio as low as possible through the substitution 
of labour for c a p i t a l , I n  consonance with the Soviet 
policy regarding the organization of its auxiliary processes, 
most Indian machine tool units perceived these operations 
as a predominantly labour-intensive form of activity. The 
evidence contained in Table 18 consolidates this point.
In some cases, involving the smaller Indian companies, a 
number of the auxiliary processes have been hived out to 
other organizations : one firm in Ludhiana, for instance, 
had the inspection of its products performed by an organ 
of the small scale industries service; it is not uncommon 
either, for the smaller units to have machinery repair and 
even maintenance carried out by other small, independent 
firms (though the owners of these concerns are usually 
members of the same family),
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Table 18 : The Labour-Intensive Nature of 
Auxiliary Operations
Companies 
Small Medium Large Row Totals
Response (nos) (%) (nos) (%) (nos ) (%) (nos) (%)
Yes 19 82.6 2 50 8 66.7 29 74
No 2 50 4 33.3 10 26
Valid Cases 23 100.0 4 100. 0 12 100.0 39 100.0
Missing Cases 1 - — 1
Sample 24 4 12 40
Source : The Indian Machine Tool Industry Survey (1978)
The resemblance between the early production organ­
ization of the Soviet machine tool industry and that of 
India's ends here, however, as the internal technological 
dualism that characterized the former case is totally 
absent in the latter, where direct as well as indirect 
production processes are distinguished by the role incum­
bent on labour as the major factor of production. Table 19 
illustrates the evidence to support this assertion. Clearly, 
the disturbing feature of the- data is the lack of commit­
ment to the adoption of modern techniques of production 
by all sizes of firm.
Table 19 Company Strategy on the Acguisition of 
Best-Practice Production Technology
Small
Companies
Medium Large Row Totals
Response (nos ) (%) (nos ) (%) (nos) (%) (nos ) (%)
In all Cases 5 20.8 3 30 8 21.0
Usually 12 50.0 4 100.0 7 70 23 60.5
Never 7 29.2 — 7 18.5
Valid Cases 24 100.0 4 100.0 10 100. 0 38 100.0
Missing Cases - - 2 2
Sample 24 4 12 40
Source ; The Indian Machine Tool Industry Survey (1978)
In summary, the aim of this section has been to add 
some empirical meat to the skeletal theoretical frame­
work propounded in Chapter two. In particular, the analysis 
has attempted to lay bare the more striking divergences 
in the comparative patterns of development between India's 
machine tool industry and the earlier industrial organ­
ization of the Soviet model. The validity of such a 
comparison is based on the belief that India is one of 
the few developing countries which, at the start of 
industrialization, possessed similar economic conditions 
to that of the Soviet Union at the beginning of its 
development push. For this reason, it is hypothesised 
that the genre of Soviet machine tool manufacture may have 
been the appropriate one for India to have followed.
A two-sector growth strategy implies that capital 
goods are in short supply. Notwithstanding this fact, a 
central theme of the preceding discussion has been the 
emphasis given to the contraposing-force of demand* or 
rather, to the effects of its deficiency on the machine 
tool industry's organizational structure in production. 
Support for this type of approach can be found from 
Jack Baranson who once wrote in similar fashion on the 
problems of manufacturing in India, thus : "Contrary to 
widely held beliefs among development economists about 
capital deficiencies, the evidence seems to indicate that 
the basic difficulties lie in limitations imposed by the 
scale of local markets and overall deficiencies in 
supplier capabilities."^^ These two elements : low 
demand and ancillary services have received particular 
attention in the text but it is in relation to the whole 
that they are important. Other issues of equal significance 
relate to such facets of organization as specialization 
and the standardization and interchangeability of components 
Also, production organization is inseparably linked with 
the composition of equipment and with types of technology
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e m p l o y e d . T h e  economic status of these associated 
factors have therefore been appraised in an attempt to 
gain a greater understanding of machine tool manufacture 
in India.
The cornerstone to the debate has been the con­
viction that cost and price minimization should have 
been conceived, from the start, as the guiding principle 
in the development of the industry. But, instead of 
treading the Soviet path, India allowed its machine tool 
sector to develop in a more or less 'ad hoc' Western 
manner. Consequently, this pattern, in combination with 
the industrial control aspects of government policy 
discussed in Section one, led to a situation being created 
where the machine tool industry never acquired the 'capital- 
saving' mentality that was characteristic of the Soviet 
approach. In fact, it is only recently that the subject 
of cost has received the attention with which it merits. 
Observe, as an example, the following (under) statement 
made at an engineering conference in 1977 : "One of the 
complaints which ^as been made against indigenous machine 
tool industry and engineering industry, is the high cost 
of its products .,. With the complete protection in the 
last two decades, there has possibly been a certain 
neglect on the cost and price a s p e c t . S y m p t o m a t i c  
of this neglect is the 'cost-plus' mechanism by which 
the final price is arrived at ; the addition of a standard 
margin on costs. In this way, very little incentive 
exists for the manufacturer to improve performance.
Indeed, when prices are set on a cost-plus basis, cost
reduction and efficiency are not the primary goals of
45production.
The degree of vertical integration of an industry is 
an important aspect in the determination of efficiency : a 
high level of vertical integration raises.production costs, 
The critical nature of the concept has been acknowledged by
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the inclusion in the section of a discussion on its 
scope and prevalence in the industry. The analysis 
concluded with a brief sketch on the role of auxiliary 
processes in machine tool manufacture. Here again, a 
comparison was made with the Soviet experience in which 
labour was utilized as the 'cheapest non-linear servo­
mechanism'^^ for the installed production technology.
Thus, cost reductions were achieved in the Soviet 
machine tool industry through high levels of : scale, 
specialization, and standardization. Of no less importance 
though, was the technological dualism that was displayed 
in the plants. Here capital-intensive production processes 
were assisted by labour-intensive auxiliary services in 
the manufacture of labour-intensive products. By contrast, 
the impression gained from the discussion hereto is that 
the Indian machine tool industry possesses predominantly 
labour-intensive techniques in both the direct and in­
direct areas of production; and the final product of the 
larger concerns which accounts for the major share of the 
market is capital-intensive relative to the needs of the 
machine building industries in India. It is also held to be 
costly, and whatever else can be said : a high-cost producer- 
goods industry is unlikely to be conducive to economic 
development.
Section 3 : The Role of Foreign Collaboration in 
the Machine Tool Industry
(i) Foreign Collaboration : The Vehicle for 
Technological Progress
The question could be asked : why did India of the 
early fifties having recognised the possibilities of the 
Soviet Planning System, as reflected by its adoption of 
a capital-goods growth model in 1956, gravitate towards
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a traditional 'Western' conceptualization of machine tool 
manufacture? In particular, what was it that galvanised 
the Indian authorities to pursue the rapid and massive 
diversification of its machine tool industry's output 
which, through the necessity of employing batch methods 
of production, dissipated the opportunities to be gained 
from economies in both specialization and scale? Or was 
it that the situation just developed by default, i.e. 
no politico-economic consensus having existed on the 
subject? A tentative reply to these questions might be 
formulated by assessing the comparative roles played by 
foreign collaboration during the early period of industrial 
ization in the Soviet Union and India.
For the first decade or so after 1930, the Soviets 
concentrated on the mass production of simple, stand­
ardized machine tools and although there was some 
collaboration with foreign companies, it was generally 
of minimal significance.^^ Admittedly, most of the 
designs of these basic tools were copies of foreign 
models, however, almost invariably such 'technological 
transfers' involved selectivity in the model chosen for 
manufacture : conforming to the overall capital-saving 
approach pursued by the Soviets, Moreover, in the 
initial stages of industrialization the Soviet machine 
tool industry limited itself to the production of a small 
nucleus of models; a policy implicitly based on a 'walk 
before you can run* philosophy. Machine tool imports were 
only allowed if advanced machinery was required to 
supplement indigenous production; this sophisticated 
equipment was, as a matter of policy, not manufactured 
in domestic plants. As such, imports of pre-selected 
machine tools were integrally incorporated into the 
development strategy of the industry. An obvious example 
of this type of import was the requirement of automatic 
machinery for the Soviets' system of flow-line production.
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By contrast, the development of the Indian machine 
tool industry has been characterized by the heavy emphasis 
given to technical collaboration with foreign companies. 
From the very beginnings of the Second Plan period with 
the establishment of HMT, foreign collaboration has been 
interpreted as the vehicle for technological development 
in machine tool design. HMT, which was begun in 1956 with 
Swiss collaboration, epitomizes this view. Between 1966 
and 1970 a further ten agreements were signed. Of these 
agreements, four alone were concluded during February/March 
1966 with the following firms, viz :
(i) Messrs. Gildemeister and Co. A.G, West Germany,
for the manufacture of multi-spindle bar and
chucking automatics;
(ii) Messrs. Manurhin of France for the manufacture
of single spindle automatics;
(iii) Messrs. Ernault Somna of France to manufacture
'S’ and *U' pilot lathes; and
(iv) Messrs. Jones and Lawson, U.S.A. to manufacture
48
shell turning 'FAY' automatics.
The process of collaboration has continued to the present 
time with HMT currently involved in six collaborations 
with foreign machine tool concerns; the most recent being 
in 1975/76 with The Cross Co., U.S.A. for the manufacture 
of very sophisticated transfer line machinery. However, 
foreign collaboration has not been confined solely to the 
public sector ; Bharat Fritz Werner Ltd., Ex-Cell-0 
India Ltd., Mysore Kirloskar Ltd., Traub India Ltd., 
and Cooper Ltd., are just a few of the more prominent 
private companies involved in this form of international 
arrangement. In retrospect, India could be accused of 
being naively indiscriminate in the technology that it 
permitted its machine tool units to manufacture under 
license. Could there really be sound economic just­
ification in terms of long-run demand potential, for HMT 
to have acquired the manufacturing capability of over 70
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different types of machine tools? Moreover, a pro­
gressively rising proportion of the product range is 
highly capital-intensive in nature, which is yet another 
divergence from the early Soviet pattern of production.
Thus the Indian machine tool industry, possibly due to 
the influences of national prestige, allowed an 
'international demonstration effect' of considerable 
proportion to pervade its product range.
In essence, the polemical debate to which the role 
of foreign technology in the development of the Soviet 
and Indian machine tool industries gives rise, centres on 
its industrial destination; whether the technology be 
process or product orientated. If the problem is addressed 
in this manner then the comparative approaches might be 
viewed from the different but perhaps more revealing 
perspective regarding the Soviet' preference for the 
more arduous task of 'skipping stages' in technological 
organization as against the Indian predilection for 
the relatively easier task of 'skipping stages' in the 
product-mix produced.
(ii) Features of the Collaboration Process
This section provides a brief discussion of the 
nature and problems of foreign collaboration in India's 
machine tool industry. The analysis is qualitative in 
character, with information being drawn from three basic 
sources : (1) a 1971 study by J. Mitra"^^ who examined 
the industrial circumstances of 18 machine tool units 
in India having foreign collaboration agreements; (2) the 
present study's survey of Indian machine tool manufac­
turers; and (3) a supplementary survey carried out by 
the author of a small number of British machine tool 
concerns which have, or have had in the past, collaboration 
agreements with Indian companies. The discussion will 
proceed from three particular standpoints : Firstly, the
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rationale behind the Indian units choice of partner. 
Secondly, the working relationship once the agreement 
has been signed; and finally, the technical state of the 
tools made under license.
The general impression to be gained from all data 
sources is that machine tool manufacturers in India have 
very little room for manoeuvre in their choice of foreign 
collaborator. In fact, from conversations held with 
Indian manufacturers in the survey to this study, it 
became clear that a greater onus was on the Indian enter­
prise to persuade foreign companies to invest in the 
Indian market rather than the other way around. Mitra 
in her study, reported that at least 6 of the 18 machine 
tool manufacturers she had interviewed, had considered 
no alternatives at all, Their choice of collaborator 
having been made on several grounds ; the prior friendship 
of the parties concerned; the Indian partner had previously 
been engaged as the selling agent of the foreign company; 
the brand name of the model to be produced under license; 
and finally, solely on the fact that the foreign coit^any 
was willing to invest.
From the scattered information available on the 
subject, it is apparent that very little scientific 
basis , existed for the .Indian companies' choice of 
collaborator or, indeed, the technology to be produced 
under license. This view is corroborated by Mitra who 
emphasises the meagre attention paid by the Indian 
enterprises to either the foreign machines selling 
potential or the appropriateness of its performance in 
the Indian market. To quote : "The major drawback in 
collaboration agreements has been the limited market 
forecast work carried out by the manufacturers before 
entering into collaboration. Government and private 
industrial aims must mesh in formulating and effecting 
a 'know-how' import policy on the basis of a proper
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evaluation which distinguishes between the types of 
machines we need to produce : whether the machine is 
rugged, simple and aims at the low budget user; whether 
the machine is the first of its Kind to be produced in 
India; whether the machine embodies a new design in a 
line of machine tools already established in India; 
whether the machine is a very sophisticated general- 
purpose or special-purpose machine tool and the range of 
applicability of such a machine; and finally, whether 
the design is based on numerical control systems and the 
scope for its use .,. The Licensing Committee and the 
Foreign Investment Board seem instead to follow the pro­
cedure of first-come-first-served and allow the first 
applicant to pre-empt capacity and then to sit pretty if 
he is so inclined. In the machine tool field, one often 
hears complaints from private sector producers that public 
sector applications are always'more equal' than others - 
they are always processed first and accepted first."^*^
This final point is borne out by the comments of a spokes­
man for a British machine tool enterprise which until 
quite recently has held a collaboration agreement with a 
prominent public sector company in India. He suggested 
that it was because his company's partner had been a 
public enterprise that little difficulty was experienced 
in the issuance of licenses for initial production and 
also for the subsequent import of materials and components. 
Moreover, as the company was also under the jurisdiction 
of the Ministry of Defence, a visit to Delhi and the 
Minister concerned was all that was required for the 
process to be expedited.
Once the collaboration agreement has been concluded 
what, in theory, are the benefits available to the foreign 
concern? The following advantages can be established;
In the first instance, there are the purely financial ' 
aspects regarding the payment of royalty and licensing
178
fees. Unfortunately, no evidence is readily available 
to indicate the extent of either type of remittance in 
the Indian machine tool industry. The survey fared no 
better in this respect; it seems that remittances paid to 
foreign collaborators is a subject of some sensitivity.
What is known, as can be garnered from the government's 
policy on collaboration, is that the normal maximum for 
royalty payments is 5 per cent of net sales. Now, given 
that Indian output levels are generally quite low and 
couple this with the fact that some 50 per cent of the 
royalty will, in any case, be taxed away by the Indian 
authorities then it may be surmised that the sums involved 
are not of 'earth shattering' significance. In fact, it 
can readily be conceived that the initial teething stages 
of the collaboration may actually involve a loss to the 
foreign partner due to the increasing transfer of resources 
and expertize to 'iron out the faults'.
The possible small size of lump-sum or royalty 
payments may cause the foreign collaborator to harbour 
misgivings over the project but a secondary form of 
potential income provides some measure of recompense; 
it has regard to the export of proprietory items, 
components and materials to the Indian partner. The 
problem with royalty payments is the need for the Indian 
company to attain sufficiently high levels of output to 
make the remittances a worthwhile revenue source to the 
foreign collaborator. Difficulties arise if satisfactory 
levels of output are not reached and in this situation 
one of the ways in which foreign concerns might be en­
couraged to mitigate for shortfalls in income returns 
is through over-pricing on the capital equipment com-
51ponents and raw materials supplied to the foreign partners.
A second factor, motivating foreign companies to 
enter into collaboration with Indian machine tool units
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relates to a non-pecuniary consideration : foreign
manufacturers are aware that once a particular machine
tool model is produced in India its import is usually
banned - hence, in order to retain a foot-hold in the
Indian market it seems reasonable to opt for a licensing
agreement especially if it is for a machine model which
52is on its way out in the developed world. Indeed, 
market interests may hold even greater importance to the 
foreign partner than questions concerning the size of 
remittances. Support for this, comes from several British 
machine tool manufacturers who gave their reasons for 
collaboration as : overcoming Indian import regulations; 
protecting their existing market position; and taking 
advantage of the potential market size.
It will be convenient at this juncture to pick-up
on the point regarding the modernity of the technology
transferred. The general conclusion of Mitra*s findings
is that : "the foreign collaborator rarely parts with
53his latest designs, even under license." Although this 
view is in unison with current academic thinking on 
technological transfer, it nevertheless runs counter 
to the evidence collected from this study's surveys, 
both in India and Britain.
Looking at the Indian situation first. Table 20 
details the number of collaboration agreements, 
machine tool units held with both foreign and Indian 
companies during 1977/78. It can be observed that out 
of the 40 respondents only 6 units were involved in 
collaboration agreements with foreign companies.
However, it should be stressed that most of these 6 
firms collaborated with more than one foreign company.
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Table 20 ; Collaboration Agreements in the
Indian Machine Tool Industry
Companies
Collaborations (nos) {%) of total firms
None 33 82 .5
Indian 1 2.5
Foreign _6 15.0
Valid Cases 40 100.0
Missing Cases -
Sample 40
Source ; The Indian Machine Tool Industry Survey (1978)
Table 21 below, takes the analysis a step further by 
documenting the replies given by these 6 Indian concerns 
to the question of whether they regarded the tools 
manufactured under license as models now obsolete in the 
industrialized countries. The findings are apocalyptic 
in character : 83 per cent of firms indicating that they 
do not regard the foreign technology being manufactured 
under license as obsolete. The validity of these results 
is reinforced by noting that the survey encompassed nearly 
all the Indian manufacturers currently holding collabor­
ation agreements with foreign machine tool concerns.
Table 21 ; The Technical State of Machine Tools
Manufactured Under License
Companies
Obsolete (nos ) (%)
Yes 1 17
No 5 83
Valid Cases 6 100.0
Missing Cases -
Sample 6
Source : The Indian Machine Tool Industry Survey (1978)
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The British manufacturers were asked a similar 
question in relation to the nature of the technology 
they were imparting to their Indian partners. The 
replies received further strengthen the credibility of 
the Indian findings : of the 4 British firms responding 
to the question, 3 stated that the technology was not 
obsolete whilst the fourth, although not answering in 
a positive fashion, is a world leader in numerically 
controlled machinery and clearly not in the business of 
manufacturing dated technology. More illuminating is 
the fact that 3 out of these 4 companies were still pro­
ducing the transferred technology at the time the 
collaboration was entered into.
Before concluding the section, it is important to 
briefly mention the influence that foreign collaboration 
has had on the price and quality of Indian output. A 
good starting point for the discussion is the not entirely 
unexpected preference shown by the overseas manufacturers 
for large Indian partners. Table 22 illustrates the 
evidence on this point by showing that 5 out of the 6 
Indian manufacturers holding collaboration agreements are 
classified as large firms.
Table 22 ; Collaboration Agreements in the Indian Machine
Tool Industry, According to Size of Firm
Companies 
Small Medium Large Row Totals
Collaboration (nos) (%) (nos) (.%) (nos) (%) (nos ) (%)
Foreign 1 100 _ 5 83.3 6 85.7
Indian — - 1 16.7 1 14.3
Valid Cases 1 100.0 - 6 100.0 7 100.0
Missing Cases - - - -
Sample 1 6 7
Source ; The Indian Machine Tool Industry Survey (1978)
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Large firms are an attractive proposition because, 
due to their higher output levels, not only are remit­
tances for royalty and proprietory items enhanced but, 
in addition, the payment streams are more likely to be 
stabilized. Furthermore, it has been a consistent theme 
of this study that scale is an important determinant 
of efficiency. However, although foreign companies prefer 
large Indian manufacturers it is not certain that con­
siderations concerning the cost-structure of the company 
play an important role. For instance, one British firm 
of international repute in the field of drilling machines 
admitted that in 1975 its foreign collaborator was selling 
the licensed machines in India at higher prices than those 
itself charged for the same machine in Britain. Further 
empirical confirmation of such price differentials is 
again provided by Baranson in his epic study of the 
collaboration agreement between Cummins Ltd. - a world 
reknown manufacturer of diesel engines - and Kirloskar 
of India. From his analysis which covered the period 
1964-69, Baranson found that : "depending upon the method 
of comparison, Indian costs ran anywhere from 3.5 to 4.1 
times U.S. c o s t s . T h e  problem is that many foreign 
collaborators seem to have viewed the Indian economy as 
a seller's market and, as a consequence, have given limited 
attention to the question of cost and price reductions.
In many respects, the very act of collaboration may itself 
prove to be counter-productive in improving industrial 
efficiency. The standardization of components reduces 
costs but this is not helped where designs originate from 
many different countries and where the foreign firms'
agencies have assumed responsibility for export and
55servicing abroad.
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Chapter 4
International Trade : The Goal 2^ ) 2É 
Technological Self-Sufficiency
In the previous chapter, demand considerations, i.e.
the low level of absorption of machine tools in the Indian
market, was adjudged to be a major retarding influence on
the development of both the machine tool industry and the
economy. In the early 1950s, however, it was the obverse
o'f this situation : a limited machine tool productive
capacity, that was held to be the constraint to capital
formation; and capital formation, moreover, was viewed as
the crucial growth-determining factor. Underdevelopment in
this context is characterized by a structural incapacity
to produce the capital goods required for growth : a problem
of supply. In relation to this state of affairs, Celso
Furtado once wrote : "development is not the endogenous
transformation of a pre-industrial economy, but the
implementation of an accelerated growth process through
1
the adoption of foreign techniques." These techniques
are embodied in physical capital goods which cannot be
2
produced domestically. This situation is usually des-
3
cribed as technological dependence; and one of the 
reasons that India decided to build up, amongst other 
heavy goods industries, a machine tool sector,was to avoid 
such dependency.
The objective of this chapter is to assess the 
importance of India's machine tool industry in the light 
of the country's pursuit of technological self-sufficiency. 
In order that the analysis proceeds in logical fashion, 
it is appropriate that discussion opens with a section 
that traces the historical thinking on the interrelation­
ship between economic development and international trade. 
This begins with the primarily Marxian approach of 
sectorizing the economy into producer - and consumer
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goods industries. The analysis is expanded, however, to 
allow 'exports' to substitute for the indigenous producer 
goods sector which during the early stages of economic 
development is invariably absent. In many respects the 
structural characteristics of this form of theorizing are 
akin to the classical principle of comparative advantage 
according to which development is promoted by specialization. 
In cognizance of this fact, the first part of the section 
reviews the main tenets of the comparative advantage 
doctrine through the medium of the typical commodities 
involved and the factors which encourage or impinge on 
their exchange via trade. Discussion is centred around 
the established criticisms made by Prebisch regarding the 
efficiency of the present international division of labour; 
however, in line with the two-sector approach emphasised 
in this study, analysis of the Prebisch thesis is developed 
through a modified Marxian framework. The penultimate 
part of this opening section examines the alternative 
theoretical approach as advanced by the critics of the 
comparative advantage doctrine. These protagonists of 
'growth theory* perceive development from a dynamic 
perspective; they tend to ignore the potential of trade 
save for the strategic purpose of stimulating the growth 
of particular sectors - on the export side, and the 
international transfer of advanced foreign technology - on the 
import side. Finally, other approaches to foreign trade are 
briefly reviewed.
The theoretical basis that an appraisal of these 
'trade models' provides brings the discussion
around to the second section of the chapter. Here, an 
attempt is made to assess empirically the importance of 
foreign trade as a source of supply of machine tools 
during the first twenty years of Indian industrialization. 
Using government policy as a springboard, the development 
of the machine tool industry will be gauged by reference 
to India's quotient of self-sufficiency in meeting the 
needs of its machine building community. Such an approach
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is deemed valid because, for the machine tool industry 
in particular, the emphasis of government policy has 
been on economic independence; a goal to be achieved at 
almost any cost.
Section 1 : Doctrinal Conflict
(i) The Structural Relationship Between Exports and 
Growth in an Underdeveloped Country^
Invariably, when an underdeveloped country begins 
to seriously consider promoting the development of its 
economy, no indigenous capital goods capacity exists. In 
such circumstances, a perfectly rational approach to the 
problem would be to sectorize the economy along the lines 
followed in Chapter 1, into a consumption goods sector 
and a capital goods sector; to begin though, the intro­
duction of foreign trade requires that the model be 
refined to conceive of the former group of industries as 
the domestic sector and the latter group as the export 
sector. The idea being that the export sector provides 
the capital goods needed for growth to take place via 
the foreign exchange it earns, whilst the domestic sector 
supplies the consumption goods needed for both sectors.^ 
Before giving serious consideration to this revised con­
ceptual framework, it will be valuable to lead into the 
discussion with a recapitulation of the main features of 
the Marxian model on which this theorizing is based. In 
particular, it will provide clarification of the differing 
technical and functional characteristics between each of 
the sectors in the circular flow of the economy.
The basic analytical construct in Marxian analysis 
is the well-known static, closed economy model :
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Capital goods Sector (dept.I) :
Consumption goods Sector (dept.II) :
Where 0 is output, K is constant capital (or fixed costs),
V is variable capital (or the wage bill), and S is the 
entrepreneurial surplus (or profits), all per period of 
time. In the stationary state there is no net investment, 
so that all profits are consumed. The equilibrium condition 
is that the supply of capital goods must equal the demand 
for them that comes from the replacement of the capital 
goods used up in both sectors in the process of production. 
Similarly, the supply of consumption goods must equal the 
demand arising from the income of workers and entrepreneurs 
in both sectors :
Supply Demand
+ =1 ' + '^ 11 
^11 ^11 ^11 = ^ I  * ^1 * ^11 ^11
each of these equations reduces to :
^11 " ^I * ^I
The dynamic derivation of this analysis is the model of 
equilibrium growth (or, in Marxian terminology s the 
schema of expanded reproduction); the major modification 
to the static approach being the introduction of savings 
and investment under the assumption that all capital 
accumulation comes out of profits. The difference by 
comparison with the stationary model is that the surplus 
is now broken down into its constituent parts according 
to the purposes to which they are applied. The dynamic
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model then takes the following form :
(dept.I) Oj. = Kj + Vj + SCj +ASKj. +ASVj +ZISC2 
(dept.II) Ojj = + Vjj + SCjj +AsVjj +AsCjj.
Here, the total surplus (S), of the stationary model is now 
divided into (SC), the stationary amount of entrepreneurial 
consumption; (ASK) the increment to constant capital;
(ASV) the increase in the wage bill; and (ASC), the 
addition to the entrepreneurs own consumption. The equil­
ibrium condition is as before : by equating the supply of 
dept.I, with the demand for its output that arises in both 
sectors from replacement and (now also) from net investment, 
and the supply of dept.II.» With the demand for consumers 
goods that comes from the income going into consumption in 
both sectors, the equilibrium equation is obtained :
+ A S K j j  = [ ^ I  + A S C j
in which the stationary terms have been put in brackets.
An important feature of this model, is that each sector 
is dependent on the other for part of its requirements, but 
produces more than it needs for its own output. Only these 
surpluses enter into the exchange between each sector. The 
two sectors must, therefore, stand in a specific quant­
itative relationship to each other. In the stationary 
state, this proportionality depends only on the capital 
output ratios; that is, technology, and additionally, in 
the dynamic model, on the savings ratio. Under the 
assumptions of this model, the capital-output ratio and 
the savings ratio are roughly given by the relative 
shares of profits and wages. The proposition is that this 
proportionality between the two sectors holds only when 
they are in the same market for their entire 'surplus' 
output, otherwise, as Merhav argues i "there is no more
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reason why they should be proportional to each other, 
than there is for the product of two countries to stand 
in a fixed ratio to one another,"^ The reasoning behind 
this is that any disturbance to the equilibrium can only 
be a temporary phenomenon in a closed economy : if one of 
the two sectors should expand more than is warranted by 
the demand created by the other, its prices and profits 
would fall and, in the long-run, capital and labour would 
migrate to the other sector until the proportionality 
between them is restored.
In the 'open' model where an export sector acts as 
a proxy for indigenous capital goods capacity there need 
be no such requirement for proportionality. The expansion 
of the export sector depends on foreign demand and on its 
own accumulation. The latter is the strategic variable 
with respect to the sectors impact on domestic growth* 
for the profitability of expansion in the export sector 
is affected only indirectly and partially by the domestic 
sector. Moreover, the export sector depends on the 
domestic sector only for the supply of wage goods. This 
fact may be illustrated if the terms that represent the 
stationary flows are withdrawn from the last equation.
The incremental equilibrium equation that results is 
thus :
= A S V ^  + A S C ^
(Domestic Sector) (Export Sector)
Clearly indicating that investment in the domestic sector 
depends entirely on the increase in the demand for con­
sumption goods generated by the growth of the export 
sector.
Evidently then, the growth of the export sector is 
the prime source for stimulating the development of the 
domestic economy. But because various factors militate
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against its efficient operation, the foregoing model 
unfortunately cannot be regarded as the key to spring 
third world countries from the 'low level equilibrium 
trap* of economic underdevelopment. Merhav dwells at 
length on three issues which have pervasive influence 
over the character and tempo of the growth of the export 
sector; it is worthwhile listing these below :
(i) On the assumption that foreign demand is perfectly 
elastic, the export sector will expand until the 
supply schedule of its domestic factors rises 
against it and attains some equilibrium level.
Beyond that level, the accumulating profits will 
not necessarily migrate into investment in the 
domestic sector because under conditions of 
technological dependence this investment will not 
create its own demand,
(ii) Even an expanding export sector does not necessarily 
induce growth in the domestic sector; there are, 
in fact, strong forces working against such an 
outcome, Merhav makes it clear that he is not 
talking about the widely observed phenomenon of 
export sectors being regarded as outposts of other 
economies in the countries where the exports are 
produced, so that accumulating profits are repat­
riated and reinvested wherever the anticipated 
return is highest - (which may or may not be the 
place where these profits originated), Even in 
the ideal case where the export sector is indigenous; 
it is on the demand side completely independent 
of the domestic economy and, suitability of factors 
may also make it, to some extent, independent of 
the demand for labour : it is often in the economy, 
but not of it.
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(iii) Such an export sector provides the economy with 
a given capacity to import and to that extent 
removes the technical bottleneck that results 
from the absence of a domestic capital goods 
industry. It will not, however, substitute for 
the latter in terms of automatically widening 
the domestic market through the investment outlays 
that expand the export sector. On the contrary, 
the larger the volume of imports it permits, the 
more will the import competing industries at home 
be depressed unless they are protected by a 
conscious development policy.
The growth of the export sector determines, through 
the volume of imports it makes possible, the boundaries 
within which the domestic sector can expand. If it were 
the case that no constraints on the expansion of the 
export sector existed then there would be no limits to 
the growth potential of the domestic economy. However, 
the problem with underdeveloped countries as Merhav 
succinctly states : arises precisely because their 
exports fail to expand sufficiently, both in terms of the 
import capacity they provide and the markets they create,
g
by generating income and employment. International 
specialization through the accident of possessing rich 
natural resources or the aftermath of a colonial economy 
may make it somewhat easier, once development is initiated, 
to effect the necessary changes for domestic savings to 
be converted into foreign exchange for the import of 
capital goods. But in general, the level of exports is 
not enough to satisfy the import requirements created by 
domestic development, nor adequate to raise income and 
employment sufficiently to compensate for a slow rate of- 
growth in the domestic sector.
This brief examination of the main principles of the 
structural relationship between the export sector and
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economic development sets the stage to enquire whether 
the growth of the export sector is so constrained as to 
not make it a viable alternative to indigenous capital 
goods capacity. In attempting this task, the nature of 
the commodities involved and the factors that affect 
their expansion in international trade will be examined 
against the rules of economic exchange on which the system 
is to all extents and purposes governed : the theory of 
comparative advantage.
(ii) The Theory of Comparative Advantage
The present international division of labour has 
evolved, whether by design or fate, in such a way as to 
preclude the majority of developing countries (the newly 
emerging countries being notable exceptions) from
actively engaging in the export of products with a high 
technological content. The reasons for the exclusion 
of these countries from this particular area of trade are 
straightforward; that is, if you happen to be a classicist. 
Theirs is a two-pronged argument : firstly, reasoning on 
the basis that specialization raises efficiency, the 
theory of international trade states that countries are 
better off with trade than without it. More recently, 
neo-classical thinking has brought forth a second reason 
in terms of the Heckscher-Ohlin version of the com­
parative advantage doctrine : countries further benefiting 
by trade if they manufacture commodities that use more of 
their relatively abundant factors of production. The 
appropriate trading strategy would then be to export 
these commodities whilst importing others which use more 
of their comparatively scarce factors. This pattern of 
exchange continuing until ultimately the world market is 
in equilibrium; a situation which, in the classical theory 
and the Heckscher-Ohlin treatment of the same, is deter­
mined from a comparison of the opportunity costs of 
producing a given commodity with the price at which the
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commodity can be imported or exported. Thus, in 
equilibrium, no commodity is produced which could be 
imported at lower cost; and exports are expanded until 
marginal revenue equals marginal cost.
The purely classical exposition of the theorem 
operates under the assumption of full employment and 
perfect competition. Therefore, if the opportunity 
cost of a commodity is equal to its market value, 
market prices of factors and commodities can be used to 
determine comparative advantage under competitive con­
ditions.^ By contrast, the Heckscher-Ohlin modification 
of the basic theory has, as its major feature, the fact 
that perfect competition and initial equilibrium are not 
mandatory elements in the determination of comparative 
advantage. Instead, the critical assumptions here are 
that factors of production are comparable amongst
countries and also that production functions are the
10same.
There is voluminous economic literature regarding 
the equity of the contemporary international division 
of labour - which is, of course, based on the principle 
of comparative advantage. It would be fair to say that 
the majority of these writings, from an empirical platform, 
weigh heavily against the validation of the theory with 
respect to the underdeveloped group of countries : both 
in terms of raising their levels of real income and 
reducing the degree of technological dependence on the 
more advanced countries. The former issue is examined 
over the next few pages whilst consideration of 
technological dependence is delayed until the next part 
of the section.
In the context of the first of the above issues : 
increasing the growth of real income in the third world
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countries, the economist whose name is most associated 
with criticizing the comparative advantage doctrine is 
that of Raul Prebisch, the former Secretary-General of 
UNCTAD. Prebisch questions the global 'gains - from - 
trade* conclusions of classical trade theory on both 
analytical and empirical grounds; however, the controv­
ersy that he raised with his criticisms was not so much 
concerned with the mechanics of trade theory but rather 
with Î
(a) the conditions under which these gains can be 
realized; and,
(b) who will gain more and who less.
In many instances, much of the criticism on the subject has a 
tendency to mirror Prebisch*s original arguments. Thus, 
the main points of his attack against present international 
trading patterns are briefly reviewed.
Prebisch analyses the development of the world 
market in terms of countries representing the 'centre*
(the advanced group of nations) and those that represent 
the 'periphery* (the underdeveloped set of nations). 
Historically, the international division of labour has 
been marked by this latter group specializing in the 
production of food-stuffs and raw materials which are 
then sold to the centre usually in exchange for 
manufactured goods* and especially technology. In direct 
conflict with the pre-supposed gains from specialization, 
Prebisch argues that growth in real income has not 
materialized in the periphery. To assist in the eval­
uation of Prebisch*s criticism, it will be helpful to 
recall the Marxian methodology expounded earlier.
Although now, the role of agriculture will be made 
explicit. The use of the Marxian model as an auxiliary 
instrument in the presentation of these economic processes 
is not made solely on the grounds of exposition but also
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to maintain consistency in the argument underpinning 
this thesis : the importance of indigenous capital goods 
capacity in the pursuit of economic development.
Naturally enough, the Marxist simple reproduction 
model acts as the starting point for the analysis. It 
will be remembered that the relationship of department I 
to department II gives the following equation :
KlI = Vl + S;
The assumption that be equated with the export
sector is no longer maintained; instead, it reverts to 
its more formal interpretation of being equivalent to 
capital goods. But some modification of this relation 
is required to make it compatible with the Prebischian 
conceptualization of those countries belonging to the 
periphery.
The pattern of production pertaining to these 
pre-industrialized nations relates firstly, to an 
agricultural sector where the subsistence of the producers 
is completely consumed by them; where the agricultural 
surplus is not re-invested but transferred to the urban 
sector or exported abroad; and finally, where agricultural 
production remains more or less constant excepting 
climatic variations. The point of significance here is 
that the removal of the surplus leaves the agricultural 
sector in a situation of comparative stagnation,
A second feature of the periphery's productive 
structure has regard to the phenomenon of the dynamic 
sector being comprised of two sub-sectors operating in 
total isolation to each other. On the one hand, they are 
composed of local industrial branches which, as a rule, 
produce consumer goods and can, therefore, be regarded as 
department II. On the other, the sector comprises the
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usually foreign dominated,enterprises, i.e. in mining
or in the plantations, which as a rule produce the raw
materials and can be considered as department I. Moreover,
here,.."in contrast to the agricultural sector, the
reproduction process is extended. That means the surplus
value is always transformed into additional capital
12(i.e. constant and variable capital)."
The above scenario applicable to the situation 
extant in the non-industrialized countries bears little 
relation to the Marxian theoretical framework which is 
based on conditions as would exist in a 'mature' indus­
trialized economy where capitalism has taken hold of both 
agriculture and industry. Under these assumptions, Marx 
included agricultural activities with the other consumption 
items in the department II category. This cannot be the 
case in the economies of the peripheral countries because 
there, agriculture is a stagnating sector which co-exists 
with the other dynamic sectors of their economies. In 
such circumstances, the concept of 'economic dualism' 
adequately describes the economic process : "the Marxist 
bi-sectoral reproduction pattern is applicable to the
capitalist dynamic sector; the stagnating non-capitalist
13sector viz. agriculture stays outside the pattern."
The essence of the distinction between each sector is a 
reflection of the different reproduction processes involved. 
Thus, the focus of attention should not be directed at the 
relation of agriculture to industry as equally dynamic 
elements in the mature capitalism of the original Marxian 
conception, but rather at the respective role of each 
sector in the process of capital accumulation.
Besides this fundamental difference, there also 
exists another significant divergence between Marx's 
original model and the present version applicable to the 
countries of the periphery; it has regard to the location 
of departments I and II. In the centre, both departments
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are located in the same society; in the periphery, 
department I consists predominantly of foreign dominated 
enterprises engaged in activities such as mining and 
plantations. As such, it might be argued that department I 
in the periphery has no connection to department II : there 
is no organic relation between-them. In fact, department I 
is more likely to be a component part of the reproduction 
process in the advanced nations : "The different locations 
of departments I and II results in the fact that turnover 
between both departments can be effected only through the 
importation of ... V- + S_ ... and the exportation of
K «14 . . . .
On the acceptance of the above logic, it is clear 
that foreign trade has an essential role to play in the 
acquisition of capital goods. The problem, however, and 
this is the mainspring of Prebisch*s attack on international 
trade theory, is that the nature of the commodities in 
which the export sector of the periphery must specialize, 
and the factors that affect their expansion in foreign 
trade, are inherently disadvantageous to the growth of 
real income in these countries. Prebisch cites two main 
causes for the failure of the periphery to gain from trade 
and, with the aid of Marx's modified theoretical apparatus, 
both are documented below :
1st Criticism : Firstly, there is the fact : "that the 
countries at the centre are their own largest customers 
for their products, so that cost and price movements 
emanating from their internal markets become transmitted 
to their external markets. This would remain true even 
if there was price discrimination between the two markets. 
Since the countries at the centre have a scarcity of 
labour, and wages are inflexible downwards, the wage 
increases which occur during the upward turn of the 
business cycle have a ratchet effect, and there is, 
therefore, a secular trend for the prices of export goods
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from the centre to rise .•. the gains in productivity
which the advanced countries have achieved have, in other
words, been distributed in the form of higher incomes
and prices rather than through stable money incomes and
15falling prices." By contrast, the periphery have great 
difficulty marketing their department II products in the 
centre. In any case : "the products of department II are 
above all sold in the home market ... hence, the developing 
countries have only one possibility of exchanging the 
products of department II with another sector viz, 
agriculture."^^ This implies that the agricultural 
surplus (Sq ) be exchanged for the items of department II,
thereby allowing primary commodities to act as the major 
export goods of the periphery and, moreover, the medium 
of exchange for the import of capital goods (V^ + S^) for 
both department I and department II.
This pattern of trade for the developing countries 
imposed constraints on the growth of real income. In 
particular, Prebisch notes that the existance of an 
elastic labour supply keeps the costs of labour constant 
in the export sector, geared, as it is, to the special­
ization in primary products chiefly through the use of 
peasant labour. The upshot of this whole process is not only 
that the centre fails to pass on to the periphery the 
gains from its own productivity increases, in so far as 
they are expressed in prices, but the periphery is 
unable to retain the benefits of its own increases in 
productivity. These are passed on to their customers in 
the centre in the form of lower prices. Therefore,
Prebisch argued, there is a long-run trend for the net 
barter terms of trade of the peripheral countries to fall.
There are, in addition, structural factors pertaining 
to the internal exchange between and which work
against the growth of real income in the developing 
countries. As is exchanged for from the centre.
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the role of the agrarian surplus can readily be conceived 
as acting as a catalyst in the process of international 
trade. This reproduction process can only be effective, 
however, if the owners of are in a position to absorb 
the products of For illustrative purposes, let
be sub-divided into its three component parts ;
So = + Sy + Sgxp
where :
= raw materials for dept.II (part of
= foodstuffs for the working people in dept.II (V^^),
S = surplus for export, as required for the exp
importation of (v^ + S^).
Thus S^, provides through internal exchange and
; foodstuffs and raw materials for department II and 
additionally, via the means of production. There­
fore, in the extreme case (without supplying capital
goods from abroad) :
= ^11 +
But while operates under the conditions of a stagnating 
agricultural sector, by contrast continues to
grow, *egged-on* by the stimulus of the extended repro­
duction process taking place in the dynamic sector of the 
department II industries. The effect of this divergent 
growth path between the two sectors has serious con­
sequences on the economic development of the periphery.
The growing department II will demand ever greater and 
Eventually though, an export sector will have to 
develop, to 'supply' the capital goods necessary to 
satisfy the increases in capacity which an expanding 
department II calls forth. Part of will then have to 
be apportioned to and it will need to grow in
unison with the rate of expansion of department II. 
However, with a constant due to stagnating agriculture.
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the requirements of and can only be met at the 
expense of reducing the part of the agricultural
surplus. So that :
(*) = So - (*) (S^ + S^)
Consequently, the agricultural surplus available for 
export will quantitatively decline even under the 
conditions of stagnating agriculture. It is this 
asymmetrical nature of the process of internal exchange 
in developing countries that severely affects their 
ability to import producer goods and, in turn, to achieve 
increases in real national income.
2nd Criticism : The second principal reason, according to
Prebisch*s thesis, why the peripheral countries are unable
to increase their capacity to import through participation
in international trade, has to do with the low income
17elasticity of demand for agricultural products. Through 
the operation of Engel's law of aggregate consumption, 
the advanced countries will exhibit a declining income 
elasticity of demand for importing foodstuffs and raw 
materials. This situation is the antithesis of that 
holding for the developing countries where the income 
elasticity of demand for manufactured goods is rising.
In any case, the cost structure of many of the emerging 
nations' primary, especially agricultural,products remains 
comparatively constant. This is mainly attributable to 
the employment of out-moded technology and the maintenance 
of inefficient practices which, by extension, lead to 
the sectors non-involvement in the reproduction process. 
Again, the foregoing situation contrasts sharply with the 
agricultural sector of the centre countries which operate 
in the dynamic environment of department II; a feature 
reflected in the relatively declining prices of the 
sector. The importance of this distinction derives from the
fact that here, agricultural products are not sold at their 
costs of production on the world market but at the pre­
vailing world price.
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These characteristics of the foreign trade of the 
peripheral countries provide a broad outline to the 
problem at hand : will supply a fund for imports,
the value of which over time, will grow less and less.
As a consequence, the pace of the reproduction process 
will be constrained because of the financial inability 
to import capital goods. However, the issue is com­
pounded for the developing countries due to the progressive 
post-war substitution of synthetic raw materials for 
those of natural origin. Combine with this, the 
tremendous technological development of industry in the 
centre which further reduces the import of raw materials 
necessary for a given unit of production, then it is 
clear that the adverse terms of trade that determine 
the peripheral countries capacity to import t the balance 
between and (V^ + S^), sorely affects their potential 
for economic development,
(iii) Growth Theory : An Escape from the Impasse?
The chief focus of attack, thus far, has been 
directed at the specialization by the periphery in the 
production and export of primary commodities. Problems 
arise here, because the terms of trade for these types 
of goods relative to the predominantly manufactured 
exports of the centre are declining. Such a process 
will naturally impinge upon the achievement of adequate 
growth because export revenue stagnates and is never 
sufficient to keep pace with the import requirements of 
the dynamic industrial sector. Hence growth in real 
income remains an elusive goal.
Table 23 shows the results of an empirical invest­
igation to test Prebisch's criticism concerning the 
adverse terms of trade of developing countries and its 
effect on their ability to purchase technology from 
abroad. The basic method used to calculate the net
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Table 23 : Indexes^^ of the Net Barter Terms of Trade,
Income Terms of Trade, and Export Quantum, 
for all trade between the Developing and 
the Developed Countries 1954-77 (1970 = 100)
Barter Terms Income Terms Quantum of
Year Of Trade Of Trade Exports
^1 ^2 ^3 :i ^2 "3 Ql Q2
1954 119 116 137 48 57 67 40 49
1955 117 115 135 49 59 69 42 51
1956 116 110 128 52 59 69 45 54
1957 110 103 119 49 56 64 45 54
1958 107 99 109 49 53 59 46 54
1959 103 97 105 51 56 61 50 58
1960 103 98 105 54 59 63 52 60
1961 99 95 106 53 58 65 54 61
1962 97 92 96 56 60 62 58 65
1963 99 96 101 61 65 69 62 68
1964 99 99 106 65 69 74 66 70
1965 99 99 107 68 70 73 69 71
1966 100 99 102 73 74 76 73 75
1967 98 97 97 75 75 75 77 77
1968 99 97 99 84 81 83. 85 84
1969 102 102 107 93 93 97 91 91
1970 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
1971 101 91 86 103 92 87 102 101
1972 99 90 84 112 102 95 113 113
1973 109 97 94 139 117 114 128 121
1974 178 102 113 222 122 136 125 120
1975 155 86 88 175 100 102 113 116
1976 163 92 89 217 126 122 133 137
1977 173 102 95 228 138 128 132 135
Coefficient of
Regression : 1.78 -0.59 -1.53 7. 16 3.39 2.184 4.38 3.87
Standard
Error : * 22.33 5.88 9.14 29. 86 9.72 11,.187.27 7.41
R^ : 0.25 0.35 0.59 0. 75 0.86, 0.'77 0.95 0.93
Source : United Nations Monthly Bulletin of Statistics,
Nov.1966, June 1977, 1978 and 1979.
Notation : T, Barter Terms of Trade, all commodities
T^ Barter Terms of Trade, excluding exports
of fuel
T_ Barter Terms of Trade, exports less fuel Vs
machinery
Im,I?,I_ Income Terms of Trade, corresponding to
I -J m rn rnil» 12,13
Q , Quantum Indices of Exports from LDCs,
all exports 
Q2 Quantum Indices of Exports from LDCs,
exports less fuels
* Due to the high standard errors, little credibility should 
be given to the absolute values of the coefficients; 
relative magnitudes and trends are, in any case, what 
are being sought.
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barter terms of trade for the developing countries was 
the ratio of the export price index to that of the import 
price index which was then related to the same for the 
developed countries. Accordingly, a relatively greater 
rise in the terms of trade of the developing countries 
shows itself as a rise in the T indexes. The income 
terms of trade, on the other hand, is a concept that 
takes account of the volume of exports of a country as 
well as its export and import prices * it is designed to 
show changes in a country* s capacity to import in exchange 
for exports. A rise in the value of the*I* indexes then, 
indicates that the developing countries can obtain a 
relatively larger volume of imports than before from 
the sale of exports. Their capacity to import in 
comparison with the advanced countries has increased.
The quantum indexes of exports are self-explanatory.
As can be noticed from Table 23, for the period 
1954-77, the net barter terms of trade, for all trade 
between the developing and the developed countries have 
shown a small upward trend of about 1.78 unit points per 
annum. However, when exports of fuels are excluded, the 
net barter terms of trade exhibit a declining trend of 0.59 
unit points clearly indicating the significance, since 
1973, of the increasing price of oil. Furthermore, 
when the price indexes of exports less fuels are com­
pared with the price indices of machinery : "the crucial 
growth-determining class of imports", the growth in the 
terms of trade deteriorates still further to a negative 1.53 
unit points. A similar pattern exists in respect of 
the developing countries capacity to import. Since 1954, 
the trend for all trade has grown at 7.16 unit points per 
annum; taking out fuels reduces this to 3.39 unit points; 
and finally, their capacity to import machinery shows 
only a modest growth rate of 2.84 unit points. The 
illuminating conclusion to emerge from the analysis is 
that even though the quantum of exports has increased 
over the 24 year period by 4.38 unit points and without fuels
—2 08 —
by 3.87 unit points, the deteriorating terms of 
trade of the mass of the developing countries without 
fuel has meant that their capacity to import technology 
has only risen by some two or three points.
It will be recalled, however, that the*real income* 
issue only constitutes a first part of the criticism 
(and apparent demise) of the static comparative advantage 
theory; there is, of course, the further question 
regarding the developing countries technological depend­
ence on the centre. The seeds to this reliance are 
common to both the Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin form­
ulation of comparative advantage and have regard to the 
essentially static nature of the concept. As Johnson 
argues : "the gains from trade are the result of taking 
advantage of comparative cost differences by specializ­
ation and international exchange, as in classical analysis 
But instead of being firmly grounded in stable and 
enduring characteristics of national economies - 
inherent cost differences, as in the Ricardian model, 
or differences in factor endowments, as in the Heckscher- 
Ohlin model - comparative advantage is the evolving 
consequence of the dynamics of technical progress, capital
accumulation, and population increase, and their diffusion
20through the world economy." From this dynamic deriv­
ation of comparative advantage, has emerged a political 
consensus in most of the developing countries that 
government should assist the drive toward industrial­
ization. It may not be feasible to leave the process of 
development entirely in the hands of the private sector 
as the time-scale involved may be inordinately long 
relative to the aspirations of these peoples. The 
importance of government intervention is critical : 
it, to a large extent, ignores present comparative 
advantages with the attendant implications on foreign 
trade and instead attempts to manipulate development 
by creating potential growth sectors. A state of affairs
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which is little more than an expression that the static com­
parative advantage doctrine has nothing to say on the 
technology element in the growth process of capital 
scarce countries.
The above considerations are interwoven into the
dialectic fabric of the 'comparative advantage versus
growth' conundrum. The development strategy chosen
will ultimately depend upon the objectives of the
respective countries belonging to the periphery. If
it is the maximization of static efficiency, then the
comparative advantage model will provide the appropriate
allocation of resources. On the other hand, if the
objective is held to be growth, then the investment
criteria will be totally different with trade being
superceded in importance by the emphasis given to rapid
increases in production. Seen in this light, the
dilemma can be reduced to a more fundamental choice-set :
the relative valuation of present versus future output
and consumption. Efficiency in resource allocation will
maximize present output and consumption from a given
amount of resources, but may impair future growth.
Striving for growth will lower present consumption but
21will provide greater output in the future,
A further strand to the discussion on whether to 
maximize present or future welfare has now been implicitly 
revealed : the choice of technique. In fact, the choice 
of technology strikes at the heart of the problem regard­
ing the dependence on imported investment goods. This 
is because without the possession of an indigenous capital 
goods industry, the choice of machinery must necessarily 
conform to the configuration of technology that is 
characteristic of the advanced nations. In so doing, 
the range of choice will be confined to the sophisticated 
end of the technology spectrum which may not be 
appropriate to the factor endowment or market-scale of 
the periphery.
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The large volume of statistical information that 
has now become available on the developing countries 
import-dependence of technology clearly indicates the 
serious nature of the limitations it imposes on choice, 
Leontief, for instance, in 1963, compared the industrial 
structures of several developing countries with the 
structure of the United States and showed that the short­
fall of self-sufficiency (i.e. domestic production of 
requirements) of the developing countries is greatest
in the sectors of machinery and basic producers'
22goods. The share of metal products and basic metals 
in total manufacturing industry in the underdeveloped 
countries is generally not over 10 to 15 per cent 
compared with 30 to 40 per cent in the advanced countries. 
One measure of the developing countries dependence on 
imports for the acquisition of technology can be found 
by the ratio of imported capital goods to gross domestic 
fixed investment. Table 24 illustrates the position of 
developing countries with respect to this factor. It is 
evident that for many of these nations in the late 
sixties, there existed a high degree of dependence, 
some as high as 50 per cent, on imported capital goods.
The degree of dependence on the import of 
technology from the centre has disquieting repercussions 
on the expansion of economic activity in the developing 
countries. Difficulties arise because the higher are 
these imports, the greater will be the employment - 
output leakages from the system. This will always be 
the case irrespective of the level of exports because 
the domestic content of fixed investment will diminish 
in proportion to the share of imports in total invest­
ment expenditure : the investment multiplier contracts 
as a direct consequence of these seepages.
23
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Table 24 : The Share of Imports of Capital Goods in 
Gross Domestic Fixed Investment in 
Selected Developing Countries (1960-62 
and 1966-68)
Country
1960-62
(%)
1966-68
(%)
Thailand 41.1 38.0
Singapore 76.4 81.7
Taiwan 36.8 42.8
Nicaragua 29.6 40.8
Philippines 31.4 27.9
Uganda 24.9 21.8
Bolivia 41.0 53.5
Tanzania 25.9 23.0
Sierra Leone 13.7 23.8
Peru 37.3 42.7
Ethiopia 19.9 21.7
Venezuela 21.8 23.8
Mexico 23,5 21,6
Pakistan 26.3 21.1
India 20.9 17.5
Malaysia (West) 51,7 57.9
Kenya 25.8 32.8
Hong Kong 62.6 54.5
Iraq 32.1 55.3
Source : U.N. World Economic Survey 1968-70, 
Table 35, pp.87-8.
(iv) More Recent Thinking on Trade Theory
A crucial question to emerge from the previous discussion, 
is whether the conflict between the gains from trade and the 
gains from growth can be resolved so that benefits from both 
can assist in the development of an economy. In this respect, 
recent writing on the subject has tended to emphasise the 
important causal link that trade may hold in the propulsion 
of a country's economy to a higher stage of growth. Just as 
trade was seen as the engine of growth for the backward 
countries under colonialism, so, too, today, following several 
decades of inward-oriented import substitution, trade is 
championed as a means to increase output and employment, and
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thereby improve the income distribution, in the still poor 
countries of the world.
Present debate has begun to move away from the confines 
of the primary-good exports of the developing world and now 
focuses on manufactured products. Quite simply, this is 
because the trade paths for primary products are given, 
being determined by natural forces, with consumption patterns 
being dependent on income levels.
The neo-classical approach to international trade,
represented by the Heckscher-Ohlin theory described earlier
in the chapter, alluded to the fact that ... "trade will be
most likely between unlike economies, and that the gains
from trade will be greater where conditions are most 
25dissimilar." There are problems, h o w e v e r w i t h  cat­
egorizing trade flows simply in terms of the exchange of 
factor-appropriate capital intensive goods from the developed 
to the developing world which in return exports factor- 
appropriate resource and/or labour intensive products back 
to them. On two points, this appreciation of the situation 
has shown to be ill-based. In the first instance, a recent 
study indicated that ,., "There is no tendency for trade 
between countries with dissimilar factor endowments (North- 
South) to be greater than trade betw^een similar countries.
In fact the proportion of trade accounted for by North and 
South countries is very similar for both North and South,
with a slight tendency for greater trade between 'similar*
2 6groups than dissimilar groups." A second criticism that 
strikes at the very core of the Heckscher-Ohlin approach to 
trade theory was briefly touched on in Chapter 1, namely, 
the Leontief 'Paradox’, which demonstrated that US exports
were labour-intensive in comparison to the country's
 ^ 27imports.
2 8A study by Myrdal took a radical and pessimistic 
perspective of the development opportunities for less 
developed countries. Through a concept he referred to as
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'cumulative causation’ he asserted that the present 
efficiency of an economy is determined largely by its 
past history : thus, although initially competitive 
economies by developing cumulatively will become more 
efficient, the reverse will occur for underdeveloped countries 
whose competitive disadvantage will lead to cumulative con­
traction of efficiency. Under Myrdal’s reasoning, problems 
loom large even if two countries are initially equally 
efficient in production, and one country later gains a 
competitive advantage; this is because the competitive 
'edge' grows cumulatively. Moreover, in a scenario where 
two countries begin industrial life from a position of 
unequal efficiency then cumulative causation may possess the 
alarming consequences of exacerbating the development chasm.
The results of Myrdal's study confirmed the difficulties 
that he hypothesised stem from the classical and neo-classical 
rationalization of trade. But as the author was unconcerned 
with the direction of that trade, it was left to Burenstam- 
Linder to tackle the problem. In his famous thesis of 1951^^ 
Linder argued that trade flows will tend to be greatest 
between 'like' countries and least between 'unlike' countries; 
this is, of course, the antithesis of classical predictions. 
The appearance of Linder's essay was the first in the 
formulation of useful empirical propositions about the 
pattern of international trade in marginally differentiated 
products of the same type. The pervasive expansion of 
intra-industry trade shows that much of the enlargement of 
international commerce takes the form of increasingly fine 
division of labour within industries, rather than the 
sectoral specialization assumed in classical discussions 
of comparative advantage - this to the discomforture of 
international-trade economists weaned on models of pure 
competition.^^ Linder showed that a country like Sweden 
specialized in the production and export of 'quality* goods 
as are reflected by the demands of the income class 
possessing the largest numbers. The product qualities 
sought by the other income groups characterized by lower
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numbers will typically be imported from those countries 
where the appropriate income levels are enjoyed by the 
largest proportion of the population.
Dreze^^ elaborated on Linder's theorizing by distinguishing
the 'style* and 'design' differences in products. He found
that small countries with a population of ethnic and cultural
diversity, such as Belgium, are unable to produce styles
and designs of goods to meet the demands of their population
at prices competitive with imports from abroad. Instead,
Belgium imports style-specific products from its larger,
neighbouring countries and specializes in the production of
more standardized and functional variants in demand by a
32narrow section of the market in the rest of the world.
Later works have tended to polarize on whether it might
be changes in 'technology* that explain the patterns of
international trade. As soon as an invention is applied -
and this innovation does not necessarily come into being
in the country where the invention evolved because the
production mechanism and marketing organisation has to meet
certain minimum requirements - the country concerned has a
sort of monopoly, which furthermore goes hand in hand with
a sellers’ market. In this initial phase a large number
of changes are made in production technique, and it is only
in the following (growth phase), in which mass production
is gradually commenced, that buyers become more price
conscious. In this phase, the production technique is
extended to other countries (e.g. by means of the sale of
licenses and the establishment of subsidiaries). Imitation
by other countries puts an end to the technological lead,
and it may even happen that these countries through lower
production costs or differentiation of their products,
export to the country in which the innovation originated.
In the last phase (maturity phase) there is a buyers'
market; and indeed not many more improvements are made in
33the production process. This is referred to in the 
literature as the product cycle model of trade.
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There are a number of caveats to the validity of the 
product-cycle approach to international trade. Firstly, 
one must not lose sight of the fact that technological 
advance also benefits traditional products. Secondly, 
innovations have sometimes been known to counteract inter­
national trade instead of stimulating it. Cases which come 
to mind are when nylon to a large extent replaced silk and 
when the Haber process made possible the extraction of 
nitrogen from air and thus reduced dependence on natural 
d e p o s i t s . F i n a l l y ,  such a cycle does not necessarily 
occur. Great uncertainty still persists as to the combination
of conditions which determines the optimum rate and direction
3 5of technological progress. Thus, although the United States 
is the country whose experience is most apposite to the 
product-cycle model, with one of the highest per capita 
incomes in the world and also the lowest of capital/labour 
cost ratios, the theory is undermined by, again, Leontiefs 
study, that US exports are more labour-intensive than are 
its imports.Notwithstanding this, product cycle 
approaches imply that the abundance of skill as opposed to 
capital is the major determinant of US export performance;
37
and this has be’en established by empirical study. However, 
because of its size, wealth, military power, educational 
system and other attributes, the United States may still not 
validate the product-cycle t h e o r y . I t  is an area where 
further empirical research is required and is, in fact, 
being undertaken.
39Vernon's study of 1966, as also those of Posner, 
Hufbauer,^^ and Stobaugh^^ have resulted in the specification 
of models capable of explaining international trade in new 
products in which the producing country has an initial 
comparative advantage, due to patent or copyright protection 
or the existence of dynamic economies of scale, but whose 
competitive-edge might be gradually eroded by the recognition 
and imitation of the innovations elsewhere. At the present 
stage of industrialization in the world, most 'new' products 
have close competitive substitutes, and therefore models of 
'technological-gaps' and *product-cycles' have direct regard 
to the previously mentioned theory on intra-industry trade.
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approach to trade, it does not, in similarity to those of 
classical ilk, allow for the transfer of technology. More 
significantly, Linder ignores the investment of multi­
national companies. But, with production by firms outside 
their national boundaries now thought to account for 15 per 
cent of the world’s output, this would, under present trading 
conditions, appear to be a serious omission. The links 
between direct investment and international trade in 
manufactured goods is further shown to be important by the 
evidence on trade which takes place 'within' multinational 
enterprizes.^^ The product-cycle theory, perhaps comes 
closest to explicitly recognizing the role of multinational 
enterprizGS in this process. Although Hirsch"^^ does admit 
to their significance. Other economists: Gruber, Mehta 
and Vernon (1967)^^ and Keesing (1966)^^ ... "have also 
observed the relationship between the production of knowledge, 
international investment and trade, and more recently 
Baldwin (1970 ^  has called for an explicit incorporation
of trade in factor inputs into trade theory.
With the introduction of direct investment into
international trade, the product cycle theory will operate
by relocating the production of 'mature' products
overseas, thereby taking advantage of the lower labour
costs in the developing countries. Innovation or 'new'
products will continue to be induced in the developed
countries by the competitiveness and economies of scale
existing in these already industrialized areas. It
clearly follows, as Frances Stewart has noted, that the
,,. "flow of trade will thus be North-South for new
('technological gap') products ... and South-North for
mature products Concentration of innovation in
the North is thus a major explanation of why Linder is
wrong in believing that trade is greatest among similar
countries - when those countries are the poor countries.
However, this same concentration is also the main reason
why South-South trade 'ought' to be developed, and North-
South trade inhibited : in other words, Linder's thesis
49ought to be made true. In consequence, there has 
recently emerged a new orthodoxy to the effect that 
(labour-intensive) manufactured exports, able to benefit 
from scale economies derived from sales to world markets
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encouraaod with at least the same vigour with which import- 
substituting industry was encouraged in the past.
To conclude this section, then,it must be accepted 
that present thinking indicates that the merging of the 
gains from trade with the gains from growth rests ultimately 
on the efficacy of the developing countries to initiate 
policy measures that produce sufficient economic change 
to make their economies more responsive to the stimulus 
from trade. But as India did, in fact, choose the growth 
strategy alternative, the intention of the next section is 
to appraise the progress that the country has made in its 
efforts to become self-sufficient in the manufacture of 
machine tools. However, to place the results of the 
empirical analysis in perspective, it will be helpful if 
the salient features of the import substitution policy are 
first described. The section begins, therefore, with a 
brief overview of the principal planning controls involved 
in India's trade regime.
Section 2 : The Case of Indian Technological Independence 
(i ) The ImpoTt Substitution Regime
The rationale of establishing domestic machine-
making capacity : to remove the need to import a major
proportion of a country's technological requirements, is
a major aspect of a capital-goods growth strategy. The
approach actively promotes the creation of indigenous
industry to replace imported goods but the problem is
that the machinery by which these goods are produced
has itself to be imported. Given, that the initial
increase in the level of imports is an acknowledged cost
of any country's thrust for self-reliance, the Draft
Outline of India's Second Five-Year Plan stated t "if
industrialization is to be rapid enough, the country
must aim at developing basic industries, and industries
which make machines to make the machines for further 
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development," Hand in hand with the growth of domestic 
industry came an increase in government interference 
in trading patterns : not only was the composition of 
imports changed, i.e. reducing the inflow of consumption
, V  1 P
goods to facilitate the rise in capital goods imports, 
but also foreign exchange ceilings were introduced to 
cover all categories of imports. Although Bhagwati 
and Desai trace the origins of import controls in India 
back to 1940 and the war years in general, it was not 
until 1947 they argue, with India's balance of payments 
becoming adverse, that the emphasis of import policy 
turned away from the purely descriptive restriction of 
imports to matters concerning the regulation of foreign 
exchange. It was at this time, they state, that India :
... "began the changeover from 'qualitative' to 
'quantitative* licensing on the basis of specified 
exchange ceilings allotted for specific commodities 
and groups, designated by currency areas."^3 However, 
because of the strains on the country's foreign exchange 
reserves caused by the heavy industrial investment of the 
Second Five-Year Plan (1956-61),the various import controls 
were rigorously tightened up. For this reason, and also 
because 1956 was in effect the formal commencement of the 
import-substitution regime, it will provide a suitable 
point to begin the review of India's import control 
procedures.
It should be stressed from the start that the method 
by which India executed its import policy, especially 
after the 1956-57 exchange crisis, was by the direct 
control of foreign exchange expenditure. Generally 
speaking, neither tariffs nor the manipulation of the 
price mechanism were used by the Indian authorities in 
influencing the structure of demand in imports.
There was an important operational distinction 
between imports of raw materials, spares and components 
as against imports of capital goods and equipment.
The six-monthly government budget naturally gave priority 
for exchange-use to essential resources such as : food, 
petroleum, and fertilizers, after which the foreign 
exchange that remained could be distributed for the
"219
benefit of economic growth in accordance with the official 
criteria laid down. The allocation of this foreign 
exchange was made on the estimated requirements of the 
public sector undertakings; the Iron and Steel Controller; 
and the economic advisor, the Ministry of Finance, who 
would be responsible for the distribution of his portion 
of the foreign exchange for the various imports of the 
private sector.
As a first step to importing, it was necessary for 
all enterprises to apply to license-issuing authorities 
in order to obtain the clearance to import permissible 
items. Licenses for established importers were known 
as 'E.I.s*; for actual users 'A.U.s*; and for capital 
goods 'C.G.s*. There were numerous other licenses but 
the aforementioned could be said to be the most important. 
The rationale under which each category of license was 
vetted centred around the two main pillars of India's 
foreign exchange policy : 'essentiality* and indigenous 
'non-availability*. It is difficult to better the 
description of these two principles than the one given 
by Bhagwati and Desai * "Thus, imports, in terms of 
both magnitude and composition, were to be permitted 
under each category only if some designated agency of 
the government had certified that they were 'essential*
(as inputs or equipment for production). At the same 
time, some agency had to clear the imports from the 
viewpoint of indigenous availability : if it could be 
shown that there was domestic production of the imports 
demanded, then the imports were not permitted (regardless 
of cost and quality considerations). Thus, in addition 
to the license-issuing authority, there was a 'sponsoring* 
agency certifying 'essentiality' and a 'clearing* agency 
for 'indigenous clearance*."
Although these measures would seem to have provided 
the Indian government with a definitive and encompassing
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regulatory framework, problems were encountered in 
practice because allocative decision making had to be 
projected past first stage priorities into the 'grey 
areas' of sub-priorities. In terms of A.U. licenses, 
difficulties must have been enormous simply due to the 
sheer numbers of industrial priorities that existed. 
Further, on what basis could there have been an evaluation 
of priority between say, a manufacturer of pneumatic 
pumps and a manufacturer of coal mining equipment? 
Seemingly, all such decisions would have to have been 
made eventually in relation to ; industrial capacity, 
employment, and perhaps, past import allocations. If 
this was the situation in regard to industry-wise 
allocations of foreign exchange, little imagination 
would be required to see that problems would have been 
amplified when decisions were reduced to the question of 
unit allocations. Here again, in the final analysis 
arbitrary judgements would have had to have been made on 
the eligibility of competing firms for the utilization 
of foreign exchange. If Bhagwati and Desai*s reflections 
are near the mark, then such decisions were inefficiently 
though perhaps inevitably based on : "the spreading-out 
evenly of a scarce resource on a 'fair' and 'equitable' 
basis
One of the objectives of the import-substitution 
regime was to restructure the composition of imports 
away from consumption commodities towards the more 
growth-orientated capital good items. One of the ways 
that the authorities successfully implemented this policy 
was through the reduction in the issue of E.I. licenses 
which covers a multiplicity of activities, in favour of 
the production-biased A.U. licenses. However, a noted 
characteristic of import-substitution strategy has 
regard to the encouragement that it implicitly gives 
to the domestic production of the displaced consumption 
good imports and India proved to be no exception to
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this process. The impact of this factor on India's 
economic growth is difficult to calculate but Hazari 
has worked out estimates which do provide some indirect 
indication of its importance through the maintenance 
imports needed to sustain domestic consumption ; "for the 
years 1961-2 and 1963-4 he found that 7.6 and 8.5 per 
cent of total imports went to 'luxuries' and 28.7 and 
32.9 per cent to 'necessities’ (which included such 
items as : matches, thermos flasks, and electric fans).'*
Space does not permit extensive treatment of the 
numerous problems which hampered the effective imple­
mentation of India's import-substitution regime. Without 
elaboration, suffice to note the more important of these 
additional constraints : delays, administrative and 
other expenses, inflexibility, lack of co-ordination 
among different agencies, absence of competition, 
inherent bias in favour, ceteris paribus, of industries 
with imported, as distinct from domestically produced 
inputs, anticipatory and automatic protection afforded
to industries regardless of costs, discrimination
58against exports, and finally, loss of revenue.
To be fair, the Indian government was aware of 
many of the weaknesses involved in the import- 
substitution procedures and in conjunction with the 
pressures from the country's continuing balance of 
payments deficit made some attempts in the sixties 
and seventies to remedy the more obvious deficiencies.
In 1962, the Import and Export Policy Committee headed 
by a Mr. Mudaliar advised that maintenance and develop­
mental imports were both essential for a growing economy. 
The interesting feature of the committee's recommen­
dations was, however, that the increased supply of 
these raw materials and components should not just be 
channelled to the priority capital goods industries 
but to any industries that were export-orientated.
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This may be seen as a significant watershed for government 
trade policy : the economy was to be encouraged to break­
out from the 'hot-house* of import substitution via the 
promotion of exports.
The import policy announced after the devaluation 
of 1966,was to provide added substance to the 
Committee's initiative by liberalizing the import of raw 
materials, components and spares for 59 priority
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industries. This increasing liberalization of imports 
was extended in 1976 to allow manufacturers engaged in 
export production to use, if so desired, their entire 
import replenishment entitlement for the import of 
machinery required for modernization, replacement and 
research and development. Finally in 1977, the coming 
to power of a new government, the Janata Administration, 
took import-liberalization many steps further on; a 
fresh philosophy was introduced, that of giving impetus 
to the small scale sectors of the Indian economy. There 
was also a major dismantling of many of the license 
restrictions and, in an effort to create greater comp­
etition and efficiency within the 'key' sectors, there 
was to be a further significant liberalization of imports 
but, now especially, capital good imports.
The description of India's import substitution 
policy has set the stage to examine the progress that 
the country had made in its drive towards self-sufficiency 
in the manufacture of machine tools. This aim of the 
industry forms the basis of the next part of the section.
(ii) Machine Tool Manufacture : Self-reliance and After
As the numerous references that permeate the text 
testify, self-sufficiency has repeatedly been stressed 
in the planning documents of India as a goal to which 
great importance has been attached. This objective has
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applied a fortiori to the machine tool industry as it has 
consistently been accorded 'key' status in the planned 
development of the country.
Since 1955, the value of imports of machine tools 
has risen five-fold from Rs.52.9 million to Rs.266.4 
million in 1975. Nevertheless, as Table 25 shows, the 
machine tool branch of India has progressed over the 
same period from a situation where it initially provided 
only 11 per cent of total consumption to one where twenty 
years later in 1975, it accounted for 78 per cent of the 
country's demand for machine tools. Thus, machine tool 
imports over the period have dropped to only 22 per cent 
of total supply consisting mainly of special types like 
gear shavers, very heavy duty types and high precision 
machines like jig boring machines, thread grinders, 
gear grinders, spiral bevel generating machines, etc.^O
At this level of analysis, import substitution in 
the machine tool industry appears to have been very 
strong, and especially so during the 1970s. However, 
with the help of a statistical technique borrowed from 
Alfred Maizels^^, the examination of the industry's 
import-replacement performance can be taken a stage 
further by breaking-down the total change in imports of 
machine tools into two elements : import-substitution 
and demand expansion. If, as industrialization has 
proceeded over the twenty year period, the increase in 
the demand for machine tool imports can be separated 
from the total change in imports, then a more accurate 
picture of the import substitution effect can be obtained. 
This 'pure' measure of import-substitution is simply the 
calculation of the difference between the actual imports 
at the end of the period and what they would have been 
if the ratio of machine tool imports in total supply had 
remained constant as at the commencement of the period. 
Likewise, the expansion of demand is arrived at by the
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calculation of the difference between the total supply 
of machine tools in the initial year with the figure 
for the current year on the assumption that the import- 
proportion of total supply had remained constant through­
out the period. Symbolically, the change in imports 
from a base to a current year can be written as :
3 M = Ml Si _
where M represents the import-proportion of machine tool 
supplies, S denotes total machine tool supplies, the 
subscripts o and 1 referring to the base and current
periods, respectively.^2
Table 2 6 shows the results of this analysis for 
the Indian machine tool industry during the period 
1960-75. The contents of the table are striking in 
that import-substitution over the whole period was 85.3 
per cent higher than the expansion in demand; a prolific 
performance by any standard. During the first period 
1960-65, the effect of the import-substitution of machine 
tools was dramatically outweighed by the stimulation of 
expanding demand generated by the heavy government invest­
ment into capital goods industries. The subsequent five 
year period witnessed a sharp change in the impact of 
import substitution,being far and away the more positive 
influence in the change of imports. In large part, this 
must be attributed to the recession that occurred in the 
economy during the latter years of the 1960s. For the 
final period, spanning the first five years of the 1970s, 
the change in imports was minimal, amounting to Rs.2 3.4 
million or only 13.5 per cent of the total change in 
imports of machine tools over the whole 16 year period. 
The 'pure' import-substitution effect in this last 
period was 33.5 per cent greater than the expansion in 
demand, thus continuing to outstrip the latter component 
by a considerable margin. For the entire period 1960-75,
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import-substitution accounted for Rs.376.5 million 
which, against the lower expansion in the demand for 
tools of Rs.203.2 million, caused a decline in imports 
of Rs,173.3 million. However, an obvious fact to emerge 
from the table relates to the progressively declining trend 
in the level of import-substitution; the share of each 
period in the total import-substitution over the 16 year 
period falling from 41.4 per cent during 1960-65, to 
33.8 per cent during 1965-70, and finally, to 24.8 per 
cent during 1970-75. Although this is what would be 
expected in the normal course of events - the more you 
make yourself, the fewer are the possibilities of 
substitution - it is the repercussions of such a process 
that evoke concern.
Table 2 6 : Effect of Import-Substitution and Expansion
in Demand on Imports of Machine Tools (1960-75)
(Rs.millions)
Import
Substit- Expansion
Change ution in Demand
Aggregate* In S - / M?-M^\ M,
Period Supply Imports Imports o s,.-S
(o) (l)(s_) (S^) (Mg) (M^) \o
1960-65 426.1 798.3 332,9 467.6 134.7 -156,0 290.7
1965-70 798.3 529.6 467.6 183.0 -284.6 -127.2 -157.4
1970-75 529.6 732.0 183.0 159.6 - 23.4 - 93.3 69.9
1960-75 : -173.3 -376.5 203.2
Source : From Table 25
* Aggregate supply = (Domestic production + Imports)-(Exports),
All data reduced to constant prices using the U.N. 
implicit price deflator index of G.F.C.F. by 
manufacturing (1970 = 100).
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India has followed the conventional path of most 
contemporary developing countries in respect of foreign 
trade : the replacement of primarily agricultural 
exports by an import-substitution regime charged with 
the objective of conserving scarce foreign exchange 
resources; but which, after a period of time has elapsed, 
gives over once again to an export-orientated type of 
economy. The problematical question concerning export- 
promotion, however, is whether the many years of operating 
in a sheltered market has left India's producers unable 
to compete in world markets. This has particular relevance 
to the machine tool industry which has been protected from 
foreign competition since its inception in 1956. It 
may be, that for many of the poorer countries, an import- 
substitution policy is a 'necessary evil' but it can 
perhaps be pushed too far to the neglect of productive 
efficiency and consequently cost effectiveness. On this 
point, it is pertinent to mention the contribution of 
Little, Scitorsky and Scott in their celebrated study on 
industry and trade in developing countries, thus :
"Too much import-substitution implies wide resort to 
capital-intensive processes. For a given value of 
industrial output more capital has to be used, which 
implies less investment in other sectors and therefore 
less employment there ... Although industry can grow much 
faster than the domestic demand for manufacturers while 
import-substitution is taking place and thus appear as a 
'leading sector' in growth, this process can go on only 
for a limited period - perhaps about 15 years ... 
Thereafter, only exports can permit industry to grow 
faster than the internal demand for manufactures. But 
by then the country will have an industrial structure 
unsuited to export markets ... restricted by the high 
prices and inequalities associated with excessive 
emphasis on import-substitution."
This statement by Little et al., seems to have been 
tailor-made to describe the predicament that the Indian
- 2 2 8 -
machine tool industry finds itself at this time. It 
is a prime example of an industry, and especially the 
public sector thereof, that has been fostered under 
heavy government protection to the possible detriment 
of the rest of the mechanized economy. Thus, with 
India's import-substitution programme running out of steam, 
if the growth of the tool industry is to bé maintained there 
will be a need, it might be argued, given the low levels of 
absorption of machine tools in India, for a rapid growth 
of exports to occur. It is to this question that the 
study now addresses itself.
Prior to 1961, there were no exports of machine tools 
from India. Even after that year, as table 25 illustrates, 
machine tool exports were of minimal significance throughout 
the remainder of the decade; the final year, 1969, was an 
exception though. In that year, the value of exports at 
Rs.29.5 million was higher than the aggregated export 
value for the entire period 1961-7. It was the recession 
in domestic industry, coupled with the introduction at 
about that time of sympathetic government measures to 
encourage exports that led to this sudden upsurge in the 
sales of machine tools abroad. The annual average rate 
of increase in export value from 1961 to 1975 amounted to 
a gargantuan 33.4 per cent. But, as this figure is 
distorted by the relatively small amount of exports in the 
base year, it may be more appropriate to gauge the rate of 
growth from 1969. Even here though, the value of exports 
up to 1975 registered a very high 19.3 per cent rate of 
growth. This rate of increase in the value of machine 
tool exports is indeed very high but it should be tempered, 
however, by the sobering fact that for 1975, the total 
volume of India's machine tool exports represented only
0.2 per cent of world exports; it was only 2,1 per cent 
of those of the United States; a mere 0.6 per cent of 
West Germany's; and, perhaps more worrying, was lower 
than Brazil's or even Taiwan's exports.
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Table 27 provides a further insight into the export 
performance of the machine tool branch by the disaggregation of 
total annual exports according to their regional destinations.
Table 27 : Export Performance of Indian Machine Tools
(Rs./Lakhs)
Region 1972-3
Year
1973-4 1974-5 1975-6
Reg.
Totals
South East Asia 54 55 176 126
West Asia __6 18 19 68
Asia Total : 60 73 195 194 522
East Africa 13 22 36 32
North and Central 4 9 18 17
Africa 
West Africa 2 __4 20 __6
Africa Total : 19 35 64 55 173
East Europe 2 79 23 28
West Europe and EEC 37 46 96 100
EFTA Countries 32 51 44 111
Others 2 3 __3 15
Europe Total : 73 179 166 154 672
United States 2 6 38 82 146
Canada __6 __6 32 42
North America Total : 32 44 114 188 378
Others 1 1 4 10
Australia 12 23 118 80
New Zealand 8 12 45 28
Oceanic Islands 3 2 2 5
West Indies 1 1 1 1
Grand Total : 210 369 712 818 2109
Source : Indian Machine Tool Manufacturers' Association 
Annual Report 1975-76, Appendix III.
Although the table only depicts data for the period 
1972-3 to 1975-6, this is probably the most important 
period,in the sense that exports expanded rapidly during 
this time. It can be seen that over the 4 year period, 
the combined Asia and Africa export totals amounted to 
Rs.695 lakhs which was Rs.355 lakhs less than for the 
combined Europe and North America totals. Moreover,
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notwithstanding the fact that the annual average growth 
of export value to the developing regions was very high 
at 27.5 per cent, it was still lower than the 28.8 per' 
cent rate of growth of Indian machine tool exports to 
Europe and N. America.
These statistics require interpretation and two 
questions contained in the questionnaire of this study's 
survey were included for just that purpose. Firstly, it 
was thought important to ascertain the role exports play 
in the manufacturing activities of the units covered in 
the sample. Table 2 8 documents the evidence for the 
3 year period 1974-75. The data clearly shows that the 
vast majority of firms were not involved in the export 
of their products to any great extent. It was usually the case 
that the larger companies and, HMT in particular, accounted 
for the lion's share of Indian machine tool exports.
Table 2 8 : Share of Companies* Output Destined for 
Export Market
Companies by Year
Share of Output 
(%) 1974 1975 1976
to Exports (nos) (%) (nos) {%) (nos) {%)
0 . 22 56.4 23 57.5 15 37.5
1-25 14 35.9 12 30.0 19 47.5
26-50 2 5.1 2 5.0 3 7.5
51-75 — - — — 1 2.5
76-100 __1 2 . 6 _3^ 7.5 _2 5.0
Valid Cases 39 100.0 40 100.0 40 100.0
Missing Cases 1 - -
Sample 40 40 40
Source : The Indian Machine Tool Industry Survey (1978)
There is good reason to believe that this fact also accounts 
for the high proportion of exports destined for the more 
advanced markets of Europe and North America, rather than 
the other developing countries where the industrial 
environment would be expected to be somewhat similar.
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On this point, note what the then Managing Director of 
HMT said in 1978 * "HMT successfully applied the first 
lesson of export promotion, the best way into the market 
is through the strongest and not the weakest buyers...", 
and commenting on the company's export performance to 
other developing countries he remarked : "sales in the 
developing countries were ... inhibited by the fact that 
the demand for sophisticated and precision machine tools 
of the type produced by HMT were limited to the few 
purchases being made mainly from aid-giving countries 
under their tied-aid programme."
If attention is directed to Table 29 it will be 
observed that the growth of HMT's exports during the 
period 1962-75 averaged 23.4 per cent though during 
1970-75, this is reduced by half, to 11.5 per cent.
Table 29 : Export Performance of HMT (1970-75)
(1)
HMT*
Exports
(2)
Industry
Exports
(3) 
Industry 
- HMT Exports
curr- con- curr- con- curr- con-
(4)
( 1 ) as
Year
ent
prices
stant
prices
ent
prices
Stant
prices
ent
prices
stant
prices
a ( %) 
of (2 )
1962
1970
1975
1.5
20.4
60.5
2.3
20.4
35.2
1.5
27.9
81.8
2.3
27.9
47.6
7.5
21.3
7.5 
12 .4
100.0
73.1
73.9
AAG(%)
(1962-
(1970-
75) : 
75) :
23.4
11.5
26.2
10.6
(i ) HMT Company Annual Accounts 
(ii) S.M. Patil : 'A Quarter Century of HMT', 
Leaflet (1978), p.43.
(iii) S.M. Patil : Study of the Indian Machine 
Tool Industry UNIDO-HMT (1975), p.5.
Source
Notes * HMT's figures relate to financial year 
(year ending 31st March)
Constant prices : (1970 = 100)
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Furthermore, it appears that the company's export per­
formance has proved only marginally more successful than 
for the industry as a whole as evidenced by the slightly 
lower growth rate of the latter over the 1970-75 period.
This small difference in the trends is surprising given that 
the value pattern of HMT*s. exports would, have been thought to 
have increased relatively more rapidly during this period.
It may partly be explained by the diminishing importance 
of machine tools in the total production activities of 
the company; that is, the growth in the volume of exports 
has been less than the growth in export value.
The second question concerning exports that was 
included in the questionnaire was intended to seek 
information on the possible existence in the industry of 
discriminatory pricing between domestic and foreign 
purchasers. The inclusion of this question was prompted 
by the results of the research conducted by M. Frankena 
in the late 1960s which indicated that : "the landed 
export prices of Indian engineering goods in 1967-70 were 
often substantially below those received for the same 
products and markets by competitors from advanced 
countries. The evidence Frankena obtained seemed to 
justify his two conclusions : (i) Indian engineering goods 
other than commodity-like products were exported for hard • 
currency only at prices below those received by competitors 
from West European countries, and (ii) the size of the 
price discount necessary to sell Indian goods was positively 
related to the marketing requirements of the product. In
respect of machine tools,he found that a discount of 
between 20-30 per cent had been applied to an unspecified 
Indian machine tool manufacturer's product in comparison 
with a West German competitor. Frankena suggested three 
reasons why export price discounts operated on Indian 
engineering goods, and they formed the basis of the 
question put to the machine tool units, covered by the 
survey, on the question of export pricing policy.
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Table 30 details the responses received by the participating 
companies. From the 26 replies given by firms to this 
question, 15 stated that they had no discount policy.
Table 30 : Policy of Companies Regarding Discounts
on the Export Price of Machine Tools
Type of Policy
(A) Discount 
Policy Because
Companies by Size
Small Medium Large Row Totals
(nos) (%) (nos) (%) (nos) {%) (nos) (%)
(i)Costs of 
breaking into 
the market 5
(ii)Increased 
profitability as 
the costs of 
marketing are greater 
than the costs of 
discounts
(iii)Smaller back-up 
services to 
distributors so 
reducing the private 
costs of exports
(B) No Discount 
 Policy  Î 10
33,3 44,4 34.6
11.1 3.8
11.1 3.8
Valid Cases 
Missing Cases 
Sample
15
9
24
66.7
100.0
100.0 33.3 15 57.7
2 100,0 9 100,0 26 100.0
2 3 14
4 12 40
Source : The Indian Machine Tool Industry Survey (1978)
Of the firms that gave discounts : 9 units regarded it as 
the costs of breaking into new m a r k e t s 1 unit,that it 
was cheaper than providing elaborate marketing arrangements; 
and 1 unit,which indicated that it was less expensive than 
the provision of back-up services. An interesting point, 
is that a higher percentage of small and medium sized firms 
had no discount policy as opposed to the large sized 
companies, although this probably reflects nothing more 
than the greater competitiveness of the 'Western* markets
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in which the larger concerns are involved.
The results contained in table 31 on the pricing 
policy of Indian machine tool exports are far too incon­
clusive to be interpreted as congruent with Frankena's
70findings on the issue. The situation would in any case
have changed since Frankena conducted his research because
in the early 1970s, the Indian government introduced an
export subsidy scheme which was available to all quality
machine tool manufacturers; it being an explicit attempt
by the authorities to encourage producers to export more
of their output. As the export subsidy amounts to 25 per
cent of saleable valuei a figure suspiciously similar to
that cited by Frankena in his study, it would seem that
the government has now overtly taken over the role of
artifically cheapening the price of India's machine tool
exports, thus, assuming the financial burden that was
previously borne by the manufacturers themselves.
However, import substitution implemented through
protection probably created in the intermediate goods
industries a situation in which the costs of production
were higher than international costs and prices.
Obviously, under such conditions, the competitiveness
of India’s machine tool exports would deteriorate in
direct relation to the increase in the costs of the
intermediate goods the tool industry used and still uses
as inputs. Inter-state and local excise duties would
have tended to compound the issue. In these circumstances,
it could be that the industry has had to use the relatively
high cost domestically produced inputs as opposed to the
cheaper input materials which could have been imported 
71from abroad; but, in order to ensure the competitiveness
of exports, the Government attempted, indirectly, to make
72these inputs available to exporters at world prices. 
Therefore, the Indian Government's export subsidy on machine 
tools could reflect more an attempt at neutralizing the 
high costs imposed by domestic inputs and taxes than the 
hypothesised need to compensate for inefficiencies incurred 
in production.
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Chapter 5
Technical Development in the Production of 
Machine Tools : The Goal^g  ^ of Efficiency
Unquestionably, there exists a relationship between 
capital accumulation and the process of development. It is 
clear that a growing capital stock enlarges a country's 
capacity to produce goods; but both Fel'dman's and 
Mahalanobis* conception of the role that capital has to 
play in a developing country ran deeper than this : their 
theoretical models explicitly took into account the growth 
inducing effects of 'reproducible' capital goods investment. 
However, there is a complication to this approach, in that 
merely increasing the size of the capital goods sector and 
thereby enlarging an economy's productive capacity, may not 
be 'far and away' the most important element in economic 
growth. Basically, the problem hinges on how capital is 
defined, and whether it incorporates technological development.
The problems concerning the definition of capital were 
dealt with fully in Chapter 1. There, capital was defined 
simply as : "those goods which expand the productive base 
of an economy". Obviously though, this classification is 
arbitrary and many goods and services commonly judged as 
being consumption-orientated could quite validly be included 
under the heading of capital items. Examples readily spring 
to mind : investment into education and social overhead 
capital for instance, both improve the potential for further 
productive investment. It is important, therefore, to be 
continually aware of such difficulties when analysing capital 
goods as a source of output growth.
Further to the problems concerning the impreciseness 
of the classification between capital goods and consumption 
goods, there is the controversy regarding the origins of 
technological advance : is it the case that growth is
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endogenously determined through factor input variables as 
classical and sector-biased growth and development theories 
have been primarily concerned to show, or alternatively, 
is growth exogenously determined as production functions 
assume? It must be emphasised, however, that this dis­
agreement does not detract from the consensus that exists 
among economists that the process of capital accumulation 
is a 'sine qua non' for technological development in an 
economy.
Irrespective of the contentiousness surrounding the 
definition of capital, two important factors which impinge 
on economic growth derive from the establishment of a 
domestic capital goods sector in the 'closed type* economies 
such as those of the Soviet Union and India : not only is 
industrial capacity to produce enlarged through the production 
of 'machine-making' machines but also, the rate of techno­
logical development in the sector will determine the price 
of capital relative to labour.
The latter aspect regarding the relative price of 
domestically produced technology is a consideration that 
has received only piecemeal attention in economic discussion; 
its importance to economic development, however, is crucial. 
The Soviet Union during its initial phase of development has 
been one of the few recently industrialised countries to 
give explicit recognition to both objectives : a policy of 
resource allocation directed mainly at extending basic 
capital goods capacity whilst at the same time, economizing, 
in the widest sense, on the use of capital wherever feasible.
The development path of the Soviet machine tool industry 
is a manifestation of this strategy. The Soviet planning 
authorities assigned the industry a 'leading sector' and 
allocated investment funds accordingly. As such, the 
situation reflected nothing more than the machine tool 
branch's critical role in the reproduction of capital. More
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significant perhaps, was the realization by the Soviets that 
efficiency in the manufacture of technology was equally 
as important as the efficiency embodied in the machines 
produced. This meant more than simply invention and inno­
vation, it encompassed education and training facilities 
and many other considerations concerned with the organisation 
of production. Productive efficiency was the 'raison d'etre' 
of the Soviet machine tool industry's development strategy 
because clearly, the simple fact had been grasped that the 
price of a machine is the essential variable determining 
its marginal efficiency to would-be buyers; it influences 
not only the initial decision to purchase but also later plays 
a major part in the decision to replace. Therefore, via 
high levels of specialization, scale and standardization, a 
high degree of operational efficiency leading to low-cost 
production was achieved in the machine tool sector.
In addition, there is the fact that the technology 
produced was appropriate to the low capital-labour coefficient 
pertaining to the Soviet machine building industry of the 
1930s. Even small accretions of capital to the workers in 
this sector would have had a substantially greater impact 
on output growth than would have occurred in countries where 
capital deepening had already been taking place for some 
considerable period of time.
When talking of a Soviet machine tool production 
strategy, it is necessary to emphasize the priority given 
to the manufacture of simple, general-purpose machine tools. 
This form of technology facilitated large production runs 
because of its amenability to the standardization of com­
ponents and parts. In turn, the economies of specialization 
and scale that accrued would have reduced the price of the 
final product. It was via this somewhat circuitous route 
that a sufficient level of demand for machine tools, 
necessary to sustain the process, was generated from the 
machine building industry. Technological progress, in the
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sense of radically altering the mechanical means of pro­
duction of the tools produced did not take place. Although 
the machine tool industry did make minor improvements to 
the product range, primarily for the purposes of *scaling- 
up', in the main, production was based on selected imports 
of only standard and proven foreign machine tool designs. 
Product-innovation, therefore, took a 'back seat' in the 
Soviet machine tool industry's overall development strategy.
India's perception of the role technological progress 
should play in the manufacture of machine tools differed 
sharply from that of the Soviet approach. Based on the 
Western model of innovation : the *Brown-Rosenberg' paradigm 
delineated in the methodology of this study, the Indian 
machine tool industry's product range was characterised by 
ever-increasing diversification and sophistication. Batch 
production methods predominated and, as a result, cost-price 
reductions due to scale and specialization did not materialize. 
Moreover, standardization of components was minimal which 
further impeded movement towards increased efficiency. Using 
foreign collaboration as the vehicle for technological 
change in the machine tool industry's product range, labour- 
saving innovation was introduced into India's metal-working 
economy. This form of technology was not only inappropriate 
but, for the reasons advanced above, it may also have been high* 
priced. In India, therefore, the traditional strategy of machine 
tool production based on innovation - induced - replacement 
broke down; the external motivations for innovation to 
take place in the tool industry were absent probably 
because the marginal efficiency of the technology the sector 
produced was far too low for machine builders to rationally 
contemplate purchasing. In a low income economy cost-price 
considerations must always predominate.
In pursuance of the Western model, India merely sub­
scribed to the accepted proposition that capital accumulation 
is a necessary, some might say the sole condition, for the 
development of underdeveloped countries : the putative
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escape route from the 'vicious circle of poverty'. A major 
intention of the present study however, has been to suggest 
that capital accumulation may not, by itself, be a 
sufficient condition for development to take place. It is 
not enough for a country like India to be self-sufficient 
in the manufacture of machine tools or other capital goods, 
attention must also be paid to the efficiency with which the 
technology is produced.
An important element in this framework relates to 
demand. There are two key issues, specifically in relation 
to the production of machine tools in India, which can be 
delineated i
(i) For the technology to be appropriate to the 
machine building sector, it might at the same 
time have to be relatively low-priced; and
(ii) as in the Soviet schema, if the above pre­
condition is satisfied, then aggregate demand 
should cease to be a constraining influence 
on the scale of machine tool output.
The contention is, that if the price of a tool can be 
reduced sufficiently then a rising demand schedule will 
automatically ensue; the process feeding on itself by 
creating the conditions necessary for scale economies to 
take place. In this reformulation of conventional industrial 
thinking, demand for machine tools in the initial stages 
of industrialization is held to follow rather than lead 
increased efficiency in the machine tool branch.
In support of this approach, it is worth noting a 
statement by Rosenberg : "in underdeveloped countries, the 
investment decision is likely to be heavily weighted by an 
unfavourable relative price structure which acts as a 
serious impediment to investment activity. The investment 
decision after all, involves computation of a prospective
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rate of return which is determined by the present price 
of capital goods and the anticipated future price of con­
sumer goods. But it should be clear that the relative 
inefficiency of the capital goods industries in under­
developed countries and therefore the high price of capital 
goods is responsible for yielding low or even negative rates 
of return on a wide range of prospective investments. A 
major handicap of underdeveloped countries then, is located 
in their inability to produce investment goods at prices
sufficiently low to assure a reasonable rate of return on
2
prospective investment." For empirical validation of his
3
thesis, Rosenberg draws on a study by Kuznets who found 
that the marginal efficiency of the capital goods produced 
by the advanced countries’ producer good industries was at 
a relatively higher level than their counterparts in the 
developing countries; this clearly indicates that the ratio 
of capital goods prices to consumer goods prices was sub­
stantially lower in the former than in the latter.
From what has been stated hereto, it would appear that 
technical progress is a concept having more than one inter­
pretation : in the Western model of machine tool production, 
technical progress has essentially been characterised by 
innovation in the product-mix; in the Soviet model of the 
1930s, on the other hand, it was a phenomenon that centred 
almost exclusively on the way in which machine tools were 
produced. The Indian machine tool industry during its 
developmental phase emulated Western practices and hence, 
rationalised technical progress accordingly. With the 
advantage of hindsight however, this may have been the wrong 
choice because, as was shown in Chapter 2, no indigenous 
innovation of an appropriate nature occurred in the tech­
nology manufactured by the tool industry.
It becomes the task of this chapter, therefore, to 
examine the data from the survey and from official sources, 
in an attempt to reach some conclusion on the technological 
development of the Indian machine tool industry’s productive 
operations during its formative years. The analytic frame­
work for the chapter is based on the three separate ways in
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which technological development can be viewed :
In Section 1, the term 'technical change' is used to 
describe the character of technical improvements; it 
commences with a discussion of the difference between 
technical and economic efficiency and proceeds to analyse 
various production coefficients of the machine tool industry. 
These single factor indexes of output per unit of input 
assist in providing information on how techniques have 
changed in response to factor price movement and are 
reflective therefore of endogenous technical change.
Section 2 concerns itself with an exploratory analysis into 
the effects of changes in technology on the industry's 
development or, more specifically, on the role of techno­
logical change in the process of growth. This is defined 
as 'technical progress', and it is important that'the con­
cept should not be confused with technological change.'^ 
Technological progress is applicable to the difference 
between planned and actual output as predicted by an 
aggregate production function; and as such, could be des­
cribed as nothing more than a 'catch-all' residual, sometimes 
referred to as 'total factor productivity', including a 
diverse number of factors besides technical change, that 
contribute toward growth. Hence, technical progress is a 
concept which goes beyond factor-price efficiency : it is 
exogenously determined. The section finishes with an 
appraisal of various- economic influences including, in 
particular, capacity utilization which are thought to be 
responsible for the efficiency levels obtained. Finally, 
in Section 3, technical development is defined more literally 
to refer to changes in technology itself where technology 
is viewed as useful knowledge pertaining to the art of 
production. The culminating section in this sense looks 
at the economic activities through which improvements in 
machine tool manufacture stem : industrial training, the 
process of 'learning by doing’, and most of all, research, 
development and design facilities.
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Section 1 : The Character of Technical Change in 
Productive Operations
Efficiency is a most difficult and nebulous concept.
Due to this fact, the first part of the section is tax­
onomic in nature; the intention being to clarify the various 
concepts under discussion so that confusion in terminology 
does not destroy the analytical content of the chapter. 
Generally speaking, efficiency measures are used for the 
purposes of gauging the performance of units or sectors on 
either a temporal or cross-sectional plane. The basic 
objective is to evaluate relative resource usage in terms 
of the output generated. In this respect, the measurement 
of efficiency is simply the relation of input to output 
which, at a first level, is purely a technical problem.
From this engineering perspective, the measurement of 
efficiency is expressed in terms of physical units; an 
efficiency rating of 100 per cent being theoretically 
feasible.
'Technical' efficiency is integral to the rationale 
of the new welfare economics. Here, efficiency has regard 
to the economy that produces at a point on its production 
possibility surface, for which there must be uniform factor 
prices for identical inputs with no price discrimination. 
Firms must all be cost minimizers with sufficient knowledge 
of their own production functions to enable them to reach 
the optimal position. If technical progress is allowed into 
the analysis, then the Paretian notion of efficiency in 
production is relevant, i.e. if a new process can produce 
the same output as the old but with less of one or more 
inputs, then the old process has become technically in­
efficient. However, if allowance is made for indivisib­
ilities, finite time horizons and economies of scale, it 
is possible to be both rational (profit maximization) and
•249-
inefficient. This is the case when indivisibilities give 
rise to increasing returns even though each process taken
5
by itself shows constant returns to scale.
In an engineering environment, technical efficiency 
is an appropriate measure of a factor's performance. There 
is a major drawback, however, in that comparisons can only 
logically be made where output and input are reasonably 
homogenous. Suppose x units of input produce a ton of 
steel in one firm and x + 1 units of input are required to 
produce a ton of steel in another. It is not known whether 
the first firm is as efficient as it might be but it would 
appear, prima facie, that it is more efficient than the 
second.^ Even with a slight alteration to the final product 
of one firm, the comparative analysis of efficiency becomes 
invalid because 'like with like' is not being compared. 
Moreover, the question of input aggregation raises equally 
serious problems of measurement. This is because it is 
impossible to add together a heterogenous assortment of 
resources : ballbearings; the 'aging' of machinery, and 
man-hours, simply cannot be aggregated. In addition, as 
Salter has trenchantly observed ; "The interpretive 
problems begin once we ask what such figures mean. They 
are not a measure of efficiency, for a high output per 
man-hour can be produced as inefficiently as a low one. 
Nobody attempts to maximise labour productivity, nor indeed 
should they. Businessmen - despite what they say at 
productivity congresses - are interested in prices, costs 
and profits, and to them increasing productivity is simply
7
one means of reducing labour costs." Clearly, the way 
around the problem, as Salter suggests, is to apply prices 
to the factors to be aggregated; and, as shall be seen 
later, to output also.
Thus, through the valuation of output and input the 
concept of 'economic* efficiency is arrived at. For reasons 
of practicality, economic efficiency is the criterion that
2 5 0
has the most relevance. Under an engineering measurement 
of efficiency, a technically perfect machine tool would 
incorporate the ideal materials and would perform to 
tolerances of extreme precision. The difficulty is though, 
that the tool would be economically inefficient because 
costs of production would be so high that there would be 
no customers which could profitably pay the price that 
would cover them.
g
M.J. Farrell in a classic article published in 1957, 
presented a diagrammatic representation of these efficiency 
concepts. As an aid to clarification, it will be useful 
to reproduce Farrell's analysis and this is done in Figure 6 
below. Working under the assumptions of constant returns 
to scale and there being only two factors of production to 
produce output, the author was able to graphically depict : 
technical, economic, and also overall efficiency. The figure 
can relate to either a firm or an industry but as Farrell 
addressed his analysis to firms, this approach will be 
continued here.
Figure 6 - A Diagrammatic Representation of the 
Various Forms of Efficiency
K/Q
r/Q
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The isoquant SS^ represents the various combinations 
of the two factors that a perfectly efficient firm might 
use to produce unit output. Obviously, any firm producing 
to the right of the efficient production function is, in 
the Paretian sense, inefficient. Point P represents the 
ratio of capital and labour per unit of output that a ' 
firm is observed to use. In similar fashion, point Q 
represents a firm using composite input in the same 
proportion as P. Technical efficiency is defined, therefore, 
as :
OP - FQ (_ ^  )
OP (" OP )
1If AA is a slope equal to the ratio of the prices of the 
two factors, then and not Q becomes the most efficient
method of production : Q is not now the optimal point on
the boundary because the capital-labour ratio that was 
applicable to technical efficiency is inappropriate for 
economic efficiency. Evidently then, economic efficiency 
is :
OR
00
Finally, the firm would be perfectly efficient (both 
economically and technically) if the capital-labour ratio
line OP intersected at the point of tangency between the
1 1 price line AA and the production frontier SS . Symbolically
00 OP OP
(ii) Production Coefficient Analysis
The rapid growth in the output of the Indian machine 
tool industry has come about through the interaction of a 
number of factors. Besides the financial and technical 
assistance of foreign collaborators and the effects of 
technological progress there is also the additional aspect 
to be considered of changes in production technique.
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Improvements in production technology not only dictate the 
absolute level of the contribution that capital and labour 
make to the process of growth but also the apportionment 
between them. In view of this, the second part of this 
opening section is concerned with examining the capital 
intensity of the machine tool industry; and to reinforce 
the conclusions to be derived from the analysis, the pro­
ductivity of each factor will also be calculated. Capital 
intensity and factor productivity are related basically 
because of the complementarity of capital and labour in the 
process of production. These associations, as Cheng has 
cogently stated, are crystallized in the movement of the 
K/L trend : "when the rate of increase in capital stock 
surpasses the rate of increase in employment, capital 
stock per worker (K/L) increases. If the rate of utiliz­
ation of capital does not decline, this must result in an 
increase in labour productivity.**^
These relations, though simple in theory, are very 
much more difficult to put into practice. Output can be 
expressed in physical measures, such as tonnes, metres or 
numerical quantities but is is impossible or meaningless to 
add together quantities of dissimilar items as, for instance, 
machine tools. One way of overcoming this problem is to 
convert the machine tools produced during a given period 
into the man-hours or machine-hours that were consumed in 
their fabrication. Unfortunately, the difficulty with this 
method is that it does not take into account the value of 
the product to the purchaser or, for that matter, to the 
process of economic development. Thus, for the purposes of 
efficiency analysis, the most appropriate expression of 
output is in terms of its monetary value. Naturally, 
monetary values are distorted by inflation but this problem 
may, to a certain extent, be overcome by using a suitable 
price deflator. An additional merit of monetary measures 
besides being an expression of producer satisfaction^^ is 
that they also determine the rewards available to labour and 
capital.
2 5 3
The value of sales or gross output is the obvious 
though not necessarily the most satisfactory measure of 
output. In many respects a better measure would be the 
net output or added-value of production : the difference 
between the value of the goods produced and the cost of 
the materials used in their manufacture. Thus, net output 
discounts the effect of variations in material costs; it 
represents the value-added to the materials by the processes 
of production. In other words, the concept represents the 
wealth created by a unit whereas gross output includes the 
wealth created by other units. Net output is the sum 
available to cover all wages, salaries, dividends, interest, 
rent and retained profits. In the analysis of the efficiency 
of India's machine tool industry net output is, therefore, 
deemed the most relevant measure and when related to the 
inputs of labour and capital, the productivity indexes can 
hence be obtained.
But, like output, there is considerable dispute con­
cerning the nature and measurement of inputs; these are all 
interconnected with the problems of aggregation and defin­
ition which were touched on earlier, especially in the 
context of capital. Moreover, there is the major criticism 
which can be applied equally to capital and labour regarding 
the inadequate treatment of changes in the quality of factor 
input both across, and at a point in time. The search for 
solutions to these problems that will appease all critics 
is not easy, and ultimately decisions will have to be taken 
on the arbitrary judgment of the individual constructing 
the production coefficient. Thus, the need here is simply 
to make the reader aware of the weaknesses inherent in 
production and productivity analysis and that these be 
taken into consideration in the interpretation of the 
research findings. In any case, little interest should be 
attached to the absolute numerical value of the ratios; it 
is the trends that are important.
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In the construction of the machine tool industry's
K/L index, labour data has been disaggregated to provide
numbers^^ and costs of direct, i.e. 'productive',
employment. However, the same has not been possible for
capital. Consequently, the capital figures are global,
in the sense that they include all categories of fixed 
12assets. Moreover, the values of fixed capital as
reported in the A.S.I. represent the written down (book)
values (where depreciation is calculated according to the
13 'rates allowed by the income tax authorities)• Most 
economists however, have generally favoured the gross stock 
measure over the net stock measure for the purposes of a 
production analysis. The reason, as sharply pointed out 
by Professor Leontief, is that the use of "depreciated 
coefficients implies that capital stocks decrease in 
efficiency in exact relation to the depreciation charge", 
whereas "most available evidence indicates that this is 
not a reliable a s s u m p t i o n . A l t h o u g h  this assumption 
implicit in the use of net stock capital figures is clearly 
not free from criticism, it could nevertheless be argued 
that the use of gross stock figures is also biased on the 
extreme assumption of constant efficiency throughout the 
service life of fixed capital assets. Thus, this manner of 
constructing the K/L ratio precludes the possibility of 
using it as an approximation of the degree of mechanization : 
the ratio of equipment to production workers, excluding 
investment in buildings from the numerator and administrative 
personnel from the denominator. Nevertheless, fixed capital 
per direct worker is adequate to provide the underlying 
trend of capital intensity in the industry.
An index representing changes in the K/L ratio of the 
machine tool industry over time reveals an interesting 
pattern. Table 31 provides a temporal analysis of the K/L 
relation for the period 1960-74. Due to the lack of con­
sensus among economists as to the most correct form of 
calculation for the index, the trends of both capital per 
wage K/L^^^ and capital per man k/L^^^^ are presented.
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Table 31 - Capital-Labour (K/L) Ratios in the 
Machine Tool Industry
Year
Fixed _ 
Capital^^ 
(Constant 
Prices) 
(Rs.OOOs)
(1)
Labour
(Nos)
(2)
Wages
(Constant
Prices)
(Rs.OOOs)
(3)
K/L(i,
( = (I )-f ( 3 ) ) 
Rs. of K 
per unit 
Rs.of L (Yr) 
Ratio Index
... _.(4)
KA.{ii)
(=(1)4(2))
Rs,000s 
Per Man (Yr) 
Ratio Index
(5)
1960 78854 7372 17300 4.6 59.0 10.7 37.5
1961 145634 7481 22618 6.4 82.1 19.5 68.4
1962 185998 9789 31902 5.8 74.4 19.0 66.7
1963 207374 13178 39779 5.2 66.7 15.7 55.1
1964 261000 14444 41847 6.2 79.5 18.1 63.5
1965 458416 17490 51641 8.9 114.1 26.2 91.9
1966 497059 17850 54597 9.1 116.7 27.8 97.5
1967 510289 17716 51992 9.8 125.6 28.8 101.1
1968 513731 17582 56661 9.1 116.7 29.2 102.5
1969 525009 17996 64592 8,1 103.8 29.2 102.5
1970 525059 18409 67268 7.8 100.0 28.5 100.0
1971 535280 19582 72947 7.3 93.4 27.3 95.8
1972 475858 19270 73807 6.4 82 .1 24.7 86.7
1973 423704 18957 66286 6.4 82.1 22.4 78.6
1974 364327 18921 56773 6.4 82 .1 19.3 67.7
Annual Average :Rate of Growth
for the Period 1960-74 : 2.4 4.3
Source : Appendix 1, Table A
The rate of growth of the indexes was 2.4 per cent for K/L ^  ^
and 4.3 per cent for (ii)' ^ possible explanation for
the difference in the growth rates of the two ratios may be 
found in the disparity between the increase in the costs of 
remuneration and the expansion of productive employment.
Thus, while in K/L^^^ the wages of direct workers rose from 
Rs.173 lakhs in 1960 to Rs.567,7 lakhs in 1974, registering 
an annual average growth of 8.9 per cent, the comparative 
growth in the employment of direct workers in over
the same period was from 7372 to 18921, recording a somewhat 
lower rate of growth of 6.7 per cent.
For an industry which was built up through foreign 
collaboration, with the technology that accompanies such
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development, it is somewhat surprising that the growth in 
capital intensity has not been higher. Figure 7 diagram- 
raatically traces the paths of and K/L^  ^ for the
period 1960-74. Clearly, up to 1967/68 there was a rapid 
growth in the relation of capital to labour : over the first 
7 years of the decade the average growth rate of the K/L 
indexes approximated 13 per cent. Immediately following 
this period came the 3 years of the recession which 
seriously affected the rate of investment in the industry. 
The situation thereafter changed dramatically with the 
static or slightly falling K/L coefficients of the recess­
ionary years giving way to continuous and progressive 
declines in the same during the 1970s.
Figure 7 - The Relative Changes in the K/L Indexes of the 
Machine Tool Industry for the Period 1960-74 
(1970=100)
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The reasons for this decline in capital intensity
are a matter for speculation although two factors can be
X 6suggested which may have been of some significance.
In the first place although the real cost of direct labour
had fallen from Rs.672.7 lakhs in 1970 to Rs,567.7 lakhs
in 1974, recording a negative rate of growth of 4.2 per
cent, this fall has to be set against the deterioration in
the growth of capital value which over the same time span
decreased at an annual average rate of 8.7 per cent. However,
it is most unlikely that this rising (in the sense that the
decline in labour cost had been less than the decline in
capital value) wage-rental coefficient would have led to
the substitution of machines for men. There would have been
resistance to such moves because of the militancy of the
unions in the larger concerns of the organised sector, the
more so since public undertakings which traditionally have
poor labour relations dominate the machine tool branch.
Greater credence can be given to this explanation by noting
that in a period when the value of capital equipment had
fallen substantially, the numbers of production workers
employed remained more or less stable. A second possible
reason for the decline in the K/L ratios could well be
17related to HMT* s 'loss of interest' in machine tool 
manufacture. Certainly the downturn in the industry's 
capital intensity does seem to have coincided with HMT*s 
diversification out of machine tool production in the early 
1970s, just as its expansion in the decade before had 
corresponded with HMT's increased production capacity.
The very size of the company's market share obviously 
dictates that its policies considerably influence the 
statistical picture of the industry.
The data on fixed capital when related to value added 
in the machine tool industry displays a reasonably stable 
pattern for the early years of the 1960s. If the 5 
observations corresponding to the time periods in Table 32 
were plotted on a diagram, the first two observations
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would proximate to a straight line drawn through the origin. 
This indicates that increases in capital would lead to the 
same proportionate increases in value added. For the 
periods 1960/62 and 1963/65, one Rupee of fixed capital 
on the average was associated with Rs.0.4 of value added.
But whilst the 1966/68 and 1969/71 points lie far below 
this line denoting a severe deterioration in capital prod­
uctivity, the final observation for the period 1972/74 is 
located slightly above this line, indicating an improvement.
Table 32 : Average and Incremental Output/Capital Ratios 
in the Machine Tool Industry
Period
Value Fixed
Added Capital
(Rs.OOOs) (Rs.OOOs)
(1)
AOKR^ ) 
(Rs.per 
unit of 
K-years)
lOKR^ ) 
(Rs.of VA 
per unii 
10 IK of K-
(Rs.OOOs) (Rs.000s)years)
1960-62 174258 410486 0.4 - —
1963-65 387529 92 6790 0.4 213271 516304 0,4
1966-68 314057 1521079 0.2 -73472 594289 -0.1
1969-71 408874 1585348 0.2 94817 64269 1,5
1972-74 566812 1263889 0.5 157938 -321459 -0.5
Growth of Capital Productivity : 1.7% (1960-62 to 1972- 74)
Source : Appendix 1, Table A
Notation : AOKR = Average Output Capital Ratio
10 = Incremental Output
IK = Incremental Capital
lOKR = Incremental Output Capital Ratio
(1) Fixed Capital defined according to AST usage.
(2) AOKR = Q t
Kt
(3) lOKR = - Qt - Qt-1
K " In_
(where In, = FC.-FC. _ ) t t t-1
The fluctuations in value added during the admittedly 
short-run time periods under review have meant that the 
average productivity of capital has differed markedly from
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the marginal. Thus, in the recessionary period 1966/68, 
the average output/capital coefficient was lower than its 
* trend* value since value added was depressed in relation 
to the size of the capital stock, being relatively fixed. 
However, while the average capital productivity remained low 
at the start of the upturn of the business cycle, the 
marginal ratio had increased rapidly. As the machine tool 
industry was working well below capacity, very little extra 
capital was needed to increase output so that substantial 
growth was achieved with only a modest growth of fixed 
capital. By contrast, capital productivity for the 1972/74 
period showed a distinct improvement over previous periods, 
rising to 0,5; this is the more remarkable because although 
value added had increased by close to 40 per cent on the 
1969/71 figure, capital stock had, in fact, declined by 
Rs.3215 lakhs. Even with this rise in the output/capital 
relation during 1972/74, the average growth of the index 
over the five periods was dismal, managing only 1.7 per 
cent.
Thus, the evidence on the machine tool industry's 
productivity of capital indicates a somewhat unsatisfactory 
performance. But this is only one side of the coin. Aside 
from the fact that the industry was almost certainly not 
working at full capacity over a major portion of the 14 years 
under consideration, there is also the point that capital 
was not operating in isolation, but in co-operation with 
labour; there is good reason to believe that labour prod­
uctivity fared much better s depending on which K/L index 
is chosen, the machine tool industry's capital intensity 
throughout the period has grown some 2 or 4 percentage 
points, and it is generally held that higher output per 
person is associated with an increase in capital intensity.
In this context, a significant feature of the develop­
ment of the industry has been the relatively fast growth 
in labour-input. While total employment in the organised
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sector of the economy increased by 59.4 per cent between 
1961 and 1974, the number of employees in the machine 
tool industry rose by 196 per cent; for direct workers only, 
the figure was 157 per cent. Rapid as this increase in 
employment was, it was not, however, in the same league as 
the 362 per cent increase in capital stock over the 1960-74 
period. Clearly then, if the complementarity of the factors 
of production is remembered there should have been a con­
sequential improvement in the productivity of labour.
Given the qualification concerning low capacity 
utilization, the relation is now made between net output 
and direct employment in order to provide a judgment on 
output per man. From Table 33, it may be noticed that 
labour productivity or the average output/employment ratio 
has, except for the recessionary years of 1966/68, shown 
a steady rise throughout the 5 periods. Against this 
pattern the marginal output/employment index has displayed 
wide variation : it was high in 1963/65, negative in 
1966/68 and, after becoming positive again in 1969/71, 
accelerated sharply in the final period. Quite clearly, 
in like manner with the ’trend’ of average labour prod­
uctivity, it was the effects of the recession which caused 
the major aberration in the growth of incremental labour 
productivity. Although, for the years 1966 to 1971, 
average labour productivity was much higher than the 
corresponding marginal ratios, indicating that the rate 
of expansion of direct labour was generally higher, or its 
decline slower, than that for value added. But at 11 per 
cent, the growth rate of average labour productivity 
covering the five periods, 1960/62 to 1972/74 is highly 
satisfactory.
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Table 33. : Average and Incremental Output/Labour Ratios
Prices, Base - 1970)
Value
Added
AOLR^^^
(1)Labour per man lO IL
I0LR(3) 
(Rs.of VA 
per man
Period (Rs.OOOs) (Nos) years) (Rs.OOOs) (Nos) years)
1960-62 175448 24637 7120
1963-55 390847 45112 8660 215399 20475 10520
1966-68 322980 53148 6080 -67867 8036 -8450
1969-71 421382 55987 7530 98402 2839 34660
1972-74 616342 57148 10790 194960 1161 167920
Growth of Labour Productivity : 11% (1960-62 to 1972 -74)
Source Î Appendix 1, Table A
Notation AOLR = Average Output Labour Ratio
10 = Incremental Output
IL = Incremental Labour
lOLR = Incremental Output Labour Ratio
(1) Labour = Nos, of 'workers' defined according
to ASI usage.
(2) AOLR Q t
Lt
(3) lOLR = Qt - Qt-1
Lt - Lt-1
The rise in labour productivity, however, was 
accompanied by a proportionately greater increase in wages. 
Table 34 provides a comparison of labour productivity with 
the growth in the wage-bill. In every period, including 
those of the recession, wage payments grew faster than out­
put per man. This was an unhealthy development for the 
industry because a wage-bill in excess of productivity would 
have reduced pro rata the shares of the other elements com­
prising value added; and a major casuality would likely 
have been the surplus available for re-investment,^^ As 
a consequence, the potential for future increases in 
labour productivity must surely have been affected.
An interesting feature of the table is that in 
1972/74 the wage-bill showed a decline over the previous 
period, something that had not occurred even during the 
trough of economic activity in the late sixties, A part of
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the already noted upsurge in capital and labour productivity 
of this final period can therefore be attributed to the fall 
in the payments to labour. This exploitation of labour, 
as Marxists would have it, is clearly shown by the sharply 
contrasting growth of the wage-bill as against that of 
labour productivity : whilst the former fell by 3.9 per cent 
on the 1969/71 period, the latter grew by some 43 per cent.
Table 34 : Comparison Between the Indexes of Growth of 
Remuneration and Labour Productivity in the 
Machine Tool Industry (Constant Prices,Base - 1970)
Period
Tri-Yearly Wage-Bill 
(Rs.OOOs) Index
Labour Productivity 
(Rs.OOOs) Index
1960-62 71820 100 . 7120 100
1963-65 133267 186 8660 122
1966-68 163250 227 6080 85
1969-71 204807 285 7530 106
1972-74 196866 274 10790 152
Source Î Appendix 1, Table A *
The growth of labour productivity outpacing the wage­
bill led to a belated increase in the surplus value which 
in turn added a degree of respectability to the machine 
tool industry’s profitability record; but this in no way 
compensates for the poor profits for the whole of the
1960-74 period. These are documented in Table 35 which 
clearly shows that for almost half the years under review, 
the industry made negative profits. That this situation 
could happen is merely indicative of the high concentration 
of public ownership in the industry where losses could be 
subsidized by the taxpayer (either directly or indirectly). 
Without question a wasteful exercise in a developing country 
such as India.
19
For those years when a positive rate of return on 
capital was achieved, the highest in 1964 amounted to 
23.6 per cent. However, even the performance in this year
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does not measure up to the experience of the machine 
tool industry in China during its development in the 1950s.
Table 35 : Rates of Return to Capital in the Machine
Tool Industry (Rs.OOOs)
Year
Value
Added
(1)
Fixed
Capital
(2)
Depreciation 
+ Wages/ 
Salaries/ 
Benefits*
(3)
Gross
Profit
(1-3)
(4)
Rate of Return
To Capital^O 
(4/2 X 100)
(5)
1960 26186 49599 20748 5438 11.0
1961 37634 93060 30874 5760 7.3
1962 49149 122015 39132 10017 8.2
1963 64776 143088 49842 14934 10.4
1964 104625 185049 61042 43583 23.6
1965 112500 345187 86575 25925 7.5
1966 105256 402618 108700 -3444 -0.9
1967 90602 429663 119357 -28755 — 6.7
1968 75948 456707 130014 -54066 -11.8
1969 105377 490883 148950 -43573 -8.9
1970 134806 525059 167886 -33080 -6.3
1971 176829 544380 193645 -16816 -3.1
1972 207415 521540 209123 -1708 -0.3
1973 238000 498700 224600 13400 2.7
1974 346100 560700 270500 75600 13.5
Source : Appendix 1, Table A
* Does not include interest payments.
According to a survey of 29 enterprises in eight branches
of the Chinese machine building industry in 1957, the
average rate of return to capital in the machine tool
21branch was 27.6 per cent. Moreover, with a return to 
capital at this level the Chinese machine tool plants could 
have recovered their capital investment in under four 
years. In the Indian machine tool industry, on the other 
hand, capital recovery, based on the average of the 8 
positive rates of return to capital during 1960-74, would 
have taken about ten years. A capital recovery period of 
such length must have constrained the ability of the 
industry to adequately replace capital with all the ills 
that this would attend,
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Technical change in the productive operations of an 
enterprise is but one aspect in the means to increase 
efficiency. It is an important component though, because 
the rationale behind the concept, unlike "technological 
progress*, is reasonably well-defined and therefore readily 
identifiable to decision-makers : an increase in capital 
intensity will tend more often than not to be associated 
with rising labour productivity. The evidence on technical 
change in India* s machine tool industry between 1960 and 
1974 lends support to this argument. The annual growth of 
capital intensity was, on average, around 2 to 4 per cent. 
Due to this improvement in production technique there was 
a related increase in labour productivity of 11 per cent 
per period. Capital productivity, however, was very low, 
reflecting the faster growth in capital stock as compared 
with the expansion of labour. A more serious cause for 
concern was that wage payments had been growing faster than 
labour productivity; but there were signs that this "trend* 
may have been changing. Finally, there was the disturbing 
discovery that for many years, the industry's rate of 
return to capital had been negative. HMT has never dis­
closed the profit performance of its machine tool operations 
and the lack of profitability of the industry which is 
dominated by this one concern perhaps suggests the reason 
why. Any losses that HMT did sustain could have been made 
good by the surplus from the other more viable arms of the 
company's business activities. It will be interesting to 
observe the future profitability of the industry now that 
machine tool production is becoming increasingly less 
important to HMT.
Section 2 : Technological Progress in Machine 
Tool Manufacture
(ii) Total Factor Productivity
Productivity analysis enables resource allocation in 
an industry to be measured by comparing the growth of net
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output with the inputs of labour and capital. But, 
although single productivity ratios have an important 
part to play in a global approach toward assessing the 
degree of efficiency in the machine tool industry, they 
suffer the drawback of not being able to separate the 
impact of technological progress from the impact of the 
complementary factor. Thus, it will be illustrative to 
compare an index of output with an index for combined 
factor inputs; this is done in Table 36, The examination 
is confined to the two factors of production, capital and 
labour. Value added is, as usual, taken as the proxy 
for output. The analytical problem concerning the deter­
mination of the appropriate weights for the two factors 
was tackled by calculating the relative shares of output
accruing to the two inputs, The relative shares for
22labour and capital were found to be 74:26. Judging from
other empirical studies utilizing country data, it would
appear that the above proportion of labour remuneration to
income may be somewhat high. Kuznets, for instance, found
that the share of compensation of employees in participation
23income in the underdeveloped countries was 59 per cent.
Similarly, Bruton looking at the productivity of a selected
group of Latin American countries, estimated labour's share
to average 55 per cent.^ ^ The ratios of these authors
however, may not be strictly comparable with the factor
share for this study because they cover the whole spectrum
of activities within an economy. In capital scarce, low-
wage countries therefore, the value of capital would be
exaggerated. Furthermore, it is likely to be the case that
resource endowments and stages of development between
economies would differ sharply. In consideration of these
facts, a higher participation of labour in output does
25seem justified. Thus, in the absence of evidence to the 
contrary, a labour share of 74 per cent is taken as valid.
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Table 36 : Indexes of Combined Input and Efficiency 
of the Machine Tool Industry (Constant 
Prices, Base Year = 1970)
Year
Index
of
Value
Added
Input
Employment
(L)
Index
* Capital 
(K)
Index of 
Combined 
Inputs 
(L.74+K.26)
Index of
Efficienc'
VA/CI
1960 100 100 100 100 100
1961 144 147 185 157 92
1962 183 179 236 194 94
1963 226 224 263 234 97
1964 357 240 331 264 135
1965 365 299 581 372 98
1966 309 320 630 401 77
1967 253 309 647 400 63
1968 207 342 651 422 49
1969 273 389 666 461 59
1970 330 404 666 472 70
1971 398 454 679 513 78
1972 435 462 603 499 87
1973 445 416 536 477 100
1974 507 393 462 411 123
Annual 
Average 
Rate of 
Growth Î 12.3% 10.3% 11.6% 10.6% 1.5%
Source : Appendix 1, Table A
* Annual Aggregated Wage/Salary/Benefits Bill for 
all Employees.
The results of Table 36 at first glance appear 
striking. The annual growth of the composite index of 
labour and capital productivity in the machine tool 
industry during 1960-74 was only 1.5 per cent. But, due 
to the volatility of the efficiency index over time, the 
series is perhaps inadequate as a measure of trend. 
Furthermore, the rate of growth cannot be gauged against 
those previously calculated for the single factor indexes 
of capital and labour because there, the data was arranged
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into 5 time groupings in relation to key events in the 
development of the industry such as the early expansion 
in capacity; the recessionary period; and, more recently, 
HMT's diversification programme. There is also the point 
that in the single factor indexes of production the term 
"labour* represented only direct employment whereas in the 
composite factor input ratio it refers to all employment 
(payments); this is because here, the efficiency of the 
total factor input is being examined. In the event though, 
when the growth of output per employee was calculated, it 
proved to be only fractionally higher, at 1.9 per cent than 
that of capital and labour productivity combined. This sad 
indictment of the industry's productive performance is 
compounded by the fact that except for 1964 when there was 
a sudden and rapid acceleration in net output, in every 
year up until the final in 1974, the industry operated at 
no greater efficiency than that which prevailed in 1960.
A poor record by any standard.
The problem with combined factor productivity ratios 
is that, in similarity to the single factor productivity 
coefficients, they remain only partial or incomplete 
indicators. This is the case because both types of index 
fail to isolate the contribution the factors of production 
make to the growth process from that of technological pro­
gress. A more satisfactory approach would be to apply a 
measure of total factor productivity under the assumption 
that machine tool output is a function of the main prod­
uctive factors, capital and labour. Thus, any increases in 
output that cannot be accounted for by increases in factor 
inputs can be attributed to a "residual" combination of 
influences, and this may then be equated to technological 
progress. These relationships are expressed in the form of 
an aggregate production function.
One aspect of the production function approach which 
requires elaboration is that factor inputs should ideally 
relate to *inputs-used" rather than "inputs-in-existance"
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during the process of production. Theoretically, therefore, 
the utilization of capital and labour should be taken into 
consideration. This has, in fact, been attempted in studies 
of advanced countries^^ where unemployment has been used to 
deflate the net capital series on the assumption that labour 
and capital are utilized in the same percentage. However, 
this has not been possible for a sectoral study of machine 
tool production because the industry's rates of utilization 
are unobtainable. An additional complication is that in a 
country like India, most industries will almost certainly 
have their share of disguised unemployment. Due to these 
difficulties, the production function analysis is carried 
out on the basis of factor-stock data rather than on the 
more ideal services that this stock provides.
The Cobb-Douglas production function may be written
as :
(1) q ^ = a^k \ l p t
Where is real output (value added) in year t; K and L 
are quantities of capital and labour available in the same 
period; A an index of total productivity; a n d a n d  i3 are 
elasticities of output to capital and labour respectively.
As it did not prove possible to estimate the function 
empirically, << and were assigned values constraining them 
to sum to unity. These values are therefore identical to 
the ones used in the previous analysis in the construction 
of the index of combined factor productivity, namely, 74:26. 
The next step is to differentiate the function with respect 
to time, thus :
t" t-1  ^ = ^^ t~ ^t-j) + aC (^t" ^t-1  ^ + 13 ^t-1 ^
Qt_i) Kt-i) L^_i)
This technique which is approximately equivalent to taking 
logs, overcomes the problems of centring the observations 
in the time series. For simplicity the expression may be
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■written as :
(3) fq "
Where g, etc. refer to the annual proportionate rates
of growth of machine tool output, total factor productivity 
and so on. The ^ variable is the most important consider­
ation here. It can be defined as technological progress; 
this may be made clearer through the transformation of (3) 
so that Î
(4) = rg - +prL)
Although in this study is taken as an index of techno­
logical progress, it should be pointed out that logically 
is nothing more than that part of output growth that is 
not attributable to the increase in factor inputs; it is, 
therefore, a 'residual* which not only explains improved 
allocation but also all the other numerous influences 
affecting productivity growth, including measurement error 
in the data series. For this reason, one economist has 
described the residual as a "measure of our ignorance".
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Table 37 shows the growth rates of inputs, outputs 
and technological progress in the Indian machine tool 
industry.
The immediate point that can be made about the results 
of the production function analysis concerns the mean 
values of r^ and r^/r^. The Indian industry's r^ was 
found to be 2.9 per cent whilst its r^/r^ was a negative 0.14 
per cent. These findings appear to conflict with Gerschenkron 
type theorizing which argues that underdeveloped countries 
as latecomers to the industrialization process, are in an 
advantageous position because they possess the possibility 
of exploiting existing technological knowledge. If this
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Table 37 ; Growth Rates of Output, Input, and
Technological Progress in the Indian 
Machine Tool Industry (1961-74)
Year ^(L.74 + K.26) = ^A/^O
1961 35.9 15.6 59.5 11.54 15.47 27.01 8.9 0.25
1962 24.0 15.8 24.3 11.69 6.32 18.01 6.0 0.25
1963 21.2 21.7 10.9 16,06 2 .83 18.89 2.3 0.11
1964 44.9 11.2 27.9 8.29 5.95 14.24 30.7 0.68
1965 2.2 25.5 54.9 18.87 14.27 33.14 -30.9 -14.05
1966 -16.8 5.7 8.1 4.22 2.12 6.34 -23.1 1.38
1967 -19.7 -0.01 2 . 6 -0.01 0.68 0.67 -20.4 1.04
1968 -20.0 — 0,01 0.7 -0.01 0.18 0.17 -20.2 1.01
1969 27.4 4.0 2.2 2.96 0.57 3.53 23.9 0.87
1970 19.0 3.8 0.0 2.81 0.0 2.81 16.2 0.85
1971 18.7 7.6 1.9 5.62 0.49 6.11 12.6 0.67
1972 8.8 -0.01 -11.7 -0.01 -3.04 -3.05 11.85 1.35
1973 2.3 -0.01 -11.6 -0.01 -3.02 -3.03 5.3 2.30
1974 12.9 0.0 -15.1 0.0 -3.93 -3.93 16.83 1.30
Mean Values of r^ and 2.9 -0.14
Source : Appendix 1, Table A 
* : L = No. of employees
were a valid hypothesis, then it would be natural to have 
expected India’s machine tool industry to have experienced 
a much higher growth of the residual, due to the country's 
rapid expansion in capital formation.
It should be stated that there are four major 
criticisms to the use of the Cobb-Douglas function : 
firstly, integral to the model is the assumption of neutral 
technical progress; if it were not, only one combination 
of factor inputs could be examined at any one time and it 
would thus become impossible to distinguish technical 
progress (shifts in the function) from technical change 
(movements along the same function). The difficulty with 
this type of theorizing though is that technical progress 
need not be neutral. Secondly, there is not complete con­
sensus among economists concerning the assumption that 
technical progress is independent of increases in factor 
inputs, i.e. that it is exogenous. But this does not 
invalidate the Cobb-Douglas model because it is not a
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specification error, relating instead to the purpose in 
which the function is put. Thirdly, changes in the ease 
of substitution between capital and labour cannot be shown 
due to the limitation of the function in respect of the 
constant unitary elasticity of substitution between factors 
whatever the factor intensity. The final criticism has 
regard to the measurement of outputs and inputs i is it 
possible to aggregate so many heterogenous items such as 
capital goods which were built at different times and, 
consequently, varying costs and productivities?
That the path of the aggregate production function is 
treacherous is widely known; it is also, however, well-trodden. 
This is because most of the criticisms documented above are 
all basically theoretical and are not so serious as to lead 
to the invalidation of the production function. Many of 
the empirical studies of technical progress in the advanced 
countries suggest that the assumption of neutrality is a 
reasonable hypothesis; that, additionally, many of these 
case studies also indicate constancy in the elasticity of factor 
substitution; and that, although the heterogeneity of output 
and input is problematical, especially regarding the 
difficulties over vintage capital, nevertheless, judging 
from published production function studies, the role of 
relative factor shares seems to perform adequately in 
practice. The overall justification is that a production 
function analysis assists in the investigation of efficiency 
levels in the Indian machine tool industry and the fact 
that the findings constitute just one element in the entire 
exercise is perhaps defence enough for its use.
The production function analysis indicates that 
technological progress in India's machine tool industry 
has been a positive but relatively minor factor in its 
development over the past two decades. There can be no
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single cause to explain this fact. Some part of r^ can 
surely be accounted for in terms of research and development 
activity; and investment into technical education and 
industrial training will doubtless account for some further 
part. The progress India's tool-makers have made in this 
direction will be explored in the final section of this 
chapter. Another major feature of productivity growth, 
however, relates to the extent of capacity utilization.
Where technology is being utilized at a level below optimum, 
there will certainly be deleterious repercussions on 
efficiency. The transplantation of advanced techniques 
from Western nations into the machine tool plants of India 
would not have been a costless exercise if the scale of 
demand to accommodate such equipment did not materialize.
In fact, amongst the numerous influences that may have acted 
to constrain the Indian machine tool sector's technological 
progress, under-utilization of productive resources could 
well have been the dominant force.
To seek support for this argument, further investigation 
of the data in'Table 37 is required, A simple regression 
of r^ on the rate of growth of output should point to the 
importance of this relationship. The estimates of r^ on 
r^ for the Indian machine tool industry over the period 
1961-74 yields the following equation:
(1) = -6.06 + 0.78 r r = 0.65
(1961-74) (sig. at 1%)
Such a finding is consistent with the notion that technological 
progress in the sector is highly dependent on the growth of 
factor input. The value of the intercept shows that 
technological progress was always negative unless r^ was 
substantially positive. Possible reasons for this state 
of affairs may be highlighted if separate regression 
equations are constructed for the period 1961-68 and 1969-74. 
The equation for the first period which includes the
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recessionary years becomes:
(2) = -12.30 + 0.72 = 0.76
(1961-68) (Sig. at 1%)
Clearly, the massive under-utilization of capacity during the 
years of the recession depresses the intercept still further 
in comparison with (1). It suggests that the falling level 
of demand, and hence spare capacity in the industry, was a 
prime source of inefficiency. This argument is strengthened 
when the regression for the period after the recession is 
examined :
(3) r^ = 5.08 + 0.63 r. r^ = 0,77
(1969-74) (Sig. at 5%)
With the upturn in the business cycle leading to an increased
scale of operation, the intercept for this equation has now
turned positive : there is a heightened dependence of r. on
—2 .r^; the greater r in comparison with that over the whole
1961-74 period is further confirmation of this. Therefore, 
as the analysis appears to suggest, it is highly likely that 
increases in the degree of capacity utilization have been 
a considerable influence in the observed improvements in 
technological progress.
(ii) Sources of Inefficiency
The preceding regression analysis of the machine tool 
sector's production function has thrown up capacity under­
utilization as a significant cause for the inefficiency of 
the industry. Not only does sub-utilization of existing 
capacity tend to reduce output/capital and output/labour 
productivities but it also impinges upon the rate of growth 
of technological progress.
An indication of the impact that underutilization of 
capacity has on the performance of total factor productivity 
may be had by comparing in Table 37 the r^ figures with the 
movements of value added for the corresponding years. Up 
to 1964, both value added and technical progress were 
characterized by their continual growth. The very high
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figures for 1964 cannot readily be explained except to note 
that it would have been in this year that the production 
of HMT Pinjore, which commenced operations in the latter 
part of 1963, would have been felt. It might also have been 
the case that the Indo-Chinese conflict of 1962 and the 
increasing tension between India and Pakistan (leading to 
the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965) placed a special emphasis 
at that time on the capacity and production of the 'strategic' 
machine tool industry. Over the ensuing three years to
1968, value added and r^ again moved in unison with both 
experiencing negative-rates of growth. Finally, the table 
shows that as the industry emerged from the recession in
1969, the increase in the utilization of existing capacity 
was reflected by the return to positive growth in value 
added which in turn brought forth an improvement in the 
index of total factor productivity. These similarities in 
the direction of the movements in value added and techno­
logical progress were obviously more than mere coincidence. 
Thus, although the level of capacity utilization may not 
have been the sole consideration in the determination of 
the efficiency of the industry, it must, nevertheless, have
had a crucial part to play in the overall scheme of things.
A capacity utilization analysis will serve as a more 
concrete affirmation of the importance of the issue.
Moreover, it has the additional attraction of breaking 
still further ground in the accumulating profile on the 
techno-economic development of the industry. Unfortunately 
though, due to the non-availability of quarterly and annual 
data on the industry's potential (or licensed) capacity, 
the construction of a historical index of the utilization 
of capacity is not possible. Nevertheless, some indication 
of the persuasiveness of this issue can be gauged by the 
findings of the survey and other information from various 
fragmentary sources.
Before embarking upon this task, however, it is
imperative to bear in mind that productive capacity is an
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elusive concept prone to much misunderstanding in both 
empirical work and general economic discussion. For 
instance, it is not possible from an economic perspective 
to define a maximum level of output unless certain 
assumptions are made about perfect competition and constant 
returns, and abstraction is made from technological change. 
There is also the point that productive capacity has only 
a most imperfect connection with any technical measure of 
the productive capacity of machines, The problems regarding 
this aspect are broadly analogous to those encountered in 
the earlier part of this chapter regarding technical versus 
economic efficiency. The technical concept of capacity 
relates to a consideration of the maximum 'physical' output 
of an enterprise or industry. An economist's view, on the 
other hand, would interpret capacity as that which is 
economically feasible, incorporating into his calculation 
such elements as productivity theory, factor input prices, 
aggregate demand, and profit/welfare maximization. Hence 
on the spectrum of capacity specifications the technical 
measure would be located at the highest point; this would 
be followed by optimum capacity, being the economic position 
for feasible operation. But, due to production bottlenecks, 
insufficiency of demand, or any other of the myriad reasons 
why optimum capacity might not be the level of output attained 
by the enterprise or industry, the notion of 'normal' capacity 
would then become relevant. Any point below economic full 
capacity, including the normal level of operation, should 
be treated as sub-optimal, implying underutilization of 
capacity. As previously, it was economic efficiency that 
was held to be the relevant concept in measuring the develop­
ment of the machine tool industry, so similarly it is again 
the economic interpretation of capacity that is deemed to 
be the appropriate index. Consequently, in the subsequent 
analysis, capacity will always refer to the economic meaning 
of the concept.
Indian industry has traditionally been associated with 
low levels of capacity utilization. Needless to say, such
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a generalization is highly dangerous because rates of
utilization would naturally vary from sector to sector.
2 8However, a recent report by the Reserve Bank of India 
does much to suggest that for the capital goods industries 
of India, the argument may have more than a ring of truth 
about it. The study, published in 1975, measured capacity 
utilization by obtaining the percentage of actual industrial 
production to total potential production; and, although for 
all sectors it found a declining level of capacity utilizat­
ion over the period 1961-73, nowhere was it more pronounced 
than in the capital goods industries : falling steadily from an 
average 82.9 per cent for the 1961-65 period to only 61.6 
per cent in 1973. The corresponding figures for the 
manufacturing sector were 87.9 per cent and 77.9 per cent 
respectively.
For the capital goods industry in general therefore, 
an economically disastrous degree of underutilization of 
capacity had existed throughout the 1960s and early 1970s,
The question is though, was this situation consistent with 
the experience of the machine tool industry over the same 
period? Albeit that the evidence on this matter is sparse, 
figures for the public sector machine tool companies in 
1974 indicate that the industry's record may even have been 
worse, Praga Tools Ltd., of Hyderabad achieved capacity 
utilization levels of 60 per cent for drill chucks, 50 per 
cent for lathe chucks, and a mere 29 per cent for surface 
grinding machines; and while HMT's capacity levels ranged 
from 80 per cent at Ajmer to 52 per cent at Bangalore, the 
Heary Machine Tool Plant at Ranchi managed what can only 
be described as a dire 22 per cènt.^^
In an attempt to supplement the admittedly limited, 
though nevertheless indicative, statistical evidence on 
the rates of capacity utilization for the public sector 
of the machine tool industry, the survey sought information 
to ascertain whether the problem was widespread throughout
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the entire branch. The initial approach was to seek 
information on the extent of firms that were operating 
below what they considered a full rate of capacity. 
Table 38 shows the response to this enquiry. From the 
sample of 40 firms 29, or over 70 per cent, replied 
affirmatively to the question.
Below a Full Rate of Operation
Response Firms % of Firms to Total
(1) (2) (3)
Yes 29 72.5
No ii 27.5
Valid Cases 40 100.0
Missing Cases —
Sample 40
Source : The Indian Machine Tool Industry Survey (1978)
Difficulties arise, however, with the interpretation 
of these results; this is because some machine tool units 
may, as a part of corporate policy, deliberately maintain 
a proportion of productive capacity under-utilized. 
Productive capacity surplus to current requirements may 
be installed to match longterm increases in demand; in 
anticipation of obtaining a larger share of the market; 
or as an emergency m e a s u r e . I n  order to check the 
importance of this issue, the question was put to machine 
tool manufacturers whether, as a matter of policy, excess 
capacity is maintained in production. From Table 39 it 
may be seen that only 3 firms, amounting to 7,5 per cent 
of those questioned pursued such a strategy.
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Table 39 : Machine Tool Units Having the Policy of
Maintaining Excess Capacity in Production
Response
(1)
Firms
(2)
(%) of Firms to Total 
(3)
Yes 3 7.5
No 12 92.5
Valid Cases 40 100.0
Missing Cases -
Sample 40
Source : The Indian Machine Tool Industry Survey,(1978)
Although the findings thus far accord with the 
situation that would have been expected to obtain in the 
tool industry, one possible distortion still remains : 
due to the array of processes carried on in engineering 
activities, most machine tool concerns almost inevitably 
suffer technological limitations to the achievement of full 
capacity. On this score also, therefore, the prevalence 
and impact of sub-utilization of capacity may easily be 
exaggerated. In an attempt to overcome this deficiency 
the obverse method was followed of identifying the number 
of units possessing sufficient capacity to meet demand. 
Table 40 documents the evidence on this point.
Table 40 : The Possession of Adequate Capacity 
to Meet Demand
Adequate Capacity 
(1)
Firms
(2)
(%) of Firms to Total 
(3)
Yes 32 91.4
No 3 8.6
Valid Cases 35 100.0
Missing Cases 5
Sample 40
Source : The Indian Machine Tool .Industry Survey (1978)
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In contrast to the results of Table 3s where 11 firms 
indicated that they were not working below a full rate 
of operation, now surprisingly only 3 companies or some 
8 per cent of the valid sample stated that they did not 
possess adequate capacity to match potential production 
orders. Even accepting that a proportion of the 11 firms 
listed as not operating below full capacity in Table 3S, 
do not require expansion to cope with the level of demand, 
the results substantiate the now overwhelming evidence 
regarding the existence of considerable capacity under­
utilization.
Given the fact that there seems to be extensive sub­
utilization of capacity throughout the machine tool 
industry, it is inconceivable to expect more than a minority 
of enterprizes organising their production on a multi­
shift basis. In the fifties, when the industry was 
established, a predominantly single-shift system could 
have been seen (although there is little evidence forth­
coming to suggest that it in fact was) as an under­
utilization of capital resources at the very time when 
much effort was being expended to enlarge capacity. 
Generally, however, firms do not have the option of comm­
encing production on a multiple-shift system. The principal 
reason for this, lies in the fact that new companies face 
complex organisational difficulties; operating a multiple- 
shift system from scratch would complicate matters still 
further. Even the Soviet policy makers during their 
initial industrialization were unable to implement this 
form of working practice. As Granick has observed ... "the 
potential inherent in round-the-clock operations was fully 
recognised by Soviet administrators in the early thirties. 
The campaign for the three-shift and seven day week was 
the order of the day. Yet it was never very successful. 
Second and third shifts seem to have had very few workers, 
and the shift coefficient (defined as the total number of 
workers divided by the number working in the main shift) in
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metal fabricating rose only to 1.5 by 1932, and then,
after first declining somewhat, it stagnated" ... thus,
..."plant utilization was an area where, by and large,
Russian administrators were pushed back in the direction
of a production solution which has been generally applied
31throughout Western Europe : that of the single-shift,"
The number of shifts currently being worked in India's 
machine tool industry is shown in Table 41 ; and as large 
firms with their need to cover relatively greater amounts 
of overhead costs are more likely to operate on a multi­
shift basis, the response to this question was analysed 
according to firm size. The results of Table 41 show that 
there is some justification for the assumption that a 
positive relation exists between the increasing size 
of an establishment and multi-shift operation. It appears 
that over 80 per cent of the large companies were operating 
on two or even three shifts. Such a situation may seem 
paradoxical given the high incidence of sub-utilization 
of capacity prevailing in the sector, but it should be noted 
that on numerous occasions during the fieldwork it was 
brought to the author's attention that underutilization of 
capacity was considerably minimised due to the diversified 
production activities of the companies. At the other end 
of the scale, the fact that the vast majority of small and 
medium sized firms operated on a single-shift system was a 
result which merely conformed to 'a priori* reasoning on 
the subject.
Table 41 : The Number of Shifts Currently being Worked in 
Machine Tool Units According to their Size
Number of Small Medium Large Row Totals
Shifts (nos) (%) (nos) (%) ( nos) (%) (nos ) (%)
1 19 79.2 3 75.0 2 16.7 24 60.0
2 3 12.5 1 25.0 7 58.3 11 27.5
3 2 8.3 — — 3 25.0 5 12.5
Valid Cases 24 100.0 4 100.0 12 100.0 40 100.0
Missing Cases - - - -
Sample 24 4 12 40
Source : The Indian Machine Tool Industry Survey (1978)
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On the findings in general, there was surprise over 
the high number of firms working double shifts, amounting 
to 27,5 per cent of the total. It is likely that some of 
India's tool manufacturers having experienced low or even 
negative levels of capital replacement for several years 
have now been forced to double-up on the operating time of 
the installed equipment to cater for the increased output 
since the recession years. But whatever the reasons are 
for a higher number of units than expected organising their 
production on a double shift basis, they should not detract 
from the fact that overall, the predominance of one shift 
working reinforces the belief of widespread sub-utilization 
of capacity in the machine tool branch.
It is perhaps worth mentioning that many of the firms 
having adequate capacity expressed the view that profitable 
investment opportunities existed (these were probably 
'progressive* firms in an 'unprogressive* market) but could 
not be taken advantage of for a variety of reasons : a 
shortage of skilled labour figured prominently, above the 
scarcity of managerial talent or even the inability to 
raise external finance; much more important than all of 
these, however, was the dominant problem of shortages in 
internal finance. This aspect is, of course, simply another 
symptom of the 'vicious circle' of low demand leading to 
sub-utilization of capacity which in turn leads to high 
cost-price methods of manufacture, so further constraining 
the growth in demand. The Indian machine tool industry 
has for the last decade or so been locked into such a 
vicious circle where infra-marginal operation has resulted 
in reduced profits and for many years even outright losses.
The concomitant diseconomies of scale have been con­
siderable; even the significant wage differentials over 
foreign competitors have likely been insufficient to create the 
maximum competitive level. Consequently, the level of 
penetration into overseas markets (even though on a rising 
trend, it remains relatively very tiny) has not been such 
as to allow increasing scale and efficiency, thwarted in 
the Indian market, to be achieved abroad. The vicious 
circle is thus compounded.
- 2 8 2 -
Aside from the hardy perenial of low rates of capacity 
utilization, there are other problems which have reduced 
the industry's ability to operate at optimum levels of 
efficiency. Many of these difficulties have 'dogged* the 
industry for years, others, not quite so long. For fullness 
of discussion, a brief mention of these secondary influences 
is perhaps required.
A factor, quite recent in appearance which many 
machine tool entrepreneurs singled out as being de­
stabilising to manufacturing performance was breakdowns 
in industrial relations, A number of causes seem to be 
behind this problem. For many workers, the increased 
freedom that has come about since the ending of the period 
of 'emergency* has provided them with the opportunity of 
re-asserting their industrial rights. The easiest way of 
achieving this is of course, through membership of a labour 
union. But many machine tool employers have attempted to 
resist the inevitable 'wind of change' blowing across the 
industrial map of India and, as a result, have become 
embroiled in union recognition disputes. Moreover, the 
fervour of unionisation has even spread to engulf existing 
unionised firms with strikes and lock-outs caused by 
inter-union rivalry. Finally, in addition to these purely 
'worker representation* disputes there were the more con­
ventional conflicts arising from the employees' claims for 
improvements in pay and conditions.
Table 42 illustrates the incidence of labour force 
unionisation amongst machine tool enterprises as it was 
in 1978. It can be seen that even in the late seventies, 
unions were only a fact of life in half the companies 
under review. In the small scale sector of the organised 
machine tool industry, unions had a foothold in less than 
30 per cent of undertakings, whilst in the medium sized 
firms there was only a 25 per cent representation.
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Table 42 ; The Incidence of Labour Force Unionisation
Amonost Machine Tool Units According to their Size
Companies
Labour Force Small Medium Large Row Totals
Unionisation (Nos) {%) (Nos) (%) (Nos) (%) (Nos) (%)
Yes 7 29.2 3 75.0 10 83.3 20 50.0
No 17 70.8 1 25.0 2 16.7 20 50.0
Valid Cases 24 100.0 4 100.0 12 100.0 40 100.0
Missing Cases - - -
Sample 24 4 12 40
Source : The Indian Machine Tool Industry Survey (.1978)
At a time when there was reaction to the stringency of life 
under the 'emergency', the denial of the right to belong 
to a union must surely have been a source of irritation 
to workers in the industry.
Of the firms that were unionised, the majority had a 
maximum of 5 unions operating within their organisations.
As Table 43 indicates, 42.5 per cent of companies had 
between 1 and 5 unions representing their employees. Two 
of the larger units had between 6 and 10 unions and one 
firm had as many as 2 6 unions to contend with. The analysis 
if taken a stage further reveals for those firms that are 
unionised, a very high unionisation ratio. Even though 
many of the firms in question did not operate 'closed shops' 
for their workers, clearly, as is depicted in Table 44, 
an extremely high proportion (90 per cent) of those enter­
prises that did allow unions had unionisation ratios within 
the 75-100 percentage bands.
Although poor labour relations in the industry was 
continually stated by manufacturers to be the next biggest 
headache after inadequate demand, contrary to what would 
have been expected, difficulties of supply in raw materials 
and intermediate goods did not even figure a mention further 
down the scale of sources of inefficiency. The supply of
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Table 43 : The Number of Trade Unions Operating in the
Machine Tool Units According to their Size .
Companies
Number of Small Medium Large Row Totals
Unions (Nos) (%) (Nos) (%) (Nos) ( % ) (Nos) (%)
0 17 70.8 1 25.0 2 16.7 20 50.0
1 - 5 5 20.9 3 75.0 9 74.9 17 42.5
6 -10 2 8.4 — - —  — 2 5.0
26 M mm — - 1 8.3 1 2.5
Valid Cases 24 100.0 4 100.0 12 100.0 40 100.0
Missing Cases - - -
Sample 24 4 12 40
Source : The Indian Machine Tool Industry Survey (1978)
Table 44 : The Percentage Unionisation of the Labour
Force of Each Machine Tool Firm According
to the Size of Establishment
Companies
Percentage Small Medium Large Row Totals
Unionisation (Nos) (%) (Nos) (%) (Nos) {%) (Nos) (%)
0 17 70.8 1 25.0 2 16.7 20 50.0
1 - 2 4 —  — — - — -
25 -  49 —  — " - - —  * - -
50 -  74 M  mm — — 2 16.7 2 5.0
75 -  99 2 8.3 2 50,0 3 25.0 7 17.5
100 5 20.8 1 25.0 5 41.7 11 27.5
Valid Cases 24 100.0 4 100.0 12 100.0 40 100.0
Missing Cases — - -
Sample 24 4 12 40
Source : The Indian Machine Tool Industry Survey (1978)
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these factors, at least for the machine tool industry, does 
not seem to present the problems of earlier times. It is 
probable that the recent slackness in engineering activity 
may, by easing the demand on scarce inputs, have had some­
thing to do with this. An exception, has regard to the 
supply of electricity. In some areas (Calcutta being one 
notable example) problems are still encountered with power 
generation. Major reductions or even black-outs in 
electricity supply usually occurring in the summer periods 
when shortages of rain restrict the hydro-electric sources 
of power.
(iii) The 'Evolutionary* Theory of Technical Progress
It was mentioned in Chapter 2 that patent registrations 
might not be an accurate reflector of a developing country's 
ability to innovate. There is a need at this juncture to 
explore this proposition a little more deeply.
A country such as India at the start of its industrial­
ization push might not be expected to become a major 
innovator in comparable terms to the already advanced 
countries, This is not to deny, however, that technical 
progress in the third world's industrializing countries does 
take place. But the nature of the change could well be
somewhat different : with minor, imperceptible amounts of
32innovational performance being the norm. Thus, when the 
'residual' is mentioned to account for that portion of growth 
which is not explained by increases in the factors of 
production it is, under this different approach, considered 
to envelope all the various forms of learning that can be 
acquired in -an industrial environment, and not simply patented 
innovation.
33Atkinson and Stiglitz were among the first economists 
to draw attention to an associated aspect of this new approach 
the 'localised' character of innovational occurrence, which 
they felt came about through workers' preoccupation with 
problems that are close at hand. In the extreme case this
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would lead to a situation as depicted in Figure 8 below 
Figure ^ 'Localised* Technical Progress
Output peril 
man
Capital per man
It is clear that here, technical progress does not raise 
output per head for all possible techniques. To clarify 
this fact, it should not be forgotten that a production 
function represents numerous production possibilities and 
the different points on the curve signify different 
manufacturing processes. Now when learning takes place at 
one point it should be evident that the resultant change 
in the function will also be confined solely to that point; 
an outward movement at A, as opposed to a general shift to 
the entire production function to a more efficient level.
In Figure 8 it is assumed that no "spillover" improvements 
into other techniques ensue from the heightened efficiency 
at A. But as the authors point out : "In reality we should 
expect that a given technical advance would give rise to some 
spillovers and that several techniques would be affected. 
However, we would reach the traditional position only if there 
were spillovers to 'every* technique. This means that a 
technical advance would have to be such as to raise productivity 
on, say, every type of textile loom from the fully automated 
to the crudest hand loom".
Although the above work broke fresh ground in the
examination of technical change, a very important lesson
35to be learnt remained misted over. N. Rosenberg has drawn
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explicit attention to the improvement opportunities in the 
operation of production techniques which derive from the 
actual experience of the worker. This constitutes a long-run 
form of learning by doing, a process of inter-play between 
man and machines or between groups and organizations, rather 
than the passive conformity of the ordinary agents of 
production to rules and systems laid down by heroic 
inventor-entrepreneurs.
It was left to Nelson and Winter to formally theorize
these modifications on the neoclassical view of technical
change into what they termed as the 'evolutionary* model of
37economic growth. In the pursuit of this aim, the authors 
distinguish between Schumpeterian theory where * the most 
important firms are those that serve as the vehicles for 
action of the real drivers of the system - the innovating 
entrepreneurs', and neoclassical theory where maximization 
of profit is based on equilibrium (rather than Schumpeterian 
dynamism) principles. Unlike either of these 'growth* theories, 
however, the evolutionary model is held to represent a 
'behaviourist* approach to individual firms. The basic 
behavioural premise is that a firm at any time operates 
largely according to a set of decision rules that link a 
domain of environmental stimuli to a range of responses on 
the part of f i r m s , T h e  neoclassical interpretation of such 
happenings would be that they are primed by profit maxim­
ization; the evolutionary's , that they are given, at least 
in the short-run. Over the long-run, of course, decision 
rules may well have to be modified to adapt to changing 
technological circumstances. In the description of the 
elements of evolutionary long-term technical change, it is 
best to quote from the authors' paper directly : "On our 
reading, at least, the neoclassical interpretation of long-run 
productivity change is sharply different from our own. It 
is based on a clean distinction between 'moving along* an 
existing production function and shifting to a new one. In 
the evolutionary theory, substitution of the 'search and
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selection' metaphor for the maximization metaphor, plus the 
assumption of the basic improbability of procedures, blurs 
the notion of a production function, ... The exploration of the 
set [being] treated as an historical, incremental process in
which non-market information flows among firms played a
, 39major role.
This debate on the incremental diffusion of innovation 
was taken a step further with the publication in the mid-1970s 
of a book by P. David, An important point to emerge from the 
treatise is the author's qualification of the adjective 
'evolutionary' by his greater emphasis given to the 'historical' 
The modified theory of David contains the Darwinian principle 
of 'survival of the fittest' a la Nelson and Winter but now 
also the Mendelian principle of 'heredity*. Thus, because 
Nelson and Winter's 'natural selection* process in the 
treatment of the generation of technological innovation 
corresponds to a stationary state - where technical 'improve­
ments' are determined completely within the span of the present 
epoch and independently of the path by which the current state 
was reached - it clearly fails to consider the historical 
feature of technical change as an irreversible, evolutionary 
development. In this respect their theory of secular change 
remains fundamentally neoclassical in spirit, even though 
their conception of micro-economic behaviour departs from 
the neoclassical tradition,
Whether the evolutionary theory of technical change 
belongs to the neoclassical school or not should not be 
allowed to detract from the important contribution it makes 
to the study of economic growth, and especially in the context 
of developing countries. For the particular case of the 
Indian machine tool industry it suggests that technological 
progress may well have been more significant than patent 
registrations indicate. It is difficult to quantify but 
clearly much 'learning' has undoubtedly taken place. In the 
private small scale sector, adaption of foreign designed
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technology has gradually evolved to serve the needs of the 
local market. And in the larger public sector companies new 
designs have emerged indigenously that have led to technical 
improvement in both process and product. HMT, for instance, 
now designs and manufactures sophisticated numerically 
controlled machine tools for domestic and export markets. 
Furthermore, the export of HMT’s technical expertize to 
assist in the establishment of machine tool plants in other 
industrializing nations, e.g. Algeria and Kenya, gives 
credence to the view that substantial scientific and productive 
skill has been accumulated by this company. The build-up 
of such technical knowledge is a heartening factor as the problem 
is, when technological innovation or improvement is 'localised* 
to particular processes, the import of technical advance 
from Western countries - either through learning by doing 
or research and development - will leave the choice-set 
of the less capital-intensive though possibly more appropriate 
techniques, comparatively unaffected, The examination of the 
state of scientific knowledge in India's machine tool sector 
is attempted in the next and final section of this chapter.
Section 3 : The State of Scientific Knowledge in the 
Machine Tool Branch
(i ) Research, Development and Design
Amelioration in productive knowledge is the final and 
most literal interpretation of technological development. 
There are a plethora of economic activities which are 
involved with improving the ability to produce; the most
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important of which is the process of research, invention, 
development/design and, ultimately, innovation. These 
factors, by expanding the frontiers of industrial knowledge, 
are conventionally regarded as the primary agents in the 
area of technical advance. But as a spin-off from either 
developmental work and straightforward production or as a 
direct result of government, company or individual initiative 
another aspect, that of the educational level of the workers 
also has a vital role to play. In the first part of this 
concluding section, the state of the arts in respect of 
research, development and design in the machine tool industry 
is explored. This is followed by a brief assessment of the 
contribution that education has made to the development of 
the sector,
Under the Western machine tool manufacturing strategy 
that India chose to follow, there is general agreement that 
research and development (R & D) expenditure makes a 
fundamental contribution to economic growth. Indeed, the 
so far insuperable obstacles to a precise measure of 
technical progress has in recent years led many economists 
to include in their development analyses an evaluation of 
R&D as a gauge of the impact of technological progress; in 
many cases to act as a supportive index for other measures 
but increasingly as in indicator in its own right. This 
increased interest in the pursuit of scientific knowledge 
has been prompted by the positive relationship that exists 
between R&D and industrial innovation : the cornerstone to 
the Brown-Rosenberg paradigm. The view is frequently 
advanced, for instance, that Britain's industrial revolution 
was fuelled by the abundant supply of inventors, innovators, 
and risk-takers; and that the role of capital accumulation, 
though indispensable, was of secondary significance in the 
acceleration of economic growth. Schumpeterian theory 
epitomizes this approach. Enshrined in Schumpeter's work 
is a term coined to describe the impact of the innovatory 
cycle : "the process of creative destruction," Comp­
etition was regarded as the driving force behind this process;
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but whether it be the cause or the effect as another body 
of opinion contends, there is little controversy surrounding 
the fact that patented-innovation is almost entirely the
province of the rich countries.
In the case of machine tool technology, special 
emphasis is required in the bid towards self-reliance and 
accelerated technological build-up because it is the 'mother' 
technology which provides the nation essential tools that 
generate production in almost all sectors of its economy.
This statement is the opening line to India's Science and 
Technology Plan for machine tools which was published in the 
early 1970s, But, although there is a clear awareness of the 
importance of the industry in the process of industrialization, 
only limited progress has been made in the field of patented- 
innovation, Traditionally, the machine tool industry has 
been a leader in invention-innovation; this has not occurred 
in India. Instead, foreign collaboration has been the main 
purveyor of change and progress in the product-mix of the 
sector. A fact which may have undermined rather than enhanced 
the technological development of the industry.
There are no published statistics on the extent of 
research and development in the Indian machine tool industry. 
Consequently, the only data on the subject is that which 
was obtained from the survey to this study and although the 
sample appears quite small, it should be remembered that 
excluding HMT, the majority of the important establishments 
were covered. However, due to the enormous size of HMT 
in relation to the industry, its omission obviously impairs 
the accuracy of the findings; to that extent, the analysis 
of R&D expenditure has more relevance if it is taken to 
relate only to the private sector of the machine tool branch.
An obvious way of judging the emphasis given to R&D 
by machine tool manufacturers is via the numbers of technical 
and design staff employed in the industry. Table 45
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Table 45
in the Machine Tool Industry
R&D Staff Firms (%) of Firms to Total
(1) (2) (3)
0 22 59.5
1 - 5 8 22.0
6 - 1 0 2 5.0
11 - 20 2 5.0
21 - 50 _3 8.0
Valid Cases 37 100.0
Missing Cases 3
Sample 40
Source î The Indian Machine Tool Industry Survey (1978)
provides figures to this effect. It is quite evident that 
for many companies R&D had no role to play at all in their 
activities; this situation is applicable to 22 firms, close 
to 60 per cent of the valid sample. Furthermore, only 3 
firms (large units) employed a staff of more than 20 solely 
for the purposes of R&D. The data on the employment of 
design staff is somewhat similar. Table 46 shows that while 
14 companies only had between 1 and 5 designers on the pay­
roll, a further 10 firms employed no design staff at all.
Table 46 : Design Staff Employed in the 
Machine Tool Industry
Design Staff 
(1)
Firms
(2)
(%) of Firms to Total 
(3)
0 10 28.6
1 - 5 14 40.0
6 - 1 0 3 8.6
11 - 20 5 14.3
21 - 50 __3 8.6
Valid Cases 35 100.0
Missing Cases 5
Sample 40
Source : The Indian Machine Tool Industry Survey (1978)
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Most of these units were small scale organisations that 
could not afford a full-time design engineer. In these 
circumstances, the normal practice would be either to 
employ a designer-cum-draughtsman on a part-time arrangement 
or, as the need arose, on a consultancy basis. In many 
instances, however, the small scale entrepreneur was him­
self the designer. It certainly would appear from the 
evidence of the two tables, that research, development 
and design activity in the industry has a low priority.
The data on R&D expenditure reinforces the above 
conclusion. In this connection. Tables 47 and 48 present 
information on two of the ways in which such expenditure 
can be channelled : for the improvement of existing output 
and for the development of new products. The figures 
contained in both tables heavily suggest that many of the 
major manufacturers are continuing to rely on the same old 
collaborators' designs. Even though R&D expenditures are 
generally on a rising trend, it is little comfort when the 
absolute amounts are so derisory t in 1974 a total of only 
Rs.23.5 lakhs was spent by the sample firms on R&D as 
against an industry sales turnover of Rs,88850 lakhs (approx­
imately 0.03%). As would be expected therefore, the low 
R&D expenditures are in symmetry with the minimal employment 
of development and design staff.
Various other data, not specifically on the machine 
tool industry, support the above findings. A 1964 study 
reported that about 50 per cent of the chemical and metal 
working firms in India spent nothing on research, about 
25 per cent spent less than 0.1 per cent of turnover, and 
the remaining 25 per cent spent on average 0.25 per cent 
of turnover. The study concluded that the average R&D 
expenditure of these industries did not exceed 0.1 per 
cent of turnover. According to a 1970 report by the 
Committee on Science and Technology, "the private con­
tribution to R&D is small and is estimated at about 0.2
45per cent of the turnover of industry. In the case of
-294-
Table 47 : Machine Tool Firms' Expenditure on Product
Development for the Years Specified (Rs.Lakhs)
Years
Expenditure 1974 1975 1976
Product Improvements 2.7 h A
Valid Cases 19 20 20
Missing Cases 21 20 20
Sample - 40 40 40
Source : The Indian Machine Tool Industry Survey (1978)
Table 48 : Machine Tool Firms' Expenditure on the
Development of New Products for the Years
Specified (Rs.Lakhs)
Years
Expenditure 1974 1975 1976
Development of
New Products 20.8 16.2 49.8
Valid Cases 20 20 20
Missing Cases 20 20 20
Sample 40 40 40
Source : The Indian Machine Tool Industry Survey (1978)
firms with foreign licenses, Kapoor reports the findings of 
a 1965 survey : "There is hardly any R&D activity by Indian 
licensees. Less than 5 per cent of the respondents 
(licensees) claimed to be engaged in any development activity 
while not over 2 per cent were engaged in research ... The 
5 per cent of the respondents engaged in some form of R&D 
activity are the large companies with an industrial back­
ground ... Though 5 per cent of the respondents are engaged 
in some sort of R&D, even these licensees became nearly
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completely dependent on the licensors' R&D in the licensed 
area
The end result of R&D should, in the main, be innovation. 
Yet, here again the results from the survey are consistent 
with the other findings on the subject; with a limited input 
of R&D resources into the machine tool industry, clearly 
innovational rewards will also be few. Table 49 provides 
the evidence on this point. Strikingly, only 3 companies 
out of the 38 respondents stated that they currently held 
a patent. By contrast, of the 4 machine tool firms interviewed 
in Britain, 3 were patent holders. Out of these firms, 1 
company held around 50 patents whilst another had 60 current 
patents with a further 60 in the process of application, 
and over 300 that had already expired. The paucity of patents 
originating from Indian machine tool units seems convincing 
proof of the poor innovational performance of the industry;
Table 49 : The Number of Machine Tool Firms Holding Patents
Possession of 
Patents 
(1)
Firms
(2)
(%) of Firms to Total 
(3)
Yes 3 8.0
No 35 92.0
Valid Cases 38 100.0
Missing Cases* 2
Sample 40
Source : The Indian Machine Tool Industry Survey (1978)
* Includes HMT Ltd.
it argues conclusively that the Brown-Rosenberg paradigm 
is inoperative in such an industrial environment and thus 
that the traditional Western argument that the tool 
industry is the harbinger of technological progress in an 
economy is of vacuous content in the case of India.
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Now that low levels of research, development and 
design inputs and innovational output have been empirically 
established, the discussion proceeds to attempt a deter­
mination of the principal underlying causes behind this 
state of affairs. It is postulated that the following 
three factors have been of major significance in this con­
text : the first two considerations are what might be termed 
the macro-aspects of the problem; they are foreign coll­
aboration and government policy. The third factor, on the 
other hand, concerns the various means that entrepreneurs 
can take, of their own volition, to improve the technological 
state of their products; this part of the analysis is micro- 
economic in nature, involving company decisions to seek 
technical advice and/or assistance from outside research 
bodies, university departments, and government technical 
centres and institutes,
Macro-Constraints :
The development of the machine tool sector has been 
characterised by an almost total dependence on foreign 
collaboration for original design. It should be pointed 
out though, that a sizeable minority of Indian machine tools, 
especially in the small scale sector have been manufactured 
without the assistance of foreign collaborators. Certain 
generalizations can be made of the machinery branch in 
general regarding these ostensibly 'indigenously designed' 
products : (i) they were generally close, if not identical 
copies of products which were previously imported; (ii) they 
were relatively simple products which did not require 
advanced manufacturing techniques; and (iii) few of them
had not been produced in advanced countries a decade or
47
two earlier. A great deal of this imitative design work 
has been occurring continuously since independence; it was 
by no means a new phenomenon, brought on by India's pro­
gramme of industrialization. Of course though, with the 
emergence of the public sector in the machine tool industry 
and the increased demand that emanated from the early phases
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of import-substitution, the trend was for relatively more 
sophisticated technology which could not effectively be 
copied. Thus, the clamour for modern design of Western 
machinery set the stage for the entrance of foreign coll­
aboration as the prime vehicle for the technological 
development of the industry.
It might validly be asked why foreign collaboration 
has been categorised as a macro-constraint to the encourage­
ment of indigenous design capacity when the decision to 
seek a foreign partner is clearly a matter for the individual 
entrepreneur. To some extent this is correct but such 
decisions are rarely taken in isolation and can be influenced 
by a whole manner of things, including indirectly government 
policy. It may not have been an overt strategy but the 
industrial and trade control regime did create a situation 
where a bias was given to link-ups with foreign manufacturers 
as the source for designs, rather than on domestic efforts. 
The clearest indictment has reference to the licensing 
arrangements of the authorities. Certainly throughout the 
first three of the Five Year Plans, the issuance of 
industrial and capital goods licenses was made contingent 
on foreign investment covering the foreign exchange require­
ment of the import of capital goods. There was a definite 
preference in this respect as Kidron has stated ; "These 
and other factors have so affected official thinking that 
it is now virtually impossible for an Indian firm to start 
up or expand without presenting a scheme for foreign coll­
aboration. As one journal put it : *it has become difficult 
to get a manufacturing license without prior arrangements 
for foreign technical collaboration ... whether (an industry) 
really needs technical know-how and foreign capital or 
not.
Aside from this indirect incentive that was given to 
foreign collaboration agreements for the introduction of 
new machine tool designs, it is argued that the entire 
direction of government policy was largely responsible for
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the poor design capacity of the industry. In particular, 
many of the more deleterious consequences of the res­
trictive control regime stemmed from the way in which the 
forces of competition were stifled. Irrespective of 
production costs or quality, the import of any product 
already manufactured in India was automatically banned or, 
if allowed, the level of protection was so high as seldom 
to make it a realistic proposition. Furthermore, the fact 
that the industry had its capacity, production, raw and 
intermediate material inputs, and capital goods investment 
all licensed, virtually established a monopolistic structure 
in the manufacture of given machine tools, particularly 
amongst the larger members of the branch. The up-shot of 
government policy was the creation of an industrial environment 
where some machine tool producers were able to manufacture 
equipment of inefficient and inappropriate design without 
being forced out of business.
Micro-Constraints t
To this point in time, the ma^jor thrust of the little 
R&D that has taken place in the industry has largely been 
aimed at achieving the goal of technological independence. 
Strictly speaking, however, it is illogical for any country 
to attempt to be 100 per cent self-sufficient in the pro­
duction of all types of machine tools. Even the highly 
advanced countries continue to import a large proportion 
of their requirements : in 1975, the import of machine tools 
into France amounted to 50 per cent of domestic production; 
in Britain it was 35 per cent; whilst for the United States, 
the world's most sophisticated producer, it was still a 
significant 13 per cent. There is no mystery surrounding 
the high level of international trade in machine tool 
technology. The NCST Report on machine tools provides a 
good explanation of its importance : ... "Because of the 
very large variety of machine tools and because of the 
very small numbers in which some varieties of machine tools 
are required, it does not pay to carry out R&D in all
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varieties of machine tools. Some countries have attained 
such extreme degrees of specialization and competence in 
some types of machine tools which it would be unrealistic 
and wasteful to duplicate." Even if in the near future 
technological independence in machine tool manufacture 
could be attained in India, the price might still be too
high for another reason; As there is only a limited R&D
capacity in the country, it could be argued that the designs
would tend to come from the advanced nations and, as has been
argued repeatedly, they will be of dubious advantage to a 
capital scarce economy. Moreover, the rationale of machine 
tool production under the Brown-Rosenberg paradigm is based 
on the premise of 'forced obsolescence' where still prod­
uctive capital equipment is compulsory retired by the 
competitive pressures originating from evermore productive 
innovations. This type of industrial philosophy is at the 
moment completely alien to the capital starved machine tool 
users in India.
Corroboration for this argument was sought from the 
survey. This was attempted by asking manufacturers to 
indicate on a scale what they felt the current life of 
machine tool designs to be. Table . 50 lists the responses 
received to the question. A majority of entrepreneurs, 
over 67 per cent, considered the current life of Indian 
machine tools to be over 9 years; one third of these, 
however, believed the design life extended even beyond 
16 years. Furthermore, it would appear that such views 
were equally distributed amongst both small and large enter­
prises, This widespread conception of the longetivity of 
the life of plant is a characteristic of the machine building 
industries in India. The probable causes are two-fold : 
the first should by now be almost self-evident, having regard to
the suggested high cost-price of indigenous machine tools. In a low- 
income market a further reason has been advanced by S.Patil, the
recently retired Managing Director of HMT. Commenting on the
demand nexus between the machine building industry and the
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Table 50 : The Average Current Life of Designs in the
Machine Tool Industry, According to Size 
of Establishment
Companies
Life of Small Medium Large Row Totals
Design(Years) (Nos) (%) (Nos) (%) (Nos) { % )  (Nos) (%)
3 - 5 3 12.5 2 16.7 5 12.5
6 - 8 4 16.7 2 50.0 2 16.7 8 20.0
9 — 12 8 33.3 2 50.0 2 16.7 12 30.0
13 - 16 3 12.5 - — 3 25.0 6 15.0
16 6 25.0 — — 3 25.0 9 22.5
Valid Cases 24 100.0 4 100.0 12 100.0 40 100.0
Missing Cases - - - -
Sample 24 4 12 40
Source : The Indian Machine Tool Industry Survey (1978)
machine tool manufacturers he suggested that ... "our 
tax formula for allowing depreciation on it [the purchase 
of new machinery] actually discourages any large accumul­
ation of depreciation reserves. The low resulting demand 
for new machinery has meant an even smaller demand for 
machine tools. As a result, HMT's market surveys have 
shown that only 7 per cent of machine tools are replaced 
every year in India as against 20 to 30 per cent in the 
U.S.A., Europe and J a p a n . T h e  consequential continued 
use of out-dated equipment has resulted in low user- 
productivity on the one hand, and low take-off of manu­
factured machine tools on the other The argument is 
not that India's machine tool stock should be composed of 
best-practice Western technology but rather that the 
designs be both 'modern' and reflect the economic conditions 
of the country. At the moment there seems a case for 
believing that the age and inappropriateness of Indian 
machine tools have meant that they are inefficient even 
for developing countries.
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Machine tool R&D should take into account the needs 
of the machine building industry; this has not happened 
in India. At the firm level, the machine tool manufacturers 
and machine tool users have been functioning in almost total 
isolation to one another. The NCST Report on machine tools 
had this to say on manufacturer-user collaboration : "The 
machine tool users have taken for granted that they would 
not get any assistance from the manufacturers to improve 
their technology, productivity etc. The manufacturers, 
on the other hand, have been too preoccupied with their own 
manufacturing and technological problems without keeping 
in touch with the needs of the machine tool users regarding 
product innovation, accessories, tooling, job engineering 
etc. ... an inter-face between the manufacturers and the
52users for feedbacks and exchange of ideas does not exist." 
Thus, the Indian machine tool industry has not, in Rosenberg's 
terminology, acted as the main 'transmission centre' for the 
dissemination of knowledge and techniques to the rest of the 
machine building industry as its counterparts in the West 
had done a century or two earlier.
The establishment of a machine tool institute (CMTI) 
orientated almost entirely towards R&D was promoted and 
sponsored by the government as a solution to the low R&D 
investment of individual companies. Domestic firms have 
been urged by the authorities to participate closely in 
the work of the Institute in order to improve their products 
and economic performance. In addition, the CMTI has 
testing and design facilities which can be made available 
on request to entrepreneurs who wish to utilise these 
services. The objective of the Institute appears fine in 
theory but how far in practice has it been an effective 
substitute to R&D engendered through the organic link 
between tool-maker and machine-builder? The results 
contained in Table 51 suggest hardly at all. Of the 40 
companies in the sample, less than a third had ever taken 
advantage of the facilities offered by the CMTI.
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Table 51 ; The Machine Tool Companies According to their
Size that have taken Advantage of the facilities 
offered by the Central Machine Tool Institute
Companies
Use of Small Medium Large Row Totals
C.M.T.I . (Nos) (%) (Nos) (%) (Nos) (%) (Nos) { % )
Yes 6 25.0 1 25.0 6 50.0 13 32.5
No 18 75.0 3 75,0 50.0 27 67.5
Valid Cases 24 100.0 4 100.0 12 100.0 40 100.0
Missing Cases - - - -
Sample 24 4 12 40
Source : The Indian Machine Tool Industry Survey (1978)
This state of affairs was common to all firm sizes t 75 
per cent of small and medium sized companies had never 
utilized CMTI's services whilst the figure for large firms 
was 50 per cent. Many of the small manufacturers explained 
their reluctance in terms of the high costs charged by the 
CMTI for the services provided. In respect of the units 
in the Northern States there were also the additional costs 
of transportation to be considered ; one entrepreneur in 
Ludhiana, for instance, stated that the CMTI had at one 
time been asked to test his product, but he was later to dis­
cover that the Institute's fees coupled with the freight 
charges involved in shipping his machine to Bangalore would 
have proved prohibitive.
Scientific knowledge need not solely be acquired from 
a research institute. In Britain, for example, many 
machine tool companies are members of research associations 
such as those of MITRA (machine tool) and PERA (production 
engineering). For India, as Table 52 shows, the reverse 
has been the case. In similarity with the findings of the 
previous table, the level of contact of the large companies 
with research bodies other than CMTI was somewhat higher 
than for the small and medium sized establishments though
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still disappointing. A minority of units did have links 
with a mechanical engineering organisation though all 
firms thought the benefits derived from membership were 
minimal. The small industry institutes were mentioned 
by some of the small scale companies, however, their 
importance is limited mainly to production assistance 
purposes such as testing and inspection.
Table 52 ; The Strength of Contact between Machine Tool 
Units according to their Size and Outside 
Research Bodies
Companies
Degree of Small Medium Large Row Totals
Contact (Nos) { % )  (Nos) (%) (Nos) (%) (Nos) (%)
Strong 5 20.8 5 41.7 10 25.0
Weak 4 16.7 1 25.0 5 41.7 10 25.0
None 15 62.5 3 75.0 _2 16.7 20 50.0
Valid Cases 24 100.0 4 100.0 12 100.0 40 100.0
Missing Cases - - — -
Sample 24 4 12 40
Source s The Indian Machine Tool Industry Survey (1978)
Interaction between the machine tool firms and 
universities was almost non-existant. The evidence for 
this is listed in Table 53. Only 12,5 per cent of 
entrepreneurs described their companies' relationship 
with engineering universities or engineering departments 
of other universities as strong. In fact, for many 
companies the maximum level of contact that they had 
experienced with universities was when engineering 
students had visited them in connection with their own 
study projects. This lack of inter-play between the 
universities and industry is not confined solely to the 
machine tool industry but is widespread, affecting all 
sectors of the economy. The situation is in sharp contrast
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Table 53 : The Level of Association between Machine Tool 
Firms According to their Size and Engineering 
Universities or Engineering Departments of 
Universities
Companies
Level of Small Medium Large Row Totals
Association (Nos) (%) (Nos) (%) (Nos) (%) (Nos) (%)
Strong 3 12.5 2 16.7 5 12.5
Weak 2 8.3 1 25.0 6 50.0 9 22.5
None 19 79.2 1 75.0 33.3 26 65.0
Valid Cases 24 100.0 4 100.0 12 100.0 40 100.0
Missing Cases - - - -
Sample 24 4 12 40
Source : The Indian Machine Tool Industry Survey (1978)
to that in the advanced nations where basic research and 
the training of research personnel is undertaken in close 
co-operation with institutes of higher learning. The 
Indian authorities though, have long been aware of the 
importance of this relationship as the Draft Outline of 
the Fourth Five Year Plan bears testament : "An over­
whelmingly large number of R&D personnel are working in 
government laboratories, in most cases without adequate 
contact with either higher educational and technological 
institutions or with industrial establishments. The 
research staff in higher technological or educational 
institutions have little contact with industry; while the 
number of R&D staff within industry itself is very small.’ 53
Thus, although the R&D activities of the Council of 
Scientific and Industrial Research and the planning efforts 
of the NCST have been prodigious over the last decade or 
so, India’s R&D expenditure per capita still remains amongst 
the lowest in the world : in 1974/75 it was 0.61 (in U.S. 0 )  
compared to 85.0 for the Soviet Union and 139.4 for the 
United States in 1973. In the specific case of the machine 
tool industry, the evidence that has been presented in
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this section is convincing that an equally poor level of 
R&D activity exists there also,
(ii) Industrial Learning
Economists that have studied the economic development 
of the already industrialized countries have concluded 
from the results of their analyses that improved knowledge 
and the acquisition of skills have been important ingred­
ients in the rates of technological progress achieved,
Denison, for instance, has identified and measured the 
contribution of various factors to the growth of the United 
States economy. He found that 23 per cent of the annual 
average growth rate of 2,9 per cent between 1929 and 1957 
could be attributed to education. Indeed, his analysis showed no 
less than 42 per cent of the per capita growth rate in the 
United States represented the contribution of education.
Another study by T. Schultz calculated that returns on 
educational expenditure explained between 20 to 30 per cent 
of the growth of income in the United States from 1929 to 
1956 and accounted for an even higher proportion of the 
rise in per capita earnings of the labour force, Schultz 
argued that the differential in earnings corresponded 
closely to the differential in education and believed that 
one was the consequence of the other. In addition, he felt 
that many of the paradoxes of economic growth could be 
resolved once human investment was taken into account :
... "Thus, it would explain the behaviour of capital/output 
ratios in advanced countries, the quick recovery of Germany 
and Japan which suffered heavy physical capital losses in 
war-time destruction, and the difficulties the underdeveloped
countries sometimes have in 'absorbing' capital despite
. . „ 55great scarcity."
When 'learning* is related to improvements in the 
performance of plant and machinery, it can be broken down 
into two components :
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The first has reference to what has been termed 
* learning-by-doing' which is the accumulation of experience 
by the workers in the process of production thereby 
increasing the efficiency of manufacturing operations. This 
is, again, a characteristic of the 'division of labour* 
concept made famous by Adam Smith. Specialization of tasks 
is beneficial because it increases the dexterity of the 
workforce; it economizes on time spent in production; and 
finally, it encourages innovation through the need to 
improve the abridgement of labour involved in the constit­
uent manufacturing activities. The resultant reductions 
in direct labour input per unit of output to cumulative 
output have been variously described as : measures of 
experience, learning curves, and progress functions.
Whatever term is used however, they all reflect temporal 
changes of irreversible knowledge. Technological develop­
ment in this sense is, therefore, the inculcation by the 
workers of increases in the skill and general ability in 
performing their tasks; it is usually considered as dis­
embodied technical progress. The exogenous nature of the 
concept has been succinctly described by W. Hirsch :
.., "They [progress functions] are dynamic cost functions 
and are distinctly different from conventional long-run 
cost functions which are timeless or assume stability in 
technical knowledge. A conventional long-run cost function 
is related to points on a number of production functions, 
each being associated with a different plant, but all plants 
using the same general technical knowledge. By contrast, 
a progress function is related to points on different 
production functions which are arranged in chronological 
order so that technological knowledge is permitted to
change while the size of the plant and scale of production
56either do not change or do not affect costs." Clearly then, 
the residual in a production function must to some degree 
reflect the extent of learning-by-doing. Although the 
most notable studies on the empirical verification of the
57concept have centred on firms with homogenous type output
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there have also been others which have sought evidence on 
the impact of progress functions in ship-building and 
machine tools.Unfortunately, for the purposes of this 
study, no easy means existed to identify the contribution 
of this element to the technological development of the 
Indian machine tool industry.
The second component of industrial learning is the 
more obvious one of education; this is the widely accepted 
interpretation of knowledge that both Denison and Schultz 
had in mind when conducting their studies. The importance 
that Indian manufacturers of machine tools have placed on 
this aspect was assessed by enquiring the minimal level 
of formal education, if any, that was required for their 
direct workers. Table 54 shows the response to this question
Table 54 t Minimum Level of Education Required by the
Machine Tool Firms for their Machine Operatives
Scale
(1)
Firms
(2)
Row { % )  of (2) 
(3)
None 12 30.0
High School 
Certificate 10 25.0
Engineering College 
(I.T.I.) 18 45.0
Post Graduate 
Qualifications
Valid Cases 40 100.0
Missing Cases -
Sample 40
Source : The Indian Machine Tool Industry Survey (1978)
It can be seen from the table that the most important 
educational attribute in the view of the manufacturers 
is graduation from one of the government sponsored 
industrial training institutes (ITIs) which are scattered 
throughout India. Post-graduate qualifications, on the
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other hand, have no part to play in the required educational 
level of productive workers. But while high school cert­
ificates were required by 25 per cent of the establishments, 
amazingly 30 per cent asked for no qualifications at all; 
these latter companies were usually in the small scale 
sector where on-the-job training was the normal and accepted 
way of doing things.
Although the ITI training schemes have been afforded 
most favoured status by the machine tool firms which 
responded to the question, their effectiveness at raising 
the capabilities of the workers has been criticised by the 
NCST Report; it had this to say : ... "One of the major 
impediments to rapid technological advancement has been 
the lack of good facilities for training skilled workers. 
Productivity too has remained at low levels because of this. 
The shortcoming can be traced to the industrial training
institutes from which the present crop of skilled workers
59comes." But the institutionalized engineering centres 
need not be the only source of worker education : firms 
can possess their own training schools. It was felt 
relevant, therefore,to seek information from the sample 
enterprises regarding the provision of their own technical 
training programmes. The replies are contained in Table 55.
Table 55 : The Provision of Technical Training by the
Machine Tool Units for their Machine Operatives
Scale
(1)
Firms
(2)
Row ( % )  of (2 ) 
(3)
None 18 45.0
Company Training 
S chool 4 10.0
Engineering College 
Courses (ITI) 18 45.0
Valid Cases 40 100.0
Missing Cases -
Sample 40
Source : The Indian Machine Tool Industry Survey (1978)
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Evidently, only 10 per cent of the companies surveyed 
supplemented the industrial knowledge of their workers 
through the provision of company training schools. These 
units will naturally have been the major undertakings in 
the industry; it is only they that possess the numbers of 
employees to make investment into such facilities worth­
while and, moreover, could afford the costs that would be 
involved. The remainder, being the small and medium sized 
companies, would perforce have to rely on the maligned 
ITls for the training of their workers.
The contemporary significance given to the role of 
education in the process of economic growth derives from 
the numerous studies of its importance in the advanced 
countries. The inference that has been promulgated from 
these studies pinpoints the low quality of human capital 
in the developing countries as being the major brake on the 
absorption of physical capital and hence technological 
progress. Although an attractive explanation for the 
retardation in the levels of industrialization in the third 
world, its importance should not be overstated. The aim 
of this study has been to show that the efficiency in the 
production of capital goods is at least as critical though 
certainly more disregarded an element in economic development 
as the act of capital formation itself. In as much as 
investment in human capital can assist in the amelioration 
of productive efficiency then it should be accorded 
preferential treatment by governments and manufacturers.
But it should be stressed, the issue constitutes just one 
aspect of the problem and on its own will not be able to 
supply the key to the conundrum that is economic development.
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Chapter 6 
Summary and Appraisal
The purpose of this final chapter is to provide an 
overview on the theoretical and empirical analysis under­
taken in the preceding pages. The study itself is an 
attempt at correcting the unaccountable gap in the knowledge 
of one of India's most important industries; it is both a 
review of the existing literature on the role of the machine 
tool industry in the process of industrialization and a 
preliminary attempt at further conceptual development. In 
a work of this type, however, it is only possible at best 
to scratch the surface of the complex set of issues involved. 
Nevertheless, a stage has now been reached where there is a 
need to gather together some of the various threads that have 
been spun through the text in an effort to make a concluding 
statement regarding the identification of the observed and 
potential motive forces as do bear upon machine tool 
manufacturing practices in India. Before offering the 
results and an appraisal of the industry's economic per­
formance it might be useful if the theoretical reasoning 
of the first two chapters is brought together and briefly 
outlined.
(i) Theoretical Review
The search for ways and means of 'evolving' or 
adapting technology so that it relates more closely to 
the requirements of the developing countries is a major 
issue in world policy forums. Actuating this search is 
a profound concern with the economic development 
of these countries coupled with the recognition that the 
simple emulation of Western production techniques and 
practices has not led to the high rate of growth in 
employment and output that was at first thought possible.
A major plank to the argument that the transference of
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advanced foreign technology is beneficial to the developing 
countries was based on the premise that latecomers to the 
industrialization process were at an advantage because they 
could exploit the technical progress that had already been 
accumulated elsewhere. There is probably a major weakness 
to such reasoning in that successful industrialization is 
not achieved merely through the implantation of sophisticated 
machinery; the acquisition of the ability to originate and 
sustain appropriate technological progress is also required. 
This and other reasons for the establishment of indigenous 
machine tool capacity were given in Chapter 1.
The origins of mass production of machine tools in 
India began with the establishment of the public sector 
company, HMT, in 1956. Since the inception of the industry 
it has been argued that machine tool manufacture has followed 
a pattern of development that is characteristic of the 
methods and practices in Western countries. The principal 
feature of production under this type of industrial philosophy 
is the emphasis given to product-innovation ; its importance 
stemming from the nexus between the machine tool branch and 
its customers in the machine building industry. Specifically, 
there are two motivational pressures for the machine tool­
makers to innovate and these come into play in correspondence 
with the opposing extremes of cyclical activity in the 
demand for their products. In broad form, the theoretical 
basis of these two external motivations to innovate derive 
from the analysis of two economists: W. Brown and N. Rosenberg 
The indeterminancy between the approaches of these authors 
regarding the timing of innovation can be resolved to a 
great extent by the assumption which underpins both theories: 
'the desire to maintain or acquire monopoly profits'. As 
such, a synthesis of the two models becomes possible with 
the resultant composite theory of innovation in machine 
tool production being termed the 'Brown-Rosenberg Paradigm'. 
This Western model emphasises innovation and capital 
replacement as the motive forces operating between the
—318 —
machine tool-users and the machine tool-makers in an 
economy.
It is fair to argue that India's machine tool industry, 
through foreign collaboration with Western machine tool 
companies, tended to follow conventional thinking and 
practices concerning the nature and production thereof of 
its products. On acceptance that this was the case, the 
question needs to be asked : what has been the operational 
significance of the Brown-Rosenberg paradigm under Indian 
industrial conditions? The minimal number of patents 
registered with India's indigenous machine tool producers 
since 1956 would seem to suggest that the model has had 
only limited validity in an economic environment characterised 
by a high degree of government penetration and low levels 
of competition, demand and product specialization. It seems 
evident that the type of industrial activity to which the 
Brown-Rosenberg paradigm relates is more likely the outcome 
of an 'evolutionary process'. The judgement that India, or 
any other developing country for that matter, can create 
conditions that are ripe for innovation, merely via the 
transplantation of foreign technology appears, therefore, 
to be erroneous.
It may be that the Soviet strategy of machine tool 
manufacture pursued in the thirties could have provided 
a more successful approach in a country where capital- 
saving ought initially to have been the dominant objective.
In fact, the essence of the Soviet 'model' was its pre­
occupation with the economising of capital. The development 
of the industry from an ex-post perspective was framed 
towards achieving very high levels of specialization, 
standardization and scale in the manufacture of a limited 
range of labour intensive products. Product innovation, 
save for the purposes of 'scaling-up', was accorded a much 
lower priority.
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The Soviet approach might also have been appropriate 
o India not only because both countries operated capital- 
foods led growth strategies and rigorous import-substitution 
irogrammes but also because both the Soviet Union and India 
ere characterised by the paucity of capital resources at 
he start of each country's industrialization drive, 
ierein lies the crucial feature of the Soviet model : the 
:oviet Union was interested in capital-saving, not purely 
n the realm of manufacturing basic labour-intensive 
tachine tools, nor it should be added, through the economies
0 be obtained in specialization as in the traditional view 
>f organizational practices, but through the economies of 
;cale also.
The machine building industry of the Soviet Union in 
he 1930s had to obtain its machine tools, which were 
characterised by their high labour intensity, from 
.ndigenous sources; there was never an overt policy to 
supply this sector with sophisticated producer equipment 
'rom abroad. This 'capital-stretching' philosophy made 
food sense in two important respects: firstly, the various 
Soviet metal-working industries were supplied with technology 
hat was appropriate to the factor proportions of their 
îconomy at that time - secondly, because of the economies 
>f scale and specialization involved in the mass production 
>f standardized tools, increases in the labour productivity 
)f the Soviet machine tool industry became consistent with
1 lower K/O ratio. The significance of this model of machine 
lool manufacture should not go unnoticed: not only were the 
Soviets able to lay a mechanized base to their economy in
h e  shortest possible time, but they did it in a capital- 
saving way. Consequently, technological progress Soviet 
style was a combination of capital saving influences which 
Lncluded both high operational efficiency in the machine 
:ool branch with appropriate technical change in the machine 
Duilding industry.
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(ii) Evaluation of Goal Performance
In consonance with the philosophy of a capita1-goods 
led growth strategy, the Indian machine tool industry 
developed in accordance with three principal goals of 
industrialization: rapid growth of output, technological 
self-sufficiency, and high operational efficiency; the 
first two factors have been explicit objectives whilst the 
third, although implicit, must necessarily also have been 
a priority aim of the authorities. The performance of 
the machine tool industry in respect of each of these three 
goals was analysed in detail in three separate chapters.
But to assist in an overall judgement on the progress that 
has been made, a resume of the main findings of these 
chapters is now presented.
Growth
There is no question that an enormous expansion in 
machine tool capacity has been successfully achieved.
Before 1956, there was hardly an industry to speak of, 
with indigenous production barely above 1,000 machine 
tools annually. Since the inauguration of HMT Ltd., 
however, India's machine tool output grew rapidly : between 
1960 and 1974, the annual average increase in the production 
of tools was 10.8 per cent as against 6.7 per cent for all 
industrial production. In addition, there was also a 
rapid change in the structure of this output; the industry, 
and HMT in particular, achieved in an extraordinary short 
space of time the capability to manufacture a very wide 
range of machine tool products. Today, HMT is one of the 
world's ten largest machine tool houses, manufacturing the 
world's widest range of machine tools. This spectacular 
growth in capacity has been helped a great deal by the 
favourable institutional environment of the Indian market. 
Government policy provided a rigorous regulatory framework 
within which companies had to operate; a major feature of 
the system being the legal requirement that the import of
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machine tools was prohibited if a similar model could be 
obtained from domestic sources. But, although growth has 
been rapid, it is not to state that the development of the 
industry has therefore been smooth. Efficiency has been 
lost because many of the larger concerns have internalised 
activities which are usually undertaken by the ancillary 
industries in the 'mature' economies of the Western countries. 
There have also been low levels of standardization of 
components which, coupled with small batches or even one-off 
methods of production, has meant that lower scales of 
output than possible have been attained. The low level of 
absorption of machine tools has been confirmed by the need 
for most credit in the machine tool industry to be used 
for variable capital rather than in the replacement of 
capital stock, over two-thirds of which is now between 10 
to 15 years of age. The inherent difficulty with such a 
poor organisation of production is that a high cost/price 
structure of output will be encouraged.
Technological Self-Sufficiency
The underdeveloped countries come up against a severe 
external obstacle to growth : their capacity to import lags 
behind their needs, for economic development brings in its 
wake a rise in import requirements. The need for the 
indigenous production of capital goods is brought out by 
the meagre 2 to 3 per cent growth in the third world 
countries' capacity to import machinery between 1954 and 1977. 
India recognised this problem very early on; indeed, one of 
the aims of the two-sector growth policy was to rid the 
country of its dependence on imported technology. In the 
case of machine tools, and notwithstanding the 'captive' 
nature of the domestic market, India's surge in the self- 
sufficiency of machine tool manufacture was perhaps even 
more remarkable than the growth in output : by 1975, the 
country was 78 per cent self-sufficient in its machine tool 
requirements. The existence of a strict foreign trade 
control regime was a considerable help to the industry in
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achieving this degree of diversification. There is evidence, 
however, that import substitution possibilities have begun 
to dry up. The machine tool industry has been aware of this 
and has attempted to compensate for the slackening in 
domestic demand by turning its attention to the export market 
As a result, there has been a fairly fast growth in exports 
of machine tools, especially to the industrialized countries 
though not insignificantly to the semi-industrialized 
countries as well. The evidence that companies have operated 
a discriminatory pricing policy favourable to machine tool 
exports is inconclusive.
Efficiency
In respect of the 1960-74 period, the capital-intensity 
of the machine tool sector's manufacturing processes 
increased by either 2.4 per cent or 4,3 per cent annually; 
the difference depending on whether labour, the denominator 
in the relation, is measured in terms of wages or workers.
The increase in the K/L index was reflected in the machine 
tool industry's productivity coefficients over the same 
period; there was, however, a wide disparity between the 
main indexes : whilst the 0/K ratio grew by only 1.7 per 
cent over each 3 year period, the 0/E index on the other 
hand, increased much more rapidly at 11 per cent per period. 
The far superior growth of labour productivity derives 
from the development path the machine tool industry chose 
to follow. To be specific, a crucial contra-distinction 
lies between the Soviet strategy of machine tool production 
in the 1930s and the traditional model based on Western 
practices : in the former country, characterised by low- 
income and capital scarcity, it was capital productivity 
that was maximised; by contrast, in the rich, labour-scarce 
countries (and India, also), it was labour productivity 
that was held to be of a premium. Alongside the dramatic 
growth in the labour productivity of India's machine tool 
industry there was also a concomitant rise in the wages of 
the workers. At a more aggregative level, the index of
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value added to combined inputs indicated that the growth in 
'efficiency* had been low, though positive, at an annual 
average of 1.5 per cent. The situation improves when 
technological progress in the industry's production function 
is isolated and measured over the period 1961-74, growing 
annually by 2,9 per cent. Low levels of capacity utilization 
appeared to be a continual problem. Some 70 per cent of the 
companies in the sample were operating beneath what they 
themselves regarded as a 'normal' level of capacity. 
Efficiency in production was found to be hampered by 
another factor; the increasing prevalence of industrial 
unrest. The level of resources devoted to research, 
development, and design was also revealed. From the survey: 
60 per cent of companies showed no commitment to research 
and development, and 70 per cent had only one person in the 
way of design staff. The natural corollary to this low 
research and development input was the dire output of 
patented-innovation from the branch : only 3 out of 38 
respondent firms holding a patent. The level of interaction 
between the manufacturers and the Central Machine Tool 
Institute (70 per cent of companies had had no contact) was 
poor; the strength of the relations with the universities 
was also low (no contact by 65 per cent of the firms); and 
the level of contact with external research bodies (50 
per cent) consolidated this unsatisfactory state of affairs. 
Finally, from a schematic examination of the importance of 
education and training in the industry, it was found that 
the Industrial Training Institutes had an important role 
to play in the training of engineering personnel, though 
they had attracted some criticism in relation to the quality 
of tuition provided.
(iii) A Critical Appraisal
This study has been concerned with examining the 
technological development of India's machine tool industry. 
Major emphasis has been given to efficiency in the operations 
of the branch because as a 'core' sector it has the ability
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to effect cost savings that percolate throughout the rest 
of the machine-building industries. In Chapter 1, a Soviet 
'model* of machine tool manufacture was constructed which 
acted as a framework of reference for the evaluation of 
the productive organization of India's tool sector. The 
Soviet model of the 1930s was held to be apposite to India 
in the 1950s because both economies at the start of their 
respective industrialization drives were characterized by 
a profound scarcity of capital. In addition, both the 
Soviet and Indian central authorities had embarked upon 
programmes of planned industrialization through rigorous 
import substitution regimes on the basis of 'closed-market’ 
economies.
Further to this, a detailed discussion was presented 
in Chapter 2 on the mechanics of the traditional approach 
to machine tool manufacture in the West; the path which 
India in actuality was adjudged to have followed. Here, 
a dual-hypothesis was advanced on (i) the appropriateness 
of the Soviet approach whatever the particular circumstances 
of India's development were, against (ii) that the Soviet 
model would not have been a rational strategy for India in 
the light of the various divergent conditions in the economy 
that would have impaired the efficiency of the model's 
operation.
It should be said immediately, however, that great 
caution needs to be exercised in the interpretation of 
data based on what has to be described as a highly 
generalised hypothetical scenario. Although there were 
symmetrical policy approaches to the development of both 
the Soviet and Indian economies there was also much 
(largely unquantifiable) incongruence in other important 
matters ; the divergent levels of industrialization in 
both countries at the start of planning; differences in 
skill and technology; the degree of autarchy imposed; the 
comparative size of effective demand; and the relative 
importance of agricultural output and cyclical demand in
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the two countries, are amongst the more significant factors 
which can be mentioned. It also has to be recognised that 
the Soviet tool industry in the 1930s faced a period of 
prolonged demand for its products not only in support of the 
rapid mechanization taking place in the Russian economy 
but also from the massive build-up of capacity that was 
simultaneously occurring in the ordnance factories at that 
time. The situation was somewhat different for India in 
the fifties and sixties where machine tool absorption after 
an initial spurt was critically affected by periodic down­
turns in the level of investment in the engineering industries; ar 
the fragility of agricultural production frequently undermined 
the Indian Government's ability to secure adequate investment 
resources for industry. Couple this with the damaging 
effects of the recession in the latter half of the 1950s 
and it becomes clear that the comparative framework of 
analysis sketched out in Chapter 2, possesses quite 
fundamental defects.
Over and above the deficiencies of analysing comparative 
Soviet and Indian development, there exists a weakness in 
the argument that India's (traditional) machine tool strategy 
has 'failed*. The prime mover of the Western approach of 
machine tool production is the primacy that is given to 
innovation in the creation of fresh markets to stimulate 
demand. Thus, an indicator of the 'success* of this strategy 
is obviously the level of patent registrations achieved.
The fact that it has been shown that India's machine tool 
sector had obtained only minimal patents since 1956 appears 
at first sight to suggest that the Brown-Rosenberg paradigm - 
the theoretical foundation to the Western model - has broken 
down under Indian conditions. But are patents an adequate 
signal that technological progress has taken place in a 
developing country environment? Discussion in Chapter 5, 
suggests that they are not. Much technological progress 
has clearly taken place in India's machine tool branch.
HMT, for instance, possesses a consultancy wing which is 
vigorously, and successfully, engaged in exporting the
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accumulated skills and expertise of its workforce to other 
industrializing countries. Other companies in the industry 
have been actively imitating, adapting, and modifying 
technology on a more or less continual basis. All of this 
acquired and assimilated learning is not reflected in formal 
patented-innovation but it must be accepted that it is, 
nevertheless, technical progress.
Given all these qualifications to an enquiry of 
whether a Soviet strategy of production might have proven 
to be of value to the development of India's machine tool 
industry, the reader might be forgiven for wondering the 
continued relevancy of the exercise. There are nonetheless 
some important benefits which can be identified. Evidence 
does exist that the Soviet Union's machine tool sector did
develop very rapidly by producing simple, general-purpose
2machme tools. In the Soviet Union the technical level of 
machine tools changed over time in almost imperceptible 
degrees in accordance with the gradual progression of 
technical specifications required in the machine building 
industry. This structure of output mirrored the demands 
from the machine tool branch's customers and was appropriate
to the factor-proportions of the Soviet economy at that
3time. Not only was this a capital-saving form of development 
from the product-side but it allowed for capital-saving on 
the process-side also through the possibility of obtaining 
economies of scale. Previously, the advantages of scale 
in machine tool production had always been regarded as 
insignificant but now they could be seen to be of quite 
major importance.^ Finally, the fact that the Soviet machine 
tools of the thirties were simple and were produced in long- 
production runs meant that the final product was inexpensive 
for the machine builders to purchase; this gave added impetus 
to the laying of a mechanized base to the Soviet economy.
To specifically argue that each of the alleged 
advantages of the Soviet model would have benefited India's 
tool sector would require a far too liberal sprinkling of 
normative supposition. Additional research (if feasible) 
would be needed to substantiate the validity of such claims. 
The fact is that 'appropriateness' in one economy at one
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stage in time might equal 'inappropriateness* in another 
economy at a later time. Further, the costs of adapting 
standard tools to suit the requirements of individual 
manufacturers would also need to be taken into account. 
Notwithstanding the inconvenience involved to the users of 
the machine tools the costs of adaption might well be 
onerous, significantly affecting the low cost/price advantages 
derived from mass production of standardized machinery. The 
ability to draw firm conclusions is also impaired by the lack
of knowledge on projected levels of demand at particular
5prices. It must be frankly acknowledged that to all extents 
and purposes the above information has been unobtainable.
Looking directly at the results of the empirical 
investigation of India's performance in the manufacture of 
machine tools there is, in fact, much to be commended.
Growth in output value has been highly satisfactory and the 
goal of self-sufficiency has also been successfully achieved. 
Efficiency in production has been a more problematical 
area of analysis; nonetheless, it can be said that labour 
productivity has been rapid and technical progress has 
grown at a positive level of around 3 per cent since the 
early 1960s, However, the industry's profit record has not 
been good with many years showing a negative level of profit.^ 
But most of these losses were incurred during the recessionary 
years of the late sixties and it is therefore dangerous to 
draw firm conclusions from this sort of evidence. It is 
also difficult to be dogmatic concerning the generally held 
belief of the high price of India's machine tools. There 
exists much anecdotal comment on this subject but little 
hard empirical fact. The present study attempted to obtain 
cost/price data on the production of equivalent machines 
in the domestic Indian market and abroad but unfortunately 
efforts in this direction were unsuccessful. Therefore, 
a judgement on this highly important point is not possible 
and clearly undermines the ability of this final chapter 
to make definitive conclusions on the efficiency of India's 
machine tool branch.
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There may veil be some elements of the Soviet model 
which could have had an important part to play in the 
development of India's tool sector; indeed, they may still 
have relevance today, e.g. scale and standardization 
effects. However, the inefficiency of the import sub­
stitution system under which the industry had to operate
7must surely have nullified much of the benefits to be obtained. 
Thus, perhaps the most that can be said is that neither 
hypothesis can be put forward as being the most appropriate.
The actual development of the Indian industry has under 
the circumstances been dynamic and whether 'selective* 
components of the Soviet strategy could have improved 
upon this performance remains an open question.
Alternatively, it might be argued that the hypothesis 
regarding the appropriateness of the Soviet model in India's 
machine tool sector was the correct one but it was framed 
under the wrong economic scenario. If, as Bhagwati and 
Desai have asserted, that Mahalanobis in the early fifties 
falsely assumed India faced a situation of 'stagnant 
export earnings' - the relevant strategy for the machine 
tool industry might have been one of specializing in the 
production of labour intensive machine tools for export 
(though built upon a sound domestic base) whilst importing 
the more limited demand for sophisticated machine tool 
technology. Thus, an export-oriented Soviet model of 
machine tool production could have been customized to fit 
the dynamic comparative advantage of India's tool sector.
The fact is that the changing pattern of comparative 
advantage has led many of the presently industrializing 
countries increasingly to export skill intensive commodities 
and the less developed countries to export unskilled 
labour-intensive commodities of the 'mature' type. The 
most advanced countries are tending to specialize in new,
*product-cycle', goods regardless of whether they are 
capital intensive or labour intensive. Thus, the expansion 
of manufactured trade of an intra-industrial character may 
have allowed India to have developed its machine tool
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operations by specializing within the branch according to 
its ‘revealed* comparative advantage.^ This pattern of 
specialization could have had, in turn, more favourable 
effects on resource allocation and economic growth than the 
import substitution regime actually followed. The recent 
growth in intra-industry trade amongst developing countries 
tends to lend support to such a conclusion.^
In many respects, this study has posed more questions 
than it has supplied answers. But it should be emphasised, 
that although the development experience of India’s machine 
tool sector is obviously of major importance to other 
developing countries in their attempts to foster indigenous 
capital goods capacity, the topic is a much neglected one 
in economic research. This study represents not only the 
first empirical examination but also, seemingly, the first 
study of any description on the industry. To repeat the 
statement contained in Chapter 2: 'There has never been a 
study on the development of the Indian machine tool industry' 
(p.84), To this extent, then, the project, due to the 
dearth of primary and secondary sources of information, has 
been a major exercise. It also means, of course, that the 
study should be doubly valuable. In this vein, the attempt 
of the study has been to open up discussion, rather than 
to settle it, in the hope that it makes interested parties 
in India, and indeed elsewhere, more aware of the vital 
importance of the issue and motivates them to make their 
own contribution to the debate.
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3. Even in the 7th-Plan Period (1959-65) of Soviet
industrialization, 70 per cent of aggregated 
machine tool orders were for universal, i.e. 
labour-using machines.
4. More recently a study has shown empirically that scale
economies are important in the realization of quite 
important cost reductions in the manufacture of 
machine tools. See C. Pratten : 'Economies of Scale 
For Machine Tool Production', Journal of Industrial 
Economics, Vol.19 (1970-71).
5. However, it is clearly true that at the end of the day
the price elasticity of demand for machine tools will 
be elastic. The decision to purchase machine tools 
comes under the special category of investment theory 
If the supply price of machine tools fall, there is 
an automatic improvement in the marginal efficiency 
of capital (MEG), so making investment to the 
businessman a more attractive proposition. This is 
an economic law as espoused by : Irving Fisher - 
'rate of return over cost*; Bohm-Bawerk - 'net 
productivity*; and, Keynes - 'marginal efficiency 
of capital*. Intuitively, machine tools possess an 
elastic demand schedule because the MEG = investment 
demand; both are in positive relation and a rise 
in the MEG will lead to a rise in demand. Thus 
graphically, at a given rate of interest, a fall 
in the supply-price of machine tools must improve 
the level of investment.
Price of
machine
tools
(reflecting a fall 
in interest rates)
Investment 
(Rs expenditure)
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6. It may be assumed that this has been caused by poor
performance of HMT and the other smaller public 
sector companies. Although HMT as a unit is a 
highly profitable industrial enterprise, profit 
figures for just its machine tool manufacturing 
business have never been published; in fact, this 
aspect of HMT's operations now account for only 
40 per cent of the company’s total output value. 
Clearly, if it were the private sector firms 
which were losing money this would be reflected 
by their departure from the industry; this has not 
occurred (according to ASI figures). Public sector 
companies can remain in business by (i) government 
subsidizing the losses, and/or (ii) the transfer 
of surpluses from other more profitable lines of 
production.
7. Some writers argue that in the short-run indigenous
technology will be more expensive than imported 
technology but that these expenses are necessary if 
indigenous technology is to develop. For review 
of the literature, see D. Crane : 'Technological 
Innovation in Developing Countries ; A Review of 
the Literature', Research Policy, 5, (1977), 
pp.374-395.
8. S. Lall : 'Developing Countries as Exporters of
Industrial Technology', Research Policy, 9,
(1980), p.26.
9. See, B. Belassa : 'Trade in Manufactured Goods i
Patterns of Change', World Development, Vol.9,
No.3, (March 1981).
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APPENDIX 2
The Questionnaires To The 
Indian And British Machine 
Tool Industry Surveys
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A SURVEY OF MACHINE TOOL MANUFACTURERS 
IN THE ORGANISED SECTOR OF INDIA
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC STUDIES 
UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW - U.K.
(1) Questionnaire No.____________________
(2) Year of Initial Production__________
(3) Period of Accounting Year___________
Please tick the space adjoining the code number appropriate 
to your Company.
TYPE OF ORGANISATION :
(1
(2
(3
(4
(5
(6
(7
Individual Proprietorship 
Partnership : Joint Family 
Partnership : Others 
Public Limited Company 
Private Limited Company 
Public Corporation 
Others (please specify)
TYPE OF OWNERSHIP :
(1) Central Government
(2) Private Enterprise
(3) Foreign Owned
(4) Parastatal Enterprise
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INDEX
This form of return is divided into three parts :
Part A : Introduction and Definitions of terms used.
Part B : Techno-Economic Data
I. Information on Employment 
II. Production Data 
III. Technology and Production Organisation 
IV. Analysis of Capacity Utilization 
V. Information on Research and Development 
VI. Miscellaneous Data
Part C Î Topics for Discussion with Company Representatives
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p a r t a  : INTRODUCTION AND DEFINITIONS OF TERMS USED
INTRODUCTION :
To secure increases in the standard of life for her 
people India has, since the early 1950's, embarked upon an 
ambitious programme of industrialization. Initial develop­
ment centred around the Mahalanobis policy of a rapid 
build-up in capacity. The emphasis was on the expansion 
of those industries which contributed most quantitatively 
to the growth of investment goods capacity e.g. the iron 
and steel industry, which to a great extent was achieved 
through the use of foreign technology.
Recent planning periods have moved more towards the 
goal of "Self-sufficiency" articulated through the 
Government’s import-substitution programme. This change 
in emphasis provided the Indian producer durable goods 
industries with the opportunity to influence the technological 
character of the manufacturing sector. How. far these 
industries were and are able to meet this challenge turns 
ultimately on their ability to design and produce machinery 
which caters to the specifications of domestic industry; 
to some extent it must also prove viable and competitive 
in international markets.
Within this general schema the machine-builders and 
especially those manufacturing machine tools have a 
significant responsibility to ensure that "indigenisation" 
is successfully achieved. The following factors suggest 
the importance of this industry :
(i) As the economic health of the machine tool industry
is inexorably linked to the level of industrialization : 
the demand for machine tools is positively related to 
economic growth, it is necessary to ensure that machine 
tool manufacturers operate as close as is possible to
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optimal efficiency. Improvements in the operating 
efficiency of machine tool production will, through 
an economic ’rippling effect’, raise the marginal 
efficiency of capital in the rest of the machine 
using sectors. This, in turn, should have favourable 
repercussions on investment opportunity and hence also 
on the pace of industrialization.
(ii) The machine tool industry may be looked upon as 
constituting a pool or reservoir of skills and 
technical knowledge which are employed throughout 
the entire machine using sectors of the economy. 
Because these skills and techniques are developed in 
response to the demands of specific customers and as 
the machine tool industry deals with processes and 
problems common to an increasing number of industries 
the sector may be described as a transmission centre 
in the diffusion of new technology. Moreover, this
pattern peculiar to the machine tool industry,i.e.
the distribution of its sales to all other machine
building industries, has, if viewed from a long-term 
criteria, a significant impact on the degree of 
’technological cross-fertilization'. That is, the 
original innovation in the machine tool industry’s 
product induces increased competition among firms 
comprising the markets for machine tools and may 
thereby influence further innovation in the tool 
industry, to the benefit of all machine-makers.
(iii) It is arguably preferable that India develops
indigenously her own machine technology because 
special consideration can then be given to the 
design and manufacture of techniques most appropriate 
to the economic conditions prevailing within the 
domestic economy. Imported technology is expensive 
in terms of the high opportunity costs of foreign 
exchange and further, it may conflict with internal
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employment generation policies as foreign machinery 
is invariably capital-intensive.
This survey which is being undertaken by a doctoral 
student at the University of Glasgow’s Department of 
International Economic Studies, forms the basis to a study 
which will examine the techo-economic aspects of the 
Indian Machine Tool Industry. It will be an independent 
and impartial analysis of the industry’s development 
performance since India began its industrialization drive 
in the mid-fifties. Your Company as a member of the machine 
tool industry is asked to participate in the survey in which 
either through an interview or postal contact your co-operation 
will be sought for completion of Part B - the questionnaire.
In conclusion it should, of course, be emphasised that
all returns will be treated in the strictest confidence.
D EFINITIONS OF TERMS USED
The terms used in questions which correspond to the 
Government of India’s ’Annual Survey of Industries’ 
questionnaire have definitions equivalent to those found 
in the Annual Survey’s Memorandum on Definitions, Concepts 
and Procedure. Some further definitions which may prove 
helpful are given below :
Accounting Year :
Information furnished in all questions of this
return should relate, unless otherwise stated,
to the accounting year of the company : closing 
on any day between 1st April, of each year and 
31st March of the subsequent year.
Direct Labour :
The term ’direct labour’ is defined as workers 
employed directly or through any agency but 
excluding persons holding positions of management
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or supervision or employed in a confidential 
position. Whether for wages or not, in any 
manufacturing process or in cleaning any part 
of the machinery or premises used for manufacturing 
process, or in any other kind of work incidental to, 
or connected with the manufacturing process, or the 
subject of the manufacturing process.
Man/Days Worked :
The total number of man/days worked during the 
accounting year for each category of employees is 
to be obtained by summing up the number of persons 
attending in each shift over all the shifts worked 
(including overtime) on all days.
Salaries, Wages etc. :
The amount of wages, salaries paid during the 
accounting year should be entered gross, i.e. before 
deductions of taxes, provident fund, employees' State 
Insurance contributions, etc.
Gross Value of Plant and Machinery :
Total original (undepreciated) price for installed 
plants and machinery as at the end of the accounting 
year.
Electricity Produced and Sold :
The book value will be shown in case of supply to 
concerns under the same ownership, and market value 
in other cases,
Sales
Costs
The total invoiced value of the products sold.
The total costs of producing a particular model 
(including direct labour/material and overhead costs) 
but before the addition of the manufacturer's margin.
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PART B : TECHNO-ECONOMIC DATA
I . INFORMATION ON EMPLOYMENT
(1) In the table provided below please indicate the average
number of workers employed by your firm in each of the
occupational categories and as far as possible, their
total emoluments for the years specified,
ACCOUNTING YEAR
1974/75 1975/76 1976/77
Employ­
ment
Classifi­
cation
Av.no, Sal- 
of ary, 
per- Wages 
sons 
worked
Av.no.
of
Bonus per­
sons 
worked
Sal — 
ary. 
Wages
Av.no. Sal- 
of ary.
Bonus per- Wages Bom 
sons 
worked
Direct 
labour : 
Skilled 
Semi­
skilled 
Unskilled 
Apprentice 
Other
-
TOTAL
Indirect 
labour ; 
Managerial 
Sk Supervy 
All other 
(Admin. 
etc. )
'
TOTAL
GRAND TOTAL
(l)(b) How many workers are employed in the following
(i) Inspection
(ii) Research & Development
(iii) Design
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(2) How many shifts are currently being worked at your 
firm? If more than one please complete the table 
in (3), otherwise go straight to (4),
1 _____
Shifts 2 _____
3
(3) Please indicate in the table below the number of your 
employees according to this employment classification 
who are employed on each shift.
Length of shift : ______  hours
Employment
classification
A v .N o . of 
employees 1
Shift
2 3
1) Direct labour
2) Managerial & Supervy.
3) All other
(Sub-totals)
TOTAL
(4) Please provide information on time lost (man/days) for 
the calendar years 1974-76 inclusive. Data should be 
readily available on time lost through absenteeism but 
it would also prove helpful if estimates can be given 
for man/days lost through the effects of strikes.
EMPLOY- 1974 1975 1976
JMÜiM i Man/ Man/ Man/ Man/. Man/ Man/ Man/ Man/ Man/
O JL —
FICA- days days days days days days days days days
T'T nNT worked lost lost worked lost lost work - lost losti UiM due due to due due ed due due
to ab­ stri­ to ab­ to to to
sence kes sence stri­ ab­ stri
kes sence kes
Direct
labour
(5) Is all or part of your company's labour force unionised?
If yes, please answer questions (6) and (7), otherwise
go straight to (8).
Yes 1
No 2
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(6) Please state the number of trade unions operating 
in your company.
No. of unions
1 ___
2 ____
3_______
4 ____
5 ____
6 ____
7_______
(7) What percentage of your company's labour force is 
unionised?
%
0 1
1-24 2
25-49 3
50-74 4
75-99 5
100 6
(8)(a) What minimum level of technical education does your 
company require of its machine operatives?
None 1 ____
High School Cert. 2 ____
Engineering college (I.T.I.) 3_______
Post-Grad, Qualifications 4_______
Other (please specify) 5_______
(8)(b) What form of technical training does your company 
provide for its machine operatives?
None 1 ____
Company Training School 2 ____
Engineering college course 3
(I.T.I.)
Other (please specify) 4
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II. PRODUCTION DATA :
(9) For the years specified, please supply information on 
the volume and value of sales for each of the major 
models in your company's range.
ACCOUNTING YEARS
Code
1974/75 1975/76 1976/77
Product (leave Vol- Va- Unit Vol- Va- Unit Vol- Va- Unit
Group blank) ume lue price ume lue price ume lue Price
(10) For the years specified, please supply data on either
unit or total costs of production for each of the major 
models in your company's range.
ACCOUNTING YEARS
Code
1974/75 1975/76 1976/77
Product
Group
(leave 
blank)
Unit Total 
cost cost
Unit Total 
cost cost
Unit Total 
cost cost
3 4 5
(11)(a) In order that your company's value added component 
may be calculated, please supply the following data 
on total items of output and input. This information 
should be readily available as it may be extracted 
directly from your records relating to the Government's 
'Annual Survey of Industries' return.
ACCOUNTING YEARS (Rupees)
Output 1974/75 1975/76 1976/77
(1) Products and By-products 
manufactured during each 
year.(Block 14-item 20)
(2) Output other than those 
reported in Block 14. 
(Block 12-item 7)
(3) Total Output
Input
(4) Materials consumed during 
each year (Block 13-item 
22)
(5) Fuel and lubricant consumed 
during each year (Block 9- 
item 14)
(6) Other items of input con­
sumed during each year. 
(Block 10-item 7)
(7) Cost of non-industrial 
services rendered by 
others (Block 11-item 7)
(8) Total Input
(9) Depreciation during each 
year
(10) Total input plus
depreciation ((B)+(9))
(11) Value added = ((3)-(10))
N.B. The figures within the brackets relate to the relevant 
section in the 'Annual Survey's' return.
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(11)(b) Additional data from your company's 'Annual Survey 
of Industries' records.
ACCOUNTING YEARS (Rupees)
1974/75 1975/76 1976/77
(1) Employees other benefits 
(Block 8B-Column 4 - 
total of items 1-4)
(2) Quantity of electricity 
produced (Block 12- 
item 8-Col,2)
1974/75 1975/76 1976/77
(3) Quantity of electricity 
produced and sold 
(Block 12-item 9 - 
Col.2)
(4) Quantity of electricity 
purchased (Block 9 - 
item 11 - Col.4)
(12) What percentage of your 
and export markets for
company's output went 
the years specified?
ACCOUNTING YEARS
to home
Sales analysis by market 1974/75 1975/76 1976/77% % %
Home
Export (Please list the 
major countries)
Other
TOTAL 100 100 100
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(13)(a) The tables below have regard to your company's 
expenditure on plant and machinery for the years 
specified. For your convenience this information 
again relates to particular entries made in the 
'Annual Survey of Industries' questionnaire.
ACCOUNTING YEARS (Rupees)
1974/75 1975/76 1976/77
Value of additional investment
Own Own Own
cons­ cons­ cons-
Purchased truc­ To- Purchased true- To- Purchased true- To-
New Used tion tal New Used tion tal New Used tion tal
Plant
and
Machin­
ery
(Block
4-item
4-cols.
3,4,5
and 6)
(13)(b) ACCOUNTING YEARS (Rupees)
1974/75 1975/76 1976/77
Gross value of plant 
and machinery at 
accounting year end 
(Block 4- item 9)
(14) Please indicate the type of depreciation provision used 
by your company,
Historic (based on 
original price)
Replacement (based 
on market price)
(15) What is the percentage your company allows for the 
depreciation of its assets?
Assets
Land and building 
Plant and machinery 
Other (please specify)
%
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III. TECHNOLOGY AND PRODUCTION ORGANISATION
(16) With respect to their age, state the number of machine 
tools installed in your firm.
AGE (Years)
Installed Machinery yZg 11-15 16-20 21^25 25^
1)Lathes : a)G.P. )
b)Semi Auto)
c)Auto )
2)Milling Machines
3)Grinding, polishing 
and Finishing Machines
4)Shaping, Planing, 
Slotting and Broaching 
Machines
5)Drilling and Boring 
Machines
6)Gear and Thread cutting 
Machines
7)Cutting-off Machines
TOTAL
(17) What percentage of machine tools installed in your 
firm originate from home and foreign suppliers 
(please specify)
Machine tools installed %
Country of
origin 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
India
Foreign countries 
(Please specify)
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(18) Which type of investment criteria is used by your
company?
Payback period 1
Discounted cash flow 2
Other (please specify) 3
(19) Is it your company's strategy to acquire the latest, 
most sophisticated production technology?
In all cases 1________
Usually 2 ____
Never 3
(20) Does your company possess its own casting facilities?
Yes 1 ____
No 2
(21) Has your company introduced, or does it in the
foreseeable future envisage introducing, continuous 
flow techniques into its production organisation?
Yes 1 ____
No 2
(22) What progress has been made towards standardization 
of machine tool components?
Considerable 1_______
Limited 2 ____
None 3 ____
Planned 4
(2 3) Has your company pursued any policy involving the 
rationalization of material inputs?
Yes 1 ____
No 2_______
Planned 3
(2 4) Does your company regard the internal handling and 
transportation of material as essentially the 
province of labour-intensive activity?
Yes 1 ____
No 2
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(25) Please state the average batch size for each of the 
major models in your company's product range.
Model Batch Size
IV. ANALYSIS OF CAPACITY UTILIZATION
(26) Please indicate, for the years shown on a quarterly 
basis, your firm's actual output and also its 
theoretical (planned output given market conditions) 
and licensed capacity in value terms.
Actual Theoretical Licensed
Output capacity capacity
(1) (2) (3)
1974
1975
1976
1977
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
(27) Factors likely to limit your capital expenditure 
authorisations on buildings, plant and machinery 
over the next twelve months are listed below. If 
you tick more than one reason in part (b) or (c) 
it would be helpful if you could rank them in order 
of importance.
(a) I have adequate capacity to meet demand __
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(b) Although I have adequate capacity, I have 
also capital investment opportunities which 
would be profitable at the present cost of 
finance, but I shall not be undertaking some 
of them for the following reason(s) :
Shortage of internal finance 1 ____
Inability to raise external
finance 2________
Shortage of managerial/technical
staff 3________
Shortage of skilled labour 4 ____
Other (please specify) 5 ____
(c) My capacity is not adequate to meet expected
demand but I do not intend increasing my 
capacity. This is for the following reason(s)
Not profitable because of the
cost of finance 1
Shortage of internal finance 2
Inability to raise external
finance 3
Shortage of managerial/technical
staff 4
Shortage of skilled labour 5
Other (please specify) 6
(d) None of the above is applicable
(28) Is your present level of output below capacity (i.e 
are you working below a satisfactory full rate of 
operation)?
Yes 1
No 2
(29) Is it a deliberate part of your company's corporate 
strategy to maintain a proportion of productive 
capacity under-utilized in preparedness for a rapid 
expansion in demand?
Yes 1 ____
No 2
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V. INFORMATION ON RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
(30) For the accounting years listed and according to each 
heading, please indicate your company's expenditure 
on R & D .
R & D Expenditure
1974/75 1975/76 1976/77
Improvements of 
existing products
Development of 
new products
Other (please 
specify)
TOTAL
(31) Does your company possess a designing capability?
Yes 1 ____
No 2
(32) If the answer to (31) was no, then where do your 
designs originate?
i
From Indian design offices 1_______
From foreign sources 2___ ____
(33) In your view what is the average current life of machine 
tool designs in the field of production in which your 
company specialises?
Years
3 - 5 1
6 - 8 2
9 - 12 3
13 - 16 4
+ 16 5
(34) State the degree of contact your company has with 
Government or Independent research bodies?
Strong contact 1 j____
Weak contact 2 _____
No contact 3
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(35) What level of association has your company with 
engineering universities and/or university 
engineering departments?
Strong Association 1 ____
Weak Association 2 ____
No Association 3 ___
(36) Has your company ever taken advantage of the research 
facilities offered by the Central Machine Tool 
Institute?
Yes 1 ____
No 2
(37) Please state below the number and title of patents 
held by your company.
Title
0 1
1 2
2 3
3 4
4 5
5 6
+5 7
(38) Are you able to give an estimate for the total initial 
costs involved in developing a new machine tool for 
any of the major models your company manufactures?
Product name Initial cost
(39) What is your estimate of the initiation lag between 
the research stage of developing a new machine tool 
and actual production of that machine tool?
Initiation 
lag (months)
12 months 1
18 It 2
24 ti 3
30 4
36 "(and above) 5
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VI. MISCELLANEOUS DATA
(40) For 1976/77, what were your company’s sources of credit, 
stating also interest rates and credit limits?
Sources of Rate(s) of Credit
credit interest limits
(41) What percentage of your firm's total credit for 1976/77 
was allocated to the areas of business activity listed 
below :
Percentage
Destination 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Investment into 
fixed capital
Working capital
R & D
Other (please specify)
(42) From the list given below please indicate your company's 
assessment of the quality of components supplied by 
ancillary industries.
Low Quality 1
Good Quality 2
Excellent Quality 3
(43) To what extent does your company enjoy price economies 
in the purchase of material inputs?
Material input
Discount %
1-4 5-8 9-12 13-16 17-20
Castings
Pig Iron
H.S. Steel
Scrap
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(44) Does your firm seek to obtain economies from the 
sharing of its organisational resources, (i.e. 
advertising, marketing, casting) with other Indian 
concerns?
Yes 1 ____
No 2
(45) On a regular basis, does your company monitor the 
efficiency of its labour and capital inputs?
Do you monitor :
Labour 1 ____
Capital 2________
Both 3 ____
Neither 4
(46) Does your company have any technical assistance/ 
collaboration agreements with Indian or foreign 
machine tool manufacturers?
None 1 ____
Indian 2
Foreign 3
(Please specify)
Both 2 & 3 4
(47) In connection with collaboration agreements,what has 
been the cost, if any, to your company for royalties 
and licenses?
ACCOUNTING YEARS
Annual costs
1974/75 1975/76 1976/77
Royalties
Licenses
(48) Is there any restriction on the export of machine tool: 
which your company manufactures under a license from a 
foreign collaborator?
Yes
No
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(49) Is it your company's view that the machine tools it
manufactures under license from a foreign collaborator 
are models now obsolete in industrialized countries?
Yes ____
No
(50) What is the policy of your company with regard to
discounts on the export price of its machine tools?
It is company strategy to give 
price discounts because of :
the costs of breaking 1_______
into the market
increased profitability 
as the costs of marketing 
are greater than the costs 
of discounts 2 ____
smaller back-up services 
to distributors so 
reducing the private
cost of exports 3 ____
OR,
It is not company policy 
to give discounts on 
exports
PART C : TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION
During the interview and aside from the formal 
completion of Part B there are a number of issues of 
company policy which it is hoped will be examined, 
Informative discussion will be directed to the topics 
listed below which have been assembled under appropriate 
functional areas. (If your firm has been included in the 
postal survey your comments on these type of points will 
also be most welcome).
Manufacturing :
Methods of production 
Quality Control 
Shift working 
Price determination
Research and Development :
Scope and approach
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Marketing :
Policy in relation to the product-mix
Plans for export expansion
Sales forecasting and market research
Delivery periods
Spares service
Price discounts
General
Managerial skills 
Industrial relations 
Government policy :
Import controls 
Licensing arrangements 
Investment strategy 
Monetary and Fiscal policy
Ancillary industries 
Availability of Annual Reports
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A SURVEY OF SELECTED
BRITISH MACHINE TOOL MANUFACTURERS
Please indicate :
(i) Period of Accounting Year
(ii) Type of Company Organisation 
(iii) Type of Ownership ..........
July 1978
Ron G . Matthews 
Dept, of International 
Economic Studies 
University of Glasgow
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SECTION *A* Qualitative Information
1) How many workers are employed in the following 
department s ?
(i) INSPECTION
(ii) R.D.
(iii) DESIGN
2) How many shifts are currently being worked in your 
factory?
3) Please state the number of Trade Unions operating in 
your Company?
4) What percentage of your Company's labour force is 
unionised?
% : 1 - 2 4  25 - 49 50 - 74 75 - 99 100
5) What minimum level of technical education does your 
Company require of its machine operatives?
NONE :
G.E.C. :
UNIVERSITY DEGREE :
POST GRADUATE QUALIFICATIONS i 
OTHER (Please specify) :
6) What form of technical training does your Company
provide for its machine operatives?
NONE :
COMPANY TRAINING SCHOOL :
APPRENTICESHIP ;
ENGINEERING COLLEGE (day release etc.) :
OTHER (please specify) :
7) Has your Company introduced, or does it in the 
foreseeable future envisage introducing continuous 
flow techniques into its production organisation?
8) Does your Company possess its own casting facilities?
9) Is it the policy of your Company to regard the internal 
handling and transportation of material as essentially 
the province of labour intensive activity?
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10) Does your Company possess a designing capability?
11) In your view what is the average current life of 
machine tool designs in the field of production in 
which your Company specialises?
YEARS :
3 - 5
6 - 8
9 — 12
13 - 16
+ 16
12) Has your Company ever taken advantage of the library 
and/or research facilities available at P.E.R.A. or 
(please specify) any other similar establishment?
13) What level of association has your Company with 
engineering universities and/or university engineering 
departments ?
NO ASSOCIATION 
WEAK ASSOCIATION 
STRONG ASSOCIATION
14) What is your estimate of the "initiation lag" 
between the research stage of developing a new 
machine tool and actual production of that machine 
tool?
LAG (Months)
12 months 
18 
24 
30 
36
(and above)
15) Please state the number and title of patents held 
by your Company.
15) Does your Company monitor, on a regular basis, the 
efficiency of its labour and capital inputs?
Do you monitor t LABOUR :
CAPITAL :
BOTH :
NEITHER :
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17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26 
27
Is your Company's present level of output below
capacity? If the answer to this question is yes,
can you provide an estimate of capacity underutilization?
How does your Company market its products (e.g. directly, 
selling houses etc.)?
What is the policy of your Company regarding price 
discounts on exports?
Re : Foreign Collaboration
What were the main factors which prompted your Company 
to enter into collaboration with the Indian Concern?
In your view is/(was) the arrangement successful?
What major problem does/(did) your Company experience 
during the course of collaboration?
Would you agree that the machine tools your Indian 
partner manufacture(d) under license are/(were at 
that time) of obsolete design?
When the period of collaboration began was your Company 
still manufacturing these "licensed" machine tools?
What is (was) your opinion of the quality of your 
Indian Collaborator's output?
Why was the collaboration ended?
What advice would you offer to a foreign machine tool 
manufacturer who is contemplating entering into 
collaboration with an Indian Concern?
28) How optimistic are you regarding the development of 
the Indian machine tool industry?
SECTION *B* Quantitative Data
29) On the table provided overleaf please indicate the 
average number of workers employed by your firm in 
each of the occupational categories and as far as 
possible, their total emoluments for the years 
specified.
362
m
CTt
in
<±r^
COr^
COr^
<Nr^
o>
CM
r^
r^
G\
U tn CO 
cd 0) , p 
t-H bO +  q 
(d cd o
CO ;s W  pq
CO
g  q t  
îz: o oj 
iw CO AÏ 
• O P H
^  CO "TS
cd cu p
r-4 bO +  PÎ
Cd Cd o 
CO 13 ^  fp
CO
O 0 "O 
S  0 0} 
IW CO r!:d 
* O 1^ M
> OJ g  
<  PU Î3:
Î-I CO CO
cd cu p
rH bO +  q 
Cd Cd O 
CO Ï3 'w' PQ
CO
O 0 T) 
Z: o OJ 
iw m ri«i 
- O  Î-) 
> 0) g  
<  PU rs
M CO to 
cd OJ 0
i  3^+ §
CO !3 pq
CO
g  C t)
z: o OJ
iw CO ^  
• O Î-4 M
^  CO CO 
cd OJ 0 
I—4 bO + fU
cd cd o
CO }3 ' pq
CO
O a T3 
Z  O OJ 
(44 CO A:• a u u
> OJ g  
<  pu es
M CO CO 
Cd OJ 0 
rH bO +  0
Cd cd o 
CO 13 pq
to
O q T3 
Z  0 0}
(44 CO A:
' O H M
/—N
0
44
OJ
•S1
CO (44
OJ M4o Cd
•H 44
4J to
OJ H
H OJ
PU rC
PU 44
cd O
A t-4
T3 f-4
OJ cd
1-4
r 4 t
•i4 0
A : Cd
CO
§  ^
O
CO
T ) *r4
OJ >
1-4 u
r 4 OJ
»r4 puM 0
CO CO
. 1
•i4
B r-4
OJ cd
CO •Hu
•V OJ
t bO
OJ cd
r 4 n
rH cd
•H s
CO
CO
• • OJ
CO
OJ p
T3 1—4
0 Ü
r-H 0o •H
•H
PJ
H O
0 rO
O Cd
rO r4
Cd
rH 44
O
4J OJ
o H
OJ •t4
H
•r4 P
o M
t-4 CM
CM
8
M
O
f4
CJ
M pa
PC: 5
t-4 o
M
i
H
363
30) For the years specified please indicate the 
supplementary costs connected with the employment 
of your.company's total workforce.
1971/72 1972/73 1973/74 1974/75 1975/76 1976/77
Employment 
Related 
Costs e.g.
National 
Insurance etc.
31) Please provide information on time lost (man/days) for 
the calendar years 1971-76 inclusive. Data should be 
readily available on time lost through absenteeism but 
it would also prove helpful if estimates can be given 
for man/days lost through the effects of industrial 
unrest.
Calendar Years
DIRECT LABOUR ONLY 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
1) Man/Days 
Worked
2 ) Man/Days
Lost (Absence)
3) Man/Days
Lost (Strikes etc.)
4) Total Man/Days 
Lost
32) For the years specified please provide information on 
your Company's value added and depreciation components,
1971/72 1972/73 1973/74 1974/75 1975/76 1976/77
Value-added
Depreciation
33) Please supply information in the two tables below which 
have regard to your Company's expenditure on plant and 
machinery for the years specified.
1971/72 1972/73 1973/74 1974/75 1975/76 1976/77
Annual value 
of additions to 
Plant and 
Machinery :
Gross Value of 
Plant and 
Machinery at 
accounting year 
end Î
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34) What percentage of your Company's output went to home 
and export markets for the years specified?
1974/75 1975/76 1976/77
SALES ANALYSIS BY MARKET (%) (%) {%)
Home Sales ;
Export Sales : (Please 
specify major countries)
35) What is the percentage your company allows for the 
depreciation of its plant and machinery?
36) Which type of investment criteria is used by your 
Company?
(i) Payback period
(ii) Discounted Cash flow
(iii) Other (please specify)
37) For the accounting years listed and according to each 
heading please indicate your Company's expenditure
on research and development.
R & D Expenditure 
1974/75 1975/76 1976/77
Improvements of 
existing products
Development of 
new products
Total
38) With regard to your collaboration agreement what 
remittances, if any, have accrued to your Company 
over the past three years in respect of royalties 
and license payments?
1974/75 1975/76 1976/77
Royalties 
License Payments
39) Please attach a list of the number and main types of 
machine tools installed in your factory.
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